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Introduction  
 
 
This PhD thesis intends to evaluate outcomes of different negotiation 
processes aimed at the resolution of intra-and inter states conflicts.  The aim of this 
dissertation is not to provide practical suggestions how to achieve the conclusion of 
the peace accords or to figure out circumstances in which agreements aimed at the 
resolution of conflicts are likely to be sighed. The goal of this dissertation is to create 
and to show the applicability of an innovative theoretical approach for the analysis of 
outcomes of negotiation processes. 
Much of the conflict resolution research investigates the decision of 
conflicting parties to sign peace agreements through the rationality assumption and by 
aggregation of material interests of adversaries. ―The idea seems to be that if parties 
rely solely on logic, both sides can advance their interests and come to a mutually 
acceptable compromise in the event that those interests conflict……Once parties have 
identified their deep-seated concerns and interests, they can make trade-offs and 
concessions and work together to devise creative solutions to their problems.‖1 
Proponents of this approach argue that conflicting parties tend to gather and analyse 
information in accordance with their rational calculations of self-intersect and behave 
in a manner that increases their material benefit. Supporters of rational choice theory 
(RCT) usually pay no attention to ideational factors such as ideas, culture, emotion, 
beliefs and identities and assume that interests of relevant actors are fixed. 
Constructivists, in contrast, seek to investigate nature, formation and transformation 
of interests through the full array of ideational factors that influence behaviour of 
people (such as identities, beliefs, norms, ideas etc.).
2
 Thus, constructivism presents a 
unique opportunity to find the middle ground between theories of international 
relations and social theories.
3
 It provides a possibility to link material factors to 
                                                 
1 Michelle Maiese (2005): ―Limits of Rationality‖, Accessed: 2008 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limits_of_rationality/?nid=6566 
2 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998), Alexander Wendt (1999) 
3 See Andrea Teti (2004): A Role in Search of a Hero: Construction and the Evolution  of Egyptian Foreign Policy, 
1952-67, pp.1-2, Accessed: 2008,  http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/tetiJMS04.pdf 
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ideational ones. The theoretical and empirical sections of this dissertation intend to 
show an example of how that combination of RCT and the constructivists‘ key 
theoretical feature might be achieved.  
Through the application of the mid-level theory derived from a realist 
approach, namely RCT, I will analyse the ways of how material factors (such as 
political, economic and strategic interests) influence the decision of conflicting parties 
to conclude peace agreements.  
Application of this theoretical approach to the analysis of agreements aimed at 
the resolution of conflicts suggests that the decision of conflicting parties to conclude 
an agreement depends on their rational calculations of costs and material benefits. 
Through the application of the constructivist theoretical framework I will 
analyse the ways of how ideational factors influence the decision of conflicting parties 
to conclude peace agreements. 
Application of this theoretical framework to the analysis of agreements aimed 
at the settlement of conflicts suggests that the decision of conflicting parties to sign 
agreements mainly depends on immaterial factors such as culture, ideas, beliefs, 
norms, rules, identities .   
 
1.1 Research Methodology  
 
My research is based on a case study analysis. According to Mitchell a case 
study is ―a detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst 
believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical 
principles‖.4 Thus, case study analysis intents to provide an in-depth examination of 
some complex issues or enhance already received knowledge from previously 
conducted investigations. In my dissertation I will not attempt to produce new data, 
but rather to investigate existing information in new ways in order to add both 
theoretical and empirical strength to the investigated phenomenon.  
                                                 
4 Mitchell (1983), in: Rhee, Y.(2004): ―What is the Case study?‖, pp.72, Accessed: 2010, 
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf 
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Even though authors offer different methods and techniques for conducting case 
study research, it is possible to underline the following most common steps for organising 
this type of investigation: 
 Determination of the research question 
 Determination of type of case study 
 Determination of boundaries 
 Selection criteria of case studies 
 Determination of techniques of analysis 
 Collection and evaluation of the data 
 Composing the findings  
 
1.1.1 The research question 
 
Formulating the research question is the first step for conducting any type of 
research. It helps to outline the scope of the study, the type of research, the techniques 
of analysis as well as to generate a specific assumption.
5
  
Since case studies are usually based on qualitative techniques of data 
gathering, they often answer the questions ―why, ―how‖ and ―who‖.6 Case studies, 
however, ―should not be confused with qualitative research‖.7 They can also include 
some quantitative evidences and, therefore, can be based on questions which intend to 
answer ―what‖ and ―how many‖.8   
My study is based on a few questions which lead to both generating and 
testing the hypothesis. 
 The key question is to answer why conflicting parties after many years of 
uncompromising conflict and non-recognition, decide to accept each other as 
negotiator and to conclude the peace accords. In other words, how it is possible to 
                                                 
5 See ―The Case Study as a Research Method‖, (1997), Accessed: 2010;  
http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm 
6 See ―The Case Study as a Research Method‖, (1997), Accessed: 2010,  
 http://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm; ―Qualitative Research Method‖, Chapter 5, Accessed: 2010, 
pp.102,  http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf 
7 Yin (1994), in: Rhee, Y.(2004): ―What is the Case Study?‖, pp.72, Accessed: 2010, 
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf;  
8 See Rhee, Y.(2004): ―What is the Case Study?‖, pp.72, Accessed:2010,  
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf 
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explain this sudden transformation of their behaviour and perception about each 
other?  
 This question helps me to generate my hypothesis of the applicability of my 
theoretical frame. By reviewing literature on different theoretical paradigms I 
construct the theoretical framework which is based on two approaches, namely 
rational choice and the constructivist theories. In my dissertation I will argue that it is 
the most suitable framework for explaining the decision of the conflicting parties to 
conclude the peace accords. 
Other important research questions of my study are to figure out how RCT and 
the constructivist theoretical framework can explain the decision of the conflicting 
parties to sign the peace agreements and what kind of factors influenced their 
decision. These questions help me to test my hypothesis of the applicability of my 
theoretical approach to real life.     
 
1.1.2 Determination of type of case study 
 
Depending on the nature of research, types of case studies can vary. There are 
single and multiple case studies. They can be illustrative, exploratory, explanatory, 
critical, cumulative etc.
9
  The focus of case studies can vary significantly as well. For 
example it might be a single individual, specific group/groups, a certain 
organisation/organisations or particular event/events.
10
  
My dissertation will be based on multiple case studies. ―A multiple case study 
enables the researcher to explore differences within and between cases. The goal is to 
replicate findings across cases.‖ 11Analysis of a few cases will help me to enhance the 
explanatory scope of my research and to test my theoretical assumptions in a more 
efficient way by supporting it with different evidences derived from the various cases. 
In my dissertations I will analyse the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, the Egypt-
Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the Oslo Accords of 1993.
12
  Above mentioned 
                                                 
9 See Rhee (2004), Davey, Lynn (1991), Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008) 
10 See ―Qualitative research method‖, Chapter 5, Accessed: 2010, pp.102,   
http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf 
11 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): ―Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers‖, pp.548, Accessed: 2010, http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf 
 
12  Below I provide detailed information on selection criteria of my case studies 
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studies will have both the explanatory and cumulative nature at the same time. In the 
table below I describe the typology of my case studies.  
 
 
Type Explanation Goal 
Explanatory An explanatory case study 
is conducted in order to 
make casual studies as well 
as to gain a deep 
understanding of a 
particular phenomenon.
13
 
To provide in-depth 
understanding of the decision of 
conflicting parties to change 
their behaviour and to sign the 
peace accord. 
Cumulative / 
retrospective 
“Cumulative Case Studies 
aggregate information from 
several sites collected at 
different times‖.14 
Cumulative case studies can 
be retrospective i.e. 
gathering data from studies 
in the past.15 
To collect information regarding 
the decision of the conflicting 
parties to sign the peace accords 
from various investigations 
conducted in the past and across 
different disciplines as well as to 
gather evidences that might 
prove or disprove the theoretical 
assumptions applied in my 
dissertation. 
 
1.1.3 Boundaries of research  
 
Identifying boundaries of case studies is important in order to avoid collecting 
information that is not related to initially determined research questions. In other 
                                                 
13 See Zaidah Zainal (2007): ―Case Study as a Research Method‖, pp.3, Accessed: 2010, 
http://eprints.utm.my/8221/1/ZZainal2007-Case_study_as_a_Research.pdf; Winston Tellis (1997): ―Application of a Case Study 
Methodology‖, Accessed: 2010,  http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html; 
14 Lynn Davey (1991): ―The Application of Case Study Evaluations‖, Accessed: 2010, 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=2&n=9 
15 See Lynn Davey (1991): ―The Application of Case Study Evaluations‖,  Accessed: 2010, 
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=2&n=9 
 
 9 
words, boundaries help to ensure that a study does not exceed the initial scope of 
research. 
16
 
―When a case study proposal includes specific propositions it increases the 
likelihood that the researcher will be able to place limits on the scope of the study and 
increase the feasibility of completing the project. The more a study contains specific 
propositions, the more it will stay within feasible limits‖.17 Propositions of my 
research will be based on theoretical assumptions elaborated by proponents of rational 
choice and constructivist theories. In other words, I will conduct my analysis in 
accordance with the key assumptions of above-mentioned theories (See theoretical 
part of my dissertation)   
 
1.1.4 Selection criteria of case studies  
 
During the selection of my case studies I pursued three key goals, namely to 
test the applicability of my analytical frame, to integrate into my analysis the role of 
different immaterial factors and to select case studies which represent some kind of 
phenomenon and are not easy to explain.  
 
 Theory-testing 
 
The most important aim of my empirical part was to test the applicability of 
my innovative theoretical framework by means of completely different case studies. It 
manifested itself in four ways. 
First, the selected case studies allow me to examine the applicability of my 
analytical framework to different types of agreement. The Austrian State Treaty and 
the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty have been aimed at the resolution of inter state 
disagreements, while the Oslo Accords were designed in order to find a solution to an 
intra state conflict.  
                                                 
16 See Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): ―Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and 
Implementation for Novice Researchers, pp. 546-547, Accessed: 2010, http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf 
17 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008): ―Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation 
for Novice Researchers, pp.551, Accessed: 2010, http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf 
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Second, the chosen case studies allow me to investigate the applicability of the 
above mentioned theories to different time frames.  The period of time which passed 
between the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty   
and the Oslo Accords was very large, totalling more than ten years between each 
treaty. To grasp different time periods is especially important for testing assumptions 
of the constructivists‘ theory. Before the end of the Cold War the shortcomings of 
conventional theories ware not yet visible
18
 and, therefore, scholarly interest in ideas-
based theories in general and social constructivism in particular was very low. The 
outcomes of negotiation processes were understood and explained through the 
analysis of material factors alone. Thus, the conclusion of Austrian State Treaty and 
the Egypt-Israeli Peace Agreement present a unique opportunity to show the 
relevance of the analysis constructed in the constructivists spirit during the bipolar 
international system that accompanied the Cold War. 
Third, the selected case studies allow me to investigate the applicability of my 
theoretical framework to a secular philosophy (as the USSR had) and different 
religious beliefs such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Religion can be described as 
a set of beliefs which influence behaviour of human beings. Rituals, traditions, 
institutions, values, perceptions, convictions of a particular society are strongly 
associated with its religious belief. Thus, conflicting parties which exercise diverse 
religious practices perceive the world differently in general and the potential situation 
of changing their relationship from conflict to cooperation in particular. Therefore, the 
above mentioned case studies provide a possibility to broaden the scope of my 
analysis.  
Fourth, the selected case studies allow me to examine the applicability of my 
analytical frame to different forms of government (or regime types) such as 
democracy (Israel), communism (the USSR) and authoritarianism (Egypt). Forms of 
government are associated with a set of political, cultural and social norms which 
constitute as well as regulate the interaction of government with society and shape 
nations' foreign policy course. Thus, the application of rational choice theory and the 
                                                 
18 See K. M. Fierke (2001): ―Critical Methodology and Constructivism‖, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik 
Jorgensen (2001): ―Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation‖, pp.115; Alexander Wendt (1999): ―Social 
Theory of International Politics‖, pp.4 
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constructivist theoretical framework to different types of regime will ultimately 
increase the explanatory power of my innovative framework.  
 
Different immaterial factors 
 
The main focus of a constructivist analysis is immaterial (ideational) factors. 
Supporters of this theory agree with each other that immaterial factors play a crucial 
role in international politics, but they analyse different immaterial factors in their 
attempt to explain processes of social construction or transformation of reality in 
general and certain political outcomes in particular.
19
 Supporters of conventional 
constructivism usually focus on ideas, norms, identities and cultures, while supporters 
of critical constructivism tend to explore the role of speeches, arguments, 
interpretative process and legal reasoning in their analysis of a certain political 
outcome. 
20
 
In order to increase the scope of my theoretical framework the selection of 
case studies was carried out in a way that allows me to evaluate the impact of 
different immaterial factors on conflicting parties‘ decisions to sign peace agreements. 
Thus, in the empirical part of my dissertation I will explore the role of ideas, norms, 
identities, cultural constructs as well as processes of interpretation. By doing so, I will 
have an opportunity to follow not only conventional, but also critical constructivist 
research design. It is also important to note that the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and 
Oslo Accords which concerned the same actor, namely Israel has not been selected 
accidentally. Those case studies present a unique opportunity to investigate the way of 
how different actors (the Labor and the Likud parties) within the same social structure 
perceive and interpret state‘s prominent ―type identities‖ through different lenses.  
 
Complexity of case studies 
 
                                                 
19 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): ―Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics‖, Accessed: 2008, 
http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf 
20 See Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003); Maja Zehfuss ( 2001); Maja Zehfuss ( 2002) 
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It is clear that the utility of my theoretical framework depends to a great extent 
on its applicability to agreements, the conclusion of which was not easy to explain. In 
other words, the relevance of my analysis depends on the complexity of case studies. 
Thus, all selected case studies represent some kind of phenomenon. The most 
puzzling question regarding the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty is how it is 
possible to explain  a sudden change of the USSR‘s official policy course of non- 
evacuation from the seized territory. The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty represent a 
remarkable phenomenon in a sense that Egypt, a creator of the pan-Arabism ideology 
and supporter of the idea to destroy Israel by all available means, became the first 
Arab country which established a direct line of communication with the Jewish state. 
A basic puzzle concerning the Oslo Accords is how it is possible to explain why 
Israel, a far more powerful party in the conflict, agreed to make significant 
concessions in order to achieve the peace treaty with the weak PLO. All those 
questions are open for interpretation and required extensive theoretical explanations. 
 
1.1.5 Techniques of analysis, data collection and 
analyses  
 
The key strength of the case studies method of research is that it allows to 
collect data from multiple sources through the application of different types of 
methods.
21
 My dissertation will be mainly based on qualitative methods of research. 
In same instance, however, I will also apply quantitative technique in order to support 
my qualitative assumption with some numerical data. For example, qualitative dada 
such as annual economic assistance of the United States to Israel and Egypt can 
illustrate material motivation of the conflicting parties to conclude a peace agreement. 
Another case in point can be numerical data with regard to military expenditure of 
Egypt and Israel and its consequent reduction after the conclusion of the peace accord. 
Nevertheless, qualitative method of research is more useful for exploring a 
sudden change in the behaviour of the conflicting parties. It is based on the 
assumptions that there is no single understanding of a reality and that all human 
                                                 
21
 See Rhee, Y.(2004): ―What is the Case study?‖, pp.72, Accessed: 2010, 
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rheey/Rhee_Case%20Study.pdf; Winston Tellis (1997): ―Application of a Case Study 
Methodology‖, Accessed: 2010, http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html 
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beings are unique in their nature.
22
 Thus, it helps to look at a certain phenomenon in 
many different ways. It ―provides information about the ―human‖ side of an issue – 
that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and 
relationships of individuals.‖23 
In my dissertation I will use multiple sources of data. I will collect and 
compare information from books, reports, articles, interviews, official documents as 
well as legal and occasional papers on the above-mentioned theory in general and on 
experiences of conflicting parties in particular. I will also analyse different proposals 
for the resolution of disputes between the conflicting parties, drafts of peace accords 
as well as final versions of those agreements.  
I will compare predicted outcome derived from theoretical assumptions with 
the actual empirical findings. The goal is to see whether or not the data gathered 
across the cases is matching with theoretical assumptions.  
 
1.1.6 Composing the findings  
 
In the organisational term this study will be divided into two parts, a 
theoretical and empirical one.  
The theoretical part will include three chapters. The overall objective of the 
theoretical part is to elaborate and present a consistent and an innovative analytical 
framework on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice 
theory and the constructivist theoretical framework for the analysis of political 
outcomes of different negotiation processes. In this respect, the first chapter will be 
dedicated to the rational choice theory; the second one will address the constructivist 
theoretical framework; the final chapter will show the usefulness of the combination 
of these two theories under the same analytical framework. 
The overall objective of the second, empirical part of my dissertation is to 
show the applicability of my innovative analytical framework to real life. In this 
                                                 
22 
See  ―Qualitative Research Method‖, Chapter 5, pp.86, Accessed: 2010, 
http://www.pathways.cu.edu.eg/subpages/downloads/Research_Chapter_5.pdf  
23 ―Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector‘s Field Guide‖, pp.1, Accessed: 2010,  
http://www.fhi.org/NR/rdonlyres/etl7vogszehu5s4stpzb3tyqlpp7rojv4waq37elpbyei3tgmc4ty6dunbccfzxtaj2rvbaubzmz4f/overvi
ew1.pdf 
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respect, I will investigate the conclusion of three completely different peace 
agreements through the above mentioned theoretical perspectives. The first case study 
will be dedicated the Austrian State Treaty of 1955; the second one to the Egypt-
Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the final one to the Oslo Accords of 1993. 
Each case study will include the following elements:  
 a description of the negotiation process 
 an analysis of disputed issues and a reference to various positions 
that are taken by the conflicting parties during the negotiation process; the 
outcome of the bargaining game;  
 an explanation of the reasoning behind the decision to accept the 
peace accord through the above mentioned theoretical assumptions. 
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Theoretical part 
 
The key aim of the theoretical part of my dissertation is to elaborate and to 
present an analytical framework for the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation 
processes aimed at the resolution of intra-and inter states conflicts. This analytical 
framework will be based on the combination of two theoretical approaches, namely 
rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical framework. 
The theoretical part of this thesis will include three chapters. The first chapter 
will be dedicated to rational choice theory. This theory addresses the full range of 
material factors that influence people‘s motivations, actions and interests. The second 
chapter will be dedicated to the constructivist theoretical framework. This theory 
addresses a full array of ideational factors that shape perceptions, views and 
behaviours of individuals. The final chapter will analyse the usefulness of the 
combination of these two theoretical perspectives under the same analytical 
framework. 
The main aim of the first two chapters is to present an overview, key 
assumptions as well as main shortcomings of these two theoretical approaches in 
order to discuss how the combination of these perspectives investigate the relationship 
between material and ideational factors in general and the decision of conflicting 
parties to sign peace agreement in particular. The final chapter will have two aims. 
The first aim is to prove that rational choice and the constructivist theories are 
compatible with each other. The second goal is to explain why from all other theories 
of international relations, I decided to select these two theories as the most suitable for 
the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes.  
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1.2 Rational Choice Theory 
 
1.2.1 Introduction to RCT 
 
This chapter will be divided into three parts. In the first part, I will briefly 
highlight core assumptions of rational choice theory. In the second part, I will 
underline key critiques against the applications of rational choice theory in political 
science as well as in international relations. In the third part, I will try to 
demonstrate that critiques of RCT are not relevant for the purpose of my analysis. 
The key aim of this chapter is to address critiques of rational choice theory 
in order to be to apply rational choice theory to the analysis of outcomes of peace 
accords as well as to show that this theoretical framework can be supplemented 
with other theories in general and with the constructivist theory in particular.  
 
1.2.2 RCT and its key assumptions  
 
Rational choice theory is a very famous theoretical framework in the field of 
international relations. It is a theoretic perspective that explains both the behaviour of 
human beings and the outcomes of their actions i.e. ways of how people create and 
transform a certain social structure in which they interact with each other.  
Rational choice approach is more than just one theory. It encompasses many 
different theories that attempt to explain behaviour of people.
24
 Thus, its scope is 
very broad and there are many variants of rational choice theory which enjoy a 
wide usage in different fields of science such as anthropology, sociology, 
economics and political science.
25
 
                                                 
24 See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): ―The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory‖, pp.101, Accessed: 2008,  
http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rrct-ii.pdf; Steven L. Green (2002): ―Rational Choice Theory:  An Overview‖ , pp.2, 
Accessed: 2008, http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc 
25 See Sociology 319 (2003): ―Rational Choice Theory (RCT)‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/319m703.htm; Steven L. Green (2002): ―Rational Choice Theory:  An Overview‖ , pp.2, Accessed: 
2008, http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc 
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Some researchers study voting paradox, others focus on markets, others 
analyse ―ethnic minority relations‖, others investigate problems of collective 
actions and social norms etc.
26
 
Nevertheless, despite of different focuses and various influences on rational 
choice theory, it is possible to underline three key assumptions recognised by all 
forms of rational choose theory.  
Firstly, the rational choose theory is committed to a methodological 
individualism. According to this approach, outcome produced by joint behaviour of 
people and social developments can be explained by aggregation of individual 
actions. 
27
 
The focus on the individual distinguishes rational choice approach from all 
forms of theories that based on holistic approach. The main idea of holism is that 
reality can be understood through the analysis of the whole social system rather 
than by investigating the sum of the parts of the structure. Supporters of the 
methodological individualism, in contrast, believe that features of social life in 
general and political outcomes in particular can be understood through the analysis 
of separate individual actions. 
Secondly, all forms of this theoretical perspective are rooted in the 
assumption of human instrumental rationality and concerns over maximization of 
personal benefits.
28
  
 According to rational choice theory, human beings are rational actors of the 
international system and all their actions are ‗rational‘ in character. ―Actions of 
individuals are optimally chosen given the preferences of the individual and given 
the opportunities or constraints the individual faces.‖29 Thus, people try to act in a 
way that would help them to achieve the greatest level of satisfaction.  
                                                 
26
 See John Scott (2000): ―Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present‖, 
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 ―As it is not possible for individuals to achieve all of the various things that 
they want, they must also make choices in relation to both their goals and the means 
for attaining these goals.
‖30 
Thus, people tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action before 
deciding how to perform.
31
 
Thirdly, rational choice theory assumes that individuals are fully concerned 
with his or her own benefit.
32
 It is however necessary to note that even though this 
theoretical framework is based on the notation that individuals tend to maximize 
expected utility, it realizes that utility is a very subjective concept and, therefore, it 
can be considered differently by different people.
33
 Thus, researchers must take into 
consideration personal characteristics of individuals. Some people can be 
characterised as loss-minimizers while others as gain-maximizers. Some 
individuals can be described as risk-prone while others as risk-averse.  
 
1.2.3 Critique of rational choice theory 
 
In recent years, a greater number of researchers have tried to apply key 
assumptions derived from rational choice theory to politics. However, the attempt 
to apply economic variables to political science brought a lot of discussions about 
the utility of the application of rational choice theory in the field of political 
science.
34
 
 It is possible to underline three main arguments against application of the 
rational choice theory in political science as well as in international relations that 
come about from the nature of this theory. The first argument arises from the 
concept of human rationality and the notation of self-interest.
35
 The second 
argument stems from the idea that rational choice theory has limited explanatory 
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power because it does not take into account the issue of micro-macro link and 
devotes little attention to different time periods, cultural as well as ideational 
factors.
36
 The final argument is the assumption that rational choice theory suffers 
from various methodological mistakes.
37
  
 
1.2.3.1 The rationality postulate 
 
The first argument against the applicability of rational choice theory in 
political science arises from the concept of human rationality and the notation of 
self-interest.
38
  
Critics argue that rational choice theorists can hardly predict peoples‘ 
behaviour because actions of relevant decision- makers are not always fully rational. 
Supporters of this opinion believe that people‘s decisions depend on cultural and 
psychological influences as well as on institutional constraints.
39
   
They claim that rational choice theory obviously faces obstacles in 
explaining issues related to altruism, reciprocity, trust and such problems as 
collective action, social norms and voting paradox.  
The problem of collective action refers to the question of how it is possible 
to explain why people agree to participate in various types of joint action such as 
engaging in different kinds of protests, participating in elections, taking part in 
strikes, joining different organisations, associations and unions. Why should people 
ever agree to do something that is not likely to bring them material benefit? Why 
should individuals agree to join and to support certain organisations when they can 
enjoy all advantages provided by them, without becoming members of those 
organisations?
40
   
Critics argue that the fact that people do participate in protests or become a 
member of organisations contradicts the core assumption of the rational choice 
theory.  
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37 See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994) 
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One possible response to this critique is an explanation that people take part 
in a joint action due to their ―collective interest‖. However, ―in groups with larger 
membership, such as labour union and business lobbies, the contribution of each 
member to the achievement of collective goals is negligible, so the potential 
members‘ interests would better be served by free riding on others‘ contributions 
than by making pointless sacrifices for the collective benefit.‖41 Thus, the question 
why would any rational person deicide to contribute to the collective action in 
terms of time, physical effort or economic resources if  she or he could not with 
certainty influence its result, remains open for the consideration.   
Mancur Olson attempted to address this question by arguing that collective 
actions is undertaken due to ―selective initiatives‖ such as compulsory membership 
or different kind of services provided to the members of an organisation. It is 
however important to notice that some organisations or associations do not provide 
―selective initiatives‖ to its members, but still manage to attract people to join and 
support them.
42
 Thus, the problem of collective action remains unresolved. 
Likewise, the similar problem of voting paradox refers to the question of 
why individuals decide to participate in elections despite its relatively high cost in 
terms of time. ―In a large election, it is highly unlikely that any single voter will 
cast the decisive ballot; therefore, for a rational maximizer to invest any resources 
in voting, such as time, would be irrational‖43  Many defenders of the rational 
choice theory tried to address this issue. For example some researchers argue that 
this paradox can be explained by the fact that people often value to high the 
benefits of their participation in election, while other believe that majority of 
citizens go to the polls due to their civic responsibilities. However, despite of 
various efforts to find an answer to this paradox, theorists do not share a common 
opinion with regard to the problem of voter turnout. 
44
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The related problem of social norms refers to the question of how it is 
possible to explain people‘s voluntary decision to comply with social norms and 
rules that do not entail them some personal benefit.
45
  
To sum up, according to critics‘ view, problems of collective action, social 
norms, voting paradox undermine the assumption of rationality. Thus, according to 
this point of view, application of the rational choice model to the analysis of 
conflicting parties to conclude or to withdraw from agreement might produce a 
poor empirical support.  
 
1.2.3.2 Problem of limited explanatory power of RCT 
 
The second serious argument against the use of the rational choice theory in 
political science as well as in related disciplines stem from the idea that  proponents 
of this theoretical approach try to explain a wide array of social as well as political 
phenomena without taking into account the social system and by analysing 
economic factors alone. As a result, they fail to explain the whole complexity of 
social life. 
46
 
It is possible to underline three main issues which can be referred to the 
problem of a limited explanatory problem of rational choice theory. Among these 
issues: the question of methodological individualism, the role of time as well as 
cultural and ideational factors in rational choice theory. 
 
  The question of methodological individualism  
 
An important critique against the application of the rational choice theory in 
political science as well as in international relations is derived from the 
commitment of the rational choice theory to the position of a methodological 
individualism.
47
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The main idea of this position is that all explanations of an analysed 
phenomenon must be explained through the aggregation of individual behaviour 
without taking into consideration the existence of structure and its relationship to 
agents. ―Social structures either are absent or have a subordinate place as market 
imperfections that must be explained through individual behaviour‖48.  
Critics however argue that structure is a very important element that should 
be incorporated in any theoretical framework aimed at explaining human 
behaviour.  They claim that it is very hard at best and impossible at worst to explain 
any kind of individual decision making without reference to structure. 
 
The role of time in rational choice theory  
 
The question of the role of time in rational choice theory refers to the 
critics‘ argument that advocates of rational choice theory do not pay enough 
attention to such an important aspect as time.
49
 This problem manifests itself in two 
ways. 
Firstly, rational choice theorists assume that different tenses (past, present 
and future) are autonomous from each other. Thus, they tend to conduct their 
analysis under static conditions, namely by assuming that agents‘ preferences and 
constraints to which people are exposed remain unchanged during the past, present 
and future. 
50
 
―Many rational choice scholars simply assume preferences and constraints 
as unproblematically given, and they unrealistically pretend that social processes 
are in equilibrium or, at least, always move swiftly towards them after an external 
upheaval is introduced.‖51 Since preferences and constraints can vary at different 
time periods, critics argue that rational choice theorists are not always capable to 
provide a proper explanation regarding behaviour and interaction of human beings 
at present.  
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Secondly, rational choice theorists do not take a proper account for a longer 
time period because in their analysis time is not dynamic. As a result, critics argue 
that rational choice theorists can not provide successful predictions of individuals‘ 
actions and their outcome in the future. ―Good sociological theories should not only 
allow us to explain (or understand) a given outcome at present with reference to the 
closed past, but also help us to predict outcomes in an uncertain future with 
reference to the known past and present conditions.‖52 This problem, however, is 
beyond my analysis because the aim of my dissertation is not to predict behaviour 
of conflicting parties in the future but to explain their decision to conclude 
agreements ex past facto.  For the purpose of my study I will need to take the issue 
of time into account only as a tool for explaining an outcome at past. Thus, critics‘ 
argument that rational choice approach is incapable to predict outcomes in an 
uncertain future is deemed irrelevant for my analysis. 
 
The role of cultural and ideational factors in rational choice theory  
 
The question of the role of cultural and ideational factors in social theory 
refers to critics‘ argument that rational choice theory is unable to explain a wide 
range of political phenomena because it focuses exclusively on the descriptions of 
economic features of social life.
53
  
Proponents of this view criticize rational choice theorists for measuring 
actors‘ preferences in a genuine economic term without taking into consideration 
psychological, sociological, ideational and cultural factors. They argue that 
people‘s behaviour are not only shaped by economic calculation of costs and 
benefits but also depends on their ideas, beliefs, feelings, identities, values and 
emotions.  
Thus, supporters of this opinion would probably argue that decision of 
conflicting parties to conclude agreements depends not only on economic factors 
but also on their ideas, beliefs, emotions etc.  
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1.2.3.3 Methodological problem of the RCT 
The fourth argument against the applications of rational choice theory in 
political science rooted in researches attempt to produce ―a universal theory of 
politics‖ and the use of method -driven approach to research.54  
In the book ―Pathologies of Rational Choice theory‖ Donald Green and Ian 
Shapiro argue that rational choice theory suffers from a verity of methodological 
mistakes. ―Empirical progress has been retarded by what may be termed method-
driven, as opposed to problem-solving, research. Rather than ask ―What causes X?‖ 
method driven research begins with the question ―How might my preferred 
theoretical or methodological approach account for X?‖55 As a result, according to 
the authors‘ opinion, rational choice theory provides little assets for understanding 
politics. 
Green and Shapiro underlined in their book six main methodological 
problems of this theoretical perspective that arise at different stages of research. 
There are the following: 
 
Post hoc theory development 
 
Under the problem of ―post hoc theory development‖ Green and Shapiro 
understand the practice of constructing a rational choice model that matches to the 
already known empirical data. According to authors this procedure precludes 
researchers from testing their assumption in a proper way.  ―Post hoc theories are 
not only tested inadequately, the manner in which they are developed tends to be in 
tension with the enterprise of empirical testing.‖56 ―Ad hoc theory amendments‖ 
make the theory‘s assumptions hard to check. 
 
Formulating test 
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Donald Green and Ian Shapiro underline two key methodological failings 
that take place during formulating tests. There are ―slippery‖ and ―vaguely 
operationalized‖ predictions.  
The ―slippery‖ predictions mean that the rational choice explanations 
usually include a wide range of unobservable terms that are immeasurable or very 
difficult to measure. Green and Shapiro argue that the high ratio of unobservable 
over observable terms generate a testability problem.
57
  
Under these circumstances, rational choice scholars can always claim that 
any received empirical outcome confirms a theory.  ―When any hypothesis fails, the 
researcher is always in a position to argue that a successful prediction was thwarted 
by an offsetting tendency or temporary aberration.‖58 Thus, it becomes very hard to 
falsify rational choice assumptions. 
The ―vaguely operationalized predictions‖ refer to the procedure of shifting 
from ―point predictions‖ to ―marginal predictions‖. The former means predictions 
of outcomes under static circumstances, while the latter indicates predictions of 
results that are affected by changing conditions such as alternation in aims, beliefs 
or environmental restriction. Authors argue that when ―point predictions‖ fail, 
rational choice theorists are moving to ―marginal predictions‖, and vice versa. ―It is 
logically possible that only one sort of prediction will survive empirical testing, but 
availability of two standards of evaluation affords defenders of a model more 
opportunity to claim support for its predictions.‖59As a result, it becomes easy to 
confirm the theory and very hard to prove the failure of rational choice approach. 
 
Selecting and interpreting evidence 
 
Green and Shapiro underline three pathologies that occur during selection 
and interpretation of evidence. 
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First, Green and Shapiro argue that rational choice scholars are looking only 
for confirming instances while neglecting disconfirming evidence. As a result, 
rational choice theorists illustrate rather than test their hypotheses.
60
 
Second, Green and Shapiro claim that rational choice researchers employ 
the practice of ―projecting‖ evidence from their theory. According to authors view, 
theorists either argue that a particular fact proves the accuracy of theory without 
providing a full explanation of the fact or simply claim that a certain data is 
consistent with RCT.  One case in point is the assumption that bad weather 
decreases voter turnout.
61
 
Finally, Green and Shapiro write that rational choice theory suffers from the 
problem of ―arbitrary domain restriction‖. Specifically, theorists tend to conduct 
their analysis in domains where theory is likely to work and withdraw from areas 
which they can not explain. Authors argue that this practice encourage rational 
choice researchers to look for supporting evidence, while neglecting illustrations 
that are not possible to verify. Consequently, the practice of selecting confirming 
instances places some difficulties on testing the theory. ―If the appropriate domain 
within which a theory is to be tested is defined by reference to whether the theory 
works in that domain, testing becomes pointless.‖62 
According to Green and Shapiro, above-mentioned methodological 
problems preclude rational choice researchers from formulating empirically testable 
assumptions or from examining their notations in an accurate way. As a 
consequence, rational choice hypotheses are poorly tested and hard to disprove.   
 
1.2.4  Response to critique 
 
Critics argue that the methodological errors as well as problems rooted in 
the rationality postulate and questions related to a limited explanatory power of 
rational choice theory are serious shortcomings of this approach. The adequacy of 
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the application of rational choice theory to the study of outcomes of peace 
agreements requires me to provide an adequate response to critiques directed 
against the applicability of this theoretical approach. In order to be able to 
accomplish this task I will devote my attention to the arguments elaborated by 
supporters of the rational choice theory. There are Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004), 
Jeffery Fridman (1996), Dennis Chong (1996), Deniel Diemeier (1996), Norman 
Schofield (1996) 
 
1.2.4.1 Response to problems rooted in the rationality 
postulate 
 
Much of the criticism of rational choice theory is based on the assumption 
that the rationality hypothesis is not consistent with a wide variety of actors‘ 
actions.
63
 Stephen L. Quackenbush claims that this criticism is derived from two 
significant confusions and, therefore, is deemed irrelevant. 
The first confusion arises from the attempt to equate this theoretical 
framework with economic factors. This misunderstanding often occurs because the 
rational choice theory was first used in economics and many advocates of this 
theoretical approach in political science applied economic variables to analyze 
behaviour of individuals. They mostly concentrated on actors‘ preferences. The 
realisation of the fact that economic as well as political behaviour can not be 
understood without analysing beliefs of individuals and the way they construct their 
beliefs about environment and other individuals, facilitated the evolution of this 
theoretical approach. Through the process of the evolution rational choice theory 
was forced to develop more complex notation of rationality, to increase its 
emphasis on beliefs and institutions.  It moved beyond the economic domain to 
integrate into its analysis assumptions elaborated by psychologists, sociologists and 
other social scientists 
64
 
                                                 
63 See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): ―The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory‖, pp.87, Accessed: 2008,  
http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rrct-ii.pdf  
64 See Norman Schofield (1996): ―Rational Choice and Political Economy‖ in: Jeffrey Friedman (1996): ―The 
Rational Choice Controversy. Economic Models for Politics Reconstructed‖, pp.190-193 
 28 
Thus, it is wrong to think that all motivations of rational individuals can be 
limited to their attempt to maximize economic benefits.  ―Demonstrating that 
people do not choose according to economic preferences does not demonstrate that 
they do not choose rationally; it only means that they are not solely motivated by 
economic gain.‖65 
The second related confusion occurs from a basic failure to distinguish 
correctly two different concepts of rationality, namely procedural and instrumental. 
Under procedural rationality, ―actors are said to make a cool and clearheaded ends-
means calculation.‖66 Under instrumental rationality, actors perform according to 
their preferences. In contrast to procedural rationality, it does not form any opinion 
regarding preferences. ―Instrumental rationality is only concerned whether people 
act in accordance with their motivations, regardless of what these motivations may 
be.‖67 Thus, according to the instrumental rationality assumption, a self-interested 
actor is one that pursues his or her own interest, regardless of whether these 
interests are reasonable in the common sense or not.  Since the rational choice 
theory is based on the concept of instrumental rationality, it is consistent with a 
broad range of motivations and behaviours of human beings.
68
  
Thus, in this sense people who participate in joint actions, go to polls, obey 
social norms or commit suicide are just as rational as these individuals who do not 
perform or commit above listed activities. In other words, I believe that problems of 
collective action, social norms and voting paradox do not contradict the 
instrumental rationality postulate in general and the rational choice theory in 
particular .   
Moreover, it is also important to notice that many scientists, who focus on 
problems derived from the concept of rationality, do not take into account the fact 
that the this postulate can not be tested in a proper way. It is, however, wrong to 
give up any key parts of a theory that can not be tested in a significant way. Instead 
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of dropping central features of any theoretical framework, such as rationality 
premise, it is always possible to adapt it to troubling observed phenomena. 
69
 
 
1.2.4.2 Response to the problem of a limited 
explanatory power of RCT 
 
As I demonstrated below, rational choice theory is based on the assumption 
of ―instrumental rationality‖.70 These facts enable me to address the problem of a 
limited explanatory power of this theory.  
There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first solution is to 
broaden the scope of rational choice theory by incorporating into this theoretical 
framework social factors that are relevant for my study. The second solution is to 
admit that this theoretical framework indeed has a limited explanatory power and to 
supplement it with other theories. Below I consider the appropriateness of these two 
ways of addressing the problem.  
As I showed in a previous section, rational choice theory has undergone the 
process of the evolution. Therefore, its domain has been already enlarged to some 
extent. In early research under rational choice design, scientists typically assumed 
that preferences and restrictions are given and that individuals are completely aware 
about all possible outcomes of their actions. Not surprisingly they have not been 
very successful in predicting actors‘ behaviour in general and under the situation of 
strong uncertainly in particular.
71
 
 However, as rational choice theory has evolved, it has been obliged to 
acknowledge the importance of social factors. It has been forced to incorporate in 
its framework the study of beliefs and to capture to some degree important effects 
of the cultural environment on people calculations of costs and material benefits of 
any action. For example, the attempt to enlarge the scope of the theory from 
economics to political economy has pushed rational choice scholars to increase its 
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emphasis on human beliefs and to admit that institutions help to resolve key 
problems of human interaction. It became clear that the question why people agree 
to pay for the production of public goods such as national defence, infrastructure 
and domestic security can only be explained by analysing both people‘s 
institutionally stimulated preferences and beliefs about other people willingness to 
spend their money on public goods. 
However, still, the dominant tendency of rational choice approach is to 
consider time as a neutral factor without taking into consideration the past and both 
medium and more extended time horizons.
72
 Moreover, although most of rational 
choice theorists in our days do not ignore ideational factors, they treat them as 
secondary important. These variables in their analysis have no independent 
explanatory power. Actors use them strategically, like any other resource in their 
disposal order to enhance their own material interests.  Thus, despite the evolution 
of rational choice theory, it is not possible to incorporate all kinds of factors that 
help to evaluate the result of different negotiation processes aimed at the resolution 
of conflicts into this theoretical framework without undermining its initial 
conditions.  
Thus, in order to avoid this problem it is necessary to supplement the 
rational choice framework by other theoretical approaches. Is it however possible to 
add some additional theoretical assumptions without undermining initial conditions 
of rational choice approach? As I demonstrated below, rational choice theory is 
based on the concept of instrumental rationality and, therefore, it is fully consistent 
with a broad range of people‘s motivations and behaviours.73 Thus, it is possible to 
draw on insights from other theoretical approaches without undermining its key 
assumptions. 
 In my dissertation, I will supplement rational choice theory by the 
constructivist approach because it has three important features which are relevant 
for my study.  
First, it seeks to grasp the full array of ideational factors that shape actor‘s 
attitude and behaviour (such as identities, beliefs and ideas). Second, it provides an 
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understanding of micro-macro relationship. Third, it takes into account different 
time periods and investigates social processes of transformation. 
In the section aimed at the constructivist theoretical approach I will consider 
the above mentioned issues in a more detailed way.  
To sum up, in the in the course of the evolution, rational choice theory has 
increased its explanatory power to some extent. It, however, can not cover the 
whole diversity of social factors that are crucial for my study. Nevertheless it is 
possible to supplement the rational choice approach by the constructivist theory 
without undermining its key assumptions. Thus, ideational factors, the macro-micro 
links and the issue of time will be analysed through the latter theoretical 
framework.  
 
1.2.4.3 Response to methodological problems 
 
 Above I underlined Donald Green and Ian Shapiro list‘s of six 
methodological pathologies of rational choice theory. Authors argue that these 
shortcomings reduce the explanatory power of the theory.  I, however, disagree 
with their view due to two main reasons.  
The first reason is that rational choice is not one theory. Rational choice 
theory is a ―descriptive phrase‖ that is served to describe different theories of 
international relations such as power theory, transition theory, conflict theories 
etc.
74
  
Green and Shapiro write that through so-called pathologies researchers 
make rational choice theory hard to check. ―They characterize rational choice 
theory as bordering on nonfalsifiability because when one rational choice theory is 
―falsified‖ another is created to explain the disconfirming evidence.‖75 This would 
only be an obstacle to research if rational choice theory were one theory. Since, 
                                                 
74
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however, it is not a case, it is impossible to falsify rational choice theory. Thus, this 
critique has no strength.
76
 
The second reason is that I believe that so-called pathologies do not produce 
problems in most domains of research in general and in my area of study in 
particular. Moreover some of them fulfil a variety of useful purposes in the 
research.
77
 Therefore, most of pathologies are necessary tools for evaluating 
decisions of conflicting parties to conclude peace accords.  
 
  Post hoc theory development pro-arguments 
 
Green and Shapiro criticised rational choice researchers for adjusting their 
theories to the troubling phenomenon. They underlined two possible ways of doing 
this. The first one is ―arbitrary domain restriction‖. It is an explicit way of 
modification that is achieved by means of concentrating on domains where theory 
is likely to work and withdrawing from areas where it does not work. The second 
one is ―post hoc theory development‖. It is an implicit way of modification that is 
realized by broadening the definition of rationality to include insights from other 
disciplines. 
78
 
Both the ―arbitrary domain restriction‖ and the ―post hoc theory 
development‖ are common methods applied by researchers in order to avoid 
irrelevance of their theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the practice of ―post hoc 
theory development‖ is more suitable for my area of study due to below mentioned 
two reasons. 
The first reason is that rational choice theory is based on the concept of 
instrumental rationality and, therefore, it is consisted with a broad range of 
motivations and behaviours.
79
 Thus, it is almost always possible to adopt rational 
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choice theory to troubling observed phenomena by supplementing it by other 
theories.  
The second reason is that the goal of my dissertation is not to test a theory 
against its key assumptions. The aim of my research is to understand to what extent 
rational choice theory provides explanations regarding the outcomes of peace 
accords and how it can contribute to my analysis.  
Since the practice of ―post hoc theory development‖ is used in order to 
incorporate empirical observations into theory,
80
 it is a very useful tool at my 
disposal which would improve the explanatory power of rational choice theory.    
―Post hoc theorizing should be applauded by those interested in the 
empirical merit of rational choice theory –since post hoc amendments are designed 
to incorporate empirical finding into theory. Only if one‘s aim is to test a theory 
against its prepositions will one object to post hoc theory explanations-since such 
amendments make the theory‘s predications unfalsifiable.‖ 81 
Thus, the practice of ―post hoc theory development‖ is sometimes a very 
useful method of research.  Many scientists believe that it is a very helpful tool of 
conducting investigations. For example both Dennis Chong and Daniel Diermeier 
write that ―post hoc theory development‖ is a very important feature of research. In 
order to prove this view they show that successful empirical theories such as the 
evolutionary theory and Newtonian physics used this tool. ―By definition, ad hoc 
modification increases the empirical power of a theory and therefore is a 
progressive development‖.82 
 
Practice of searching for confirming evidence – pro-arguments  
 
I believe that the practice of searching for confirming instances is an 
important tool at my disposal that will help me to explain the behaviour of 
conflicting parties.  
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 As I already pointed out, the aim of my research is not to provide solutions 
or to predict circumstances in which conflicts are likely to be resolved. My goal is 
to analyze and explain complex phenomena without producing explicit predictions 
and exact policy proposals. ―If the task of empirical research is to see whether, and 
to what extent, a theory explains a particular slice of reality rather than to see 
whether reality falsifies a theory, positive evidence will be even more valuable than 
the negative kind.‖83 
Moreover, I disagree with an opinion that rational choice researchers are 
only looking for confirming data, while neglecting disconfirming evidence. The key 
concern of rational choice theory is often the questions that are very difficult to 
resolve (such as voting paradox). It shows that researchers do not ignore 
discomforting evidence. Furthermore, explanatory success of a theory depends not 
only on its power to explain complex phenomena but also on its ability to pose an 
exact question of what has to be explained. Since rational choice researchers often 
return to difficult issues and reformulate questions that have to be asked, they 
sometimes increase the explanatory power of a theory by changing the question of 
research. For example, rational choice researchers addressed the question of voting 
in ways it had not been considered in previous theories. They changed the focus of 
analysis by trying to explain voting rather than non-voting.  Consequently, they did 
not only contribute to research by changing the theoretical focus but also enhanced 
the explanatory strength of rational choice theory.
84
 
 
The “slippery” predictions pro-arguments 
 
Green and Shapiro argue that the high ratio of unobservable over observable 
terms generates a testability problem and, therefore, causes a serious challenge to 
rational choice theory.
85
 I however disagree with this opinion because of the 
following two reasons: firstly, rational choice theory contains only two 
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unobservable terms, namely ideas and preferences.
86
  Thus, the ratio of 
immeasurable over measurable variables is not very high. Secondly, many 
successful theories contain unobservable terms. Among them are general 
equilibrium theory, macroeconomics, Newtonian physic etc.
87
 The presence of 
unobservable terms is not only unavoidable for above mentioned theories but also 
crucial for their success. Such terms help to avoid generalisations, enlarge the 
content of a theory and facilitate the developments of new prognoses. ―Since 
theoretical terms (i.e. unobservable terms) are not only unavoidable, but fulfil a 
variety of useful purposes, such as allowing comparative statistics analysis, 
prohibiting theories contain theoretical terms would thus not only eliminate all 
empirical science since Archimedes, but also restrict political science to 
theoretically trivial generalisation of particular data sets.‖88 
 
1.3 The constructivist theoretical framework 
1.3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter of my dissertation will be dedicated to the content and the 
applicability of the constructivist theoretical approach for the study of outcomes of 
peace agreements. This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will be 
dedicated to reasons why this theoretical approach became popular in international 
relations and to the description of its key types. In the second part I will address 
three key assumptions of constructivism. The first assumption is that reality is 
socially constructed.
89
 The second feature is that agent and structure have a 
―mutually constituted‖ nature.90 The final assumption is that ideational (immaterial) 
factors matter in world politics.
91
I will show that depending on types of analysis, 
constructivists proceed differently with these above mentioned assumptions in their 
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research. Therefore, it is very hard to underline general critique directed against this 
theoretical approach.  
The key goal of this chapter is to show the ways of how I will apply key 
assumptions of the constructivist theoretical framework to my case studies. Another 
major aim of this chapter is to prove that constructivism can be supplemented with 
rational choice approach.  
.  
1.3.2  Rise of constructivism in IR and its types 
 
Constructivists study a socialisation process by which human beings obtain 
knowledge from their life experience. It attempts to provide an explanation regarding 
social construction and transformation of the reality. Unlike other theories of 
international relations such as realism and liberalism, constructivism is not a theory.
92
 
It is also not a homogenous approach to world politics that can produce a single set of 
assumptions. Although constructivism based on a greater amount of different 
disciplines, it has no direct roots in international relation theory.  
In political science in general and in the international relations in particular, 
constructivism addresses various issues such as construction of identities, the role of 
norms, beliefs and ideas in world politics, the effect of culture on human beings, the 
power of international organizations and NGOs, the question of the structure and 
actor etc. 
After the end of the Cold War the interest of researches in the constructivist 
theory has grown dramatically because the shortcomings of international relations 
theories became more visible. The main analytical approaches of international 
relations, neorealism and neoliberalism not only failed to predict the end of the Cold 
War and the break up of the Soviet Union but also had no adequate explanations with 
regard to these events.
93
 ―In the 1990s, traditional ―positivists‖ approaches in the field 
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began to lose the high ground, faced with their failure to account for the end of the 
Cold War or dramatic changes taking place in the world of international politics.‖94   
In contrast to international relations theories, constructivists offer better tools 
for explaining the sudden change in Soviet foreign policy and end of the Cold War by 
incorporating in their analytical framework the role of identities, beliefs, regulative 
and constitutive norms. According to the constructivist school, the ideas produced by 
Gorbachev‘s New Thinking facilitated a fundamental modification of Soviet Union 
foreign and domestic policy priorities. Soviets‘ changing beliefs about the Cold War 
produced not only new norms of security but also changed the reality. ―Gorbachev‘s 
New Thinking was a deep, conceptual reassessment of what the US-Soviet 
relationship ‗was.‘ . . . It may be that objective conditions were such that the Soviets 
‗had‘ to change their ideas about the Cold War but that does not change the fact that 
in an important sense those ideas were the Cold War, and as such changing them by 
definition changed the reality.‖95 
Nevertheless, despite the growing popularity of constructivism after the end of 
the Cold War, it is impossible to provide an exact description of it.  There is no agreed 
definition of constructivism because it is more than just one theory per se.
96
 
Constructivism encompasses a broad range of different theories that aim to address 
the question of people‘s behaviour by emphasising the social nature of international 
relations. 
Like rational choice theory, constructivist theoretical framework is applied to 
different fields of science such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, political 
science and international relations. ―Constructivism has a prominent presence in 
several disciplines, including sociology (Alfred Schütz (1967), Berger and Lukman 
(1966), Giddens (1984), Luhmann (1997), and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), 
history (Hayden White (1987)), psychology (Jean Piaget) and anthropology (Benedict 
Anderson (1983)).
97
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Since there are many different types of constructivism, it is very hard to 
distinguish its key variants. Nevertheless, it is possible to name three main tapes of 
constructivist approaches to the study of international relations. There are 
conventional and critical/radical variants. 
Conventional constructivism is most closely associated with Alexander 
Wendt, Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Ted Hopf, John Ruggie, Kathryn 
Sikkink and Peter Katzenstein. This type of constructivism is dominant in the US and 
very much recognized in the field of international relations.
98
 Key interests of 
conventional constructivism lie in examination of the role of norms, ideas, beliefs and 
identities in shaping political outcomes. It attempts to build a bridge between diverse 
theoretical perspectives of international relations.
99
 
Critical/radical constructivism enjoys a wide usage in Europe
100
 and has to be 
identified with such famous author as  Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, Richard 
Ashley, whose intellectual assumptions are rooted in critical social theory, which was 
partly elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Jugen Habermas.
101
 Nicholas Onuf was the 
first researcher, who introduced the term constructivism to IR in 1989. With the book 
―World of Our Making‖, he presented the first variant of this theoretical approach to 
international relations. However, the significance of this event received little attention 
on the part of international community. Constructivism became a popular theoretical 
approach only after Alexander Wendt has published in 1992 the article ―Anarchy Is 
What States Make of It‖.102  
Many advocates of critical/radical constructivists stress the importance of 
power and consider language as a key feature of the creation of reality. Since many of 
them use linguistic approaches in their research, proponents of this type of constructivism 
put a great emphasis on language and discourse in their analysis of political 
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outcomes.
103
 For example, Nicholas Onuf was greatly influenced by the later 
Wittgenstein‘s view that ―the limits of my language are the limits of my world.‖104  
The key aspect that distinguishes conventional from critical constructivism is 
their different attitude towards language. The latter criticise conventional 
constructivists for not taking seriously into consideration the nature and the role of 
language.
105
 
Although in my dissertation I will mostly refer to the assumptions elaborated 
by advocates of conventional constructivism, in some case studies I will employ a 
number of ideas expressed by supporters of critical/radical constructivism as well.  
 
1.3.3 Key features of constructivism 
 
Despite of different variants, focuses and various influences on constructivism, 
it is possible to spell out three key assumptions recognised by all forms of 
constructivism. There are the following: 
 
 First, it is mutually recognised among constructivists that reality is 
socially constructed and not static.
106
  
 Second, advocates of different forms of constructivism attempt to 
resolve the agent-structure problem by assuming that they are 
―mutually constituted‖ elements as a starting point of analysis.107  
 Third, constructivists agree with each other that ideational (immaterial) 
factors provide meaning to material ones.
108
 Therefore, they are crucial 
in determining political outcomes and explaining human action.  
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1.3.3.1 The social construction of reality  
 
Constructivists argue that reality is socially constructed and can change over 
time. ―At the heart of constructivist theory is the idea that significant aspects of 
international relations are socially constructed, that is, historically contingent rather 
than necessary consequences of the nature of international politics.‖109 
According to constructivism philosophy, the social world is constructed by 
ideational rather than material factors.
110
 A key goal of constructivism is to 
understand the processes in which individuals and different groups participate in the 
creation of their reality. They try to figure out the ways of how the process of social 
construction takes place at both national and international level. 
The term ―social construction‖ was first mentioned by Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann in their famous book ―The Social Construction of Reality‖, 
published in 1966. Since then, this term became a key feature of constructivist 
theoretical framework. 
 The central argument of this book is that everyone in society participates in 
the process of construction of reality and that the ―sociology of knowledge‖ must 
analyze the processes in which this takes place. It must examine the ways of how 
different societies establish and maintain their realities as well as differences between 
these realities. ――Sociology of knowledge‖ will have to deal not only with the 
empirical variety of ―knowledge‖ in human societies, but also with the processes by 
which any body of ―knowledge‖ comes to be socially established as ―reality.‖111 
It is important to note that although supporters of different variants of 
constructivism agree with the basic assumption that reality is socially constructed, 
they have different views with regard to two issues underlined below:  
 
First issue: different level of construction  
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At the level of philosophical abstraction, constructivists operate with a 
different level of construction. They adopt two different approaches of exploring the 
level of construction of social reality. There are realists (so-called constructive 
realism) and idealists (so-called constructive idealism) approaches.
112
  
According to constructive realism, agents have only an epistemic influence on 
the world i.e. agents construct knowledge but the existence of reality does not depend 
on the existence of agents.
113
  
The most radical variants of constructivism accept the idealist version of 
reality. According to this version, agents have not only an epistemic but also an 
ontological impact on the world i.e. the existence of world and its nature fully 
depends on agents‘ knowledge of it.114 ―In the extreme solipsist understanding, reality 
only exists if we know about it. From the antirealist stance follows that, in the final 
analysis, everything is socially constructed. Furthermore, we contribute, through our 
scientific practice, to the construction of the reality we are investigating and 
describing. Whether deliberate or not, we may even change the social world that we 
are interested in understanding.‖115 
In my dissertation I will adopt the realist approach of the social construction of 
reality. I will not claim that everything is socially constructed. I will take some 
elements of reality as a given as a starting point of my analysis.  
 
Second issue: The role of different people in the process of social construction 
 
  Constructivists are not united with regard to the question of how to evaluate 
contribution, which individuals and groups bring to the process of social construction. 
Critical constructivists put more emphasis on the issue of power. They link ideas to 
power. As a result, supporters of this type of constructivism believe that some 
powerful individuals and groups play a greater role in the process of social 
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construction. Social (conventional) constructivists in contrast view ideas as 
independent variables from power and, therefore, they often do not distinguish the 
role of some powerful actors in the process of establishing social reality.
116
  
In my dissertation I will adopt the assumption derived from critical 
constructivists. Namely, I will assume that some powerful individuals or groups play 
a greater role in the process of social construction which leads to the conclusion of 
agreements aimed at the resolution of conflicts. It is important to note that the role of 
individuals and some powerful groups will vary depending on the case study. It is 
logical that decision-makers in states which have an authoritarian political system 
have much more power, in comparison to these who operate in a democratic 
environment. Thus, for example in the case of the Austrian State treaty it is obvious 
that since the USSR has a totalitarian political system, leaders of the communist party 
of the Soviet Union had great influence on the resolution of the Austrian problem. 
After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev became almost a unilateral decision-maker. 
Therefore, he played a crucial role in the process of social construction of reality 
which led to the resolution of the Austrian problem. In case of the Oslo Accord, 
which was concluded between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), the situation is not that obvious as with the totalitarian USSR 
because there were many major architects of the Oslo Accord. Therefore, in my 
analysis of this case study I will need to take into account the role of various 
individuals and groups.  
 
1.3.3.2 Structure and agency debate  
 
Secondly, constructivists address the question of structure and agency by 
finding the middle ground between methodological individualism and methodological 
holism. The debate regarding the superiority of structure or agency in determining 
social reality and their influence on human behaviour is a key question of both 
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classical and contemporary sociology. There are two famous approaches related to 
this debate.
117
   
The first approach is derived from theories committed to the notation of 
methodological individualism. These theories highlight the superiority of agency over 
structure. According to this approach, agents construct and transform social reality. 
Structure under this approach has no generative qualities because it does not 
constitute actors.
118
  
The second approach stems from theories committed to the radical version of 
methodological holism. These theories stress the superiority of structure over agency.  
According to these theories, actors socialised and act in social structures of society, 
which restrict or provide them the opportunity to perform. Thus, social structures 
shape behaviour of agents. Agents under this approach have no generative qualities 
because they do not construct and reconstruct structures. ―Structure-orientated 
approaches treat social structures as causal variables and derive actors and interests 
from them. Structures, not agents, are ontologically primitive and the starting point 
for analysis.‖119 
To sum up, advocates of the structure-oriented approach tend to embrace a 
―top-down conception of social life‖, while proponents of the agent-oriented approach 
tend to favour a ―bottom-up‖ analysis of social life.120 ―Whereas the latter aggregates 
upward from ontologically primitive agents, the former works downward from 
irreducible social structures.‖ 121 
Constructivists attempt to find a balance between these two dramatically 
different approaches. The agent-structure problem was first introduced in international 
relations by Alexander Wendt in 1987. This problem was derived from sociology, in 
particular from the work of Anthony Giddens.
122
 ―The central issue regards the 
relationship between structures ―out there‖ that constrain human and social action and 
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the freedom of the individual agent, that is, whether structures determine individual 
behaviour, or individuals are capable of acting as agents to change structures.‖123 
 Constructivists argue that taking either structure or agency as a given as the 
starting point of analysis will make the view of world politics very limited.  
Therefore, constructivists consider structure and agency as complementary 
elements.
124
 This idea was derived from Anthony Giddens, who introduced the 
concept of structuration. According to this notation, structures and agents depend on 
each other.
125
 ―Social structures are the result of the intended and unintended 
consequences of human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an 
irreducible structural context.‖126 
According to the constructivist ontology the structures and agents are not only 
―mutually constituted‖ but also have a dynamic nature. They are always in a process 
of development. Agents socialize in a certain social context which influences their 
actions. In turn, actors determine their own social context when new thoughts and 
ideas expressed by them enter into this system. 
127
 
Constructivists agree with each other that structures and agents are ―mutually 
constituted‖, but differ with regard to the detail specification of agents and 
structures.
128
 There are a number of questions that are differently approached by 
different authors.  Among them are the following: What are the most relevant levels 
and types of structure? What are the key elements that make social structures? What 
kind of elements and effects of social structure/structures are the most relevant? Who 
are the relevant actors and what kind of properties do they have? The notation of 
structure and agent in international politics implies different things to researchers.
129
 
Below I will address each above mention question in a separate section. The aim of 
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this work is to show that it is possible to look at the concept of structure and agency in 
a different way and that the in-depth specifications of above mentioned questions 
depend on the intellectual beliefs of authors as well as on the task of research and 
issues analyzed. I will conclude each section elaborated below with a short 
description of how I will specify the content and properties of structure and agency in 
my dissertation.  
 
Levels of structures 
 
It is possible to define two levels of structures. There is the level of domestic 
structures and the level of international structures. 
130
 
Constructivists interested in the former level of structures, conduct their 
analysis by defining relevant structures within the domestic environment of states. In 
this kind of analysis, relevant agents are usually taken from the domestic 
environment. Thus, the role of agents can be assigned to any individual, decision-
maker or group of individuals etc, who operate at the level of domestic structures but 
can be influenced from the outside world. For example Herman in his analysis of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has focused on the USSR 
domestic structure and Soviet elites as relevant actors who managed to transform the 
existed structure through creating new ideas for solving the country‘s problems.131 
Theorists interested in the latter level of structures, conduct their analysis by 
specifying relevant structures within the international environment. In this kind of 
analysis, the role of agent is typically assigned to states or to important decision-
makers who represent the interest of a certain state. However, in some case 
international organizations or activist groups who operate at the level of international 
structures are assumed to be relevant agents. For example, Kathryn Sikkink tried to 
show the increasing importance of non-governmental actors and transnational civil 
society.
132
 He conducted his study at the level of the international system. 
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Constructivists differently approach above described levels of structures. 
Some put great emphasis on the domestic structures, some stress the importance of the 
international structures and some integrate both levels of structures in their analysis.  
In my dissertation I mostly focus on domestic level structures. However, in 
some situation I will need to shift my attention to the level of international structures.  
 
Effects of structures  
 
Despite different attitudes of researchers toward different levels and elements 
of structures, constructivists usually believe that both domestic and international 
structures can have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Causal 
effect means that structures can shape agents‘ behaviour. Structures both constrain 
and enable actors to act. Constitutive effect means that structures can shape and 
change actors‘ properties including their identities and interests.133 
In my dissertation I will investigate both causal and constitutive effects of 
structures on agents‘ behaviour and properties.  
 
Types of structures 
 
 Most constructivists in general and those who refer themselves to the 
conventional school of thought in particular, acknowledge the existence of three key 
structures defined by Alexander Wendt. There are material structure, structure of 
interests and ideational structure (immaterial).
134
 It is almost mutually accepted in the 
field of international relations that all above mentioned types of structures are 
important, there is, nevertheless, no united opinion with regard to their relative 
weight. For example materialists (including advocates of rational choice theory) pay 
more attention to material structure in their attempt to show the origin of interests, 
while idealists tend to focus on ideational structure as a source of interests.
135
 
Constructivists, in contrast to idealists and materialists, believe that all those 
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structures are coherent and equally important for explaining any political outcome. 
―Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful 
material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all.‖136 
Thus, according to constructivist view, ideational structures provide meaning 
to the material ones. Consequently, these structures create a structure of interests. 
It is important to note that theorists tend to distinguish different types of 
structures only for analytical purposes in order to be able to explain a social system in 
a better way. At the end, any given social system has only one structure that is made 
up of different elements. Therefore, the core task of constructivists is to combine 
these structures into a single social system. ―It may make sense for analytical 
purposes to distinguish between ―material‖ structure and ―ideational‖ structure, but in 
the end a social system has just one structure, composed of both material and 
ideational elements. The task of structural theorizing ultimately must be to show how 
the elements of a system fit together into some kind of whole.‖137 
 
Elements of structures 
 
Material structure  
 
The key feature of constructivism is to understand the ways of how immaterial 
factors help to determine political outcomes.
138
 Without supplementing it with other 
theories, constructivism is lacking a comprehensive explanation regarding elements of 
material structures. Therefore, I will need to refer to other theoretical sources.  
In my dissertation, material structures will be understood in a broad term. 
They will cover a wide variety of political, economic and strategic interests of 
conflicting parties. I, however, will not attempt to design a universal, applicable to all 
case studies-description of material structures. This task would be impossible to fulfil 
because the nature and content of those structures might vary from situation to 
situation. It is, nevertheless, necessary to find some analytical tools that will help me 
to link agents‘ material interests to these structures. In my opinion, rational choice 
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theory is perfectly suitable for fulfilling this task. According to this theory, people 
tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do and 
how to act.
139
 Thus, it is possible to link agents (conflicting parties) to material 
structures through quantitative and /or qualitative analysis of costs and benefits of all 
available options faced by conflicting parties, namely to conclude a peace agreement 
or to keep the status quo.  
 
Ideational structure 
 
 The term ideational structure and its elements are not clearly determined in 
constructivists research. It can include a great number of different elements such as 
cultures, norms, beliefs, customs, ideas, rules, ideologies, religions, discourses, 
languages, values etc. Ideational structure can be divided into two levels, namely 
microstructure and macrostructure. ―Microstructure is the pattern of relations between 
most basic elements of social life, that cannot be further divided and have no social 
structure of their own. ….Macrostructure is thus a kind of 'second level' structure, a 
pattern of relations between objects that have their own structure.‖140 According to 
constructivism, elements of ideational structure are mainly based on common 
knowledge.
141
 
 However, the exact specifications of the content, level and the most relevant 
elements of structure depend on researchers and issues they investigate.
142
 In order to 
show the importance of ideational structure, constructivists conduct the same kind of 
research as other social scientists do. They collect different evidence and analyze 
them through a variety of research tools such as qualitative, quantitative and 
interpretative methods. Depending on the nature of research, they pick the most 
appropriate tool or combination of different methods.
143
 ―Designing constructivist 
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research is not fundamentally different from designing other kinds of research. 
Constructivists, like any other researchers, use the full array of available tools.‖144  
In my dissertation, I will not attempt to specify the exact content, level and 
most relevant elements of ideational structure that can be applied to all analysed case 
studies.  The substantive description of structures will be provided case by case. In my 
analysis of the Austrian state treaty I will mostly focus on communist ideology, new 
ideas and norms as the most relevant elements of Soviet ideational structure. In the 
case of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty and Oslo Accords I will need to take into 
account a greater amount of cultural elements. 
 In my study I will collect information with regard to ideational structures 
from different sources that are widely used in other types of social analysis. I will 
assess this information mostly through interpretative methods of research. 
 
Agents and their properties 
 
Constructivists agree with each other on a key assumption that structures and 
agents have a ―mutually constituted‖ nature.145 Agents socialize in a certain social 
environment which influences their identities, power, interests, culture, language etc. 
These elements effect actors‘ preferences, interests and actions. In turn, actors have a 
potential not only to regulate but also to change existing structures by expressing new 
ideas, thoughts, principles and beliefs or by interpreting old norms in a new way.
146
 
―Political system are remade or changed through actors‘ practice. Therefore, 
fundamental change of the international system occurs when actors, through their 
practices, change the rules and norms constitutive of international relations.‖147 
                                                 
144 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): ―Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics‖, pp. 396, Accessed: 2008,  
http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf 
145 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001): ―Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://faculty.msb.edu/murphydd/CRIC/Readings/Finnemore-Sikkink-Taking%20Stock%20%20Constr%20Res%202001.pdf 
146
 See Jackson: ―Social Constructivism‖, Chapter 6, pp.163, Accessed: 2008, 
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf 
147 Kratochwil, in: Maja Zehfuss (2001): ―Constructivism in International Relations: Wendt, Onuf, and Kratochwil‖, 
in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik Jorgensen (2001): ― Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation‖, pp.63 
 50 
However, constructivists do not provide detail specifications of relevant 
individuals, their properties and ways of how they regulate as well as change 
structures.
148
 
Depending on the topic of research, appropriate agents could be these who 
exercise direct control over existing structure (states, individual politicians, etc.) or 
those who have no actual authority to govern (activists group, economic actors, 
international and nongovernmental organizations, etc.).  
Constructivists in their attempt to explain mechanisms of construction of 
social reality and possible processes of structural transformation focus on alternations 
of different types of agents‘ properties such as identities, ideas, language, power or 
culture etc. Advocates of the conventional school of thought tend to focus on 
identities, ideas, norms and culture as crucial elements of structural change. For 
example for Alexander Wendt identities are the basis for transformation
149
; for 
Michael Barnett and Martina Finnemore its agents‘ practice of interpretation and their 
rational-legal, delegated, moral as well as expect authorities
150
 ; for Peter Katzenstein 
culture plays a key role in the process of construction of national security 
paradigms.
151
  
Supporters of critical constructivism, in contrast, tend to focus on the 
linguistic properties of agents as key factors of structural change.  For example for 
Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (―World of Our Making‖, 1989) the basis for social 
construction of reality and structural transformation is language and speech acts.
152
 
According to the author, speech acts may be institutionalized into rules and thereby 
change structures.
153
 ―Any given language precedes its individual speakers and 
thereby constrains how they communicate; at the same time. Their use of that 
language can change it over time-and so the practice alters the structure.‖154 
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In my dissertation I will try to explain processes of social construction and 
transformation of the reality through the analysis of actors‘ identities, ideas, cultural 
constructs, and processes of interpretation. In doing so, I will have an opportunity to 
follow not only conventional, but also critical constructivist research design.  
 
1.3.3.3 Immaterial factors  
 
Thirdly, the focal point of a constructivist analysis is immaterial (ideational) 
factors.
155
 Constructivists argue that people‘s interactions and behaviours can not be 
understood through the analysis of material factors alone. They believe that human 
relations are mainly based on ideational factors. Although constructivists do not deny 
the importance of material aspects in international relations, they argue that cultural 
factors such as ideas and beliefs give meaning to material aspects of world politics. 
―Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality are 
ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as well as 
instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective 
intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not 
independent of time and place.‖156 
Ideational factors shape actors and explain their behaviour at the domestic as 
well as at the international level.  According to the constructivist assumption, the 
international system is a human creation constituted by a full array of ideas, norms, 
thoughts and beliefs.
157
 
All Constructivists believe that immaterial factors play a crucial role in world 
politics, but they focus on different immaterial factors in their attempt to explain 
processes of construction of social reality and its transformation in general and certain 
political outcomes in particular. For example, advocates of conventional 
constructivism typically focus on ideas, norms, identities and cultures, while 
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supporters of critical constructivism tend to explore the role of speeches, arguments 
and legal reasoning as mechanisms of social construction.
158
  
Below I will provide a theoretical specification of immaterial factors that will 
be integrated in my analytical framework of analysis of outcomes of different 
agreements aimed at conflict resolutions. There are ideas, norms, beliefs, cultures and 
identities.  
 
Ideas, Norms and Beliefs 
 
Norms and ideas play a crucial role in research conducted in different fields of 
social sciences, including psychology, sociology, anthropology and political science. 
One of the main goals of constructivist empirical research in international relations is 
to show that norms and ideas matter in the international as well as domestic 
politics.
159
 Since much of the constructivists work focuses on norms and ideas, these 
immaterial factors are the most define in constructivist theoretical framework. This 
distinguishes this theoretical approach from most of social science theories including 
realism and RCT which pay little attention to norms and ideas. Although liberals 
accept the possibility that norms and ideas can change political outcomes, they do not 
seek to explain their sources. Moreover, advocates of liberal theory typically focus on 
formal and liberal types of norms. Constructivists, in contrast, focus on all kinds of 
possible norms and try to explain their casual as well as constitutive effects. 
―Constructivists do not claim to understand the extraordinarily complex processes 
regarding constitutive rules fully (or even mostly). But neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists lack even a space for them in their ontology‖ 160 
 In my dissertation I will characterize ideas and norms in a simple way which 
is often used in a constructivist research design.  I will define ideas as opinions, 
principle, beliefs or convictions that are held by individuals.
161
 Norms will be viewed 
as ―shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of 
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actors.‖162 Ideas can be private and subjective, while norms are always shared and 
intersubjective.
163
 When norms become institutionalized, they can limit public policy 
choice and influence the decisions of politicians long after the goals of its original 
advocates have changed.  Ideas, however, through process of institutionalization can 
acquire properties of norms.
164
   
 
Types of norms and ideas  
 
It is possible to define four key types of norms and ideas. There are world 
views, principled (normative) beliefs, causal beliefs and policy perceptions.
165
  
 
World views 
 
World views are an organized collection of ideas and beliefs through which 
individuals view the world. ―World views are embedded in the symbolism of culture 
and deeply affect modes of thought and discourse.‖166 This type of beliefs comprise at 
least the following three views:
167
 
 
 Views about ontology i.e. beliefs about reality and the nature of being. 
 Views about ethics  i.e. beliefs about right and wrong 
 Views about cosmology  i.e. beliefs about the nature of the universe 
 
Thus, world views include a wide variety of beliefs. These beliefs, for 
example, can be based on religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc) or on political 
ideologies (marxism, communism, capitalism, fascism etc). Therefore, understanding 
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the impact of world views on politics in general and foreign policy in particular 
requires a detailed analysis of culture.  
 
Principle beliefs  
 
Principled (normative) beliefs are beliefs about right and wrong as well as just 
and unjust.
168
  Those beliefs are based on values and attitudes and can be covered by 
world views. However, in contrast to the latter beliefs, they are purely normative. 
Moreover, world views can incorporate a greater amount of beliefs, including 
different, opposing to each other principled views. ―Principled beliefs are often 
justified in terms of larger world views, but those world views are frequently 
expansive enough to encompass opposing principled beliefs as well. For instance, 
although many opponents of slavery justified their arguments with references to 
Christianity, Christianity had tolerated slavery for almost two millennia.‖169 
 
Causal beliefs and policy prescriptions 
 
Causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect as well as means-end 
relationships. Those beliefs provide guidelines or strategies for individuals on how to 
attain their policy aims and objectives.
170
  
Policy prescriptions are ideas aimed at addressing a particular problem. In 
other words, policy prescriptions can be described as a set of pragmatic ideas 
elaborated by policymakers through processes of specification of solutions aimed at 
the solving of specific policy problems.
171
 
It is important to note that below provided categorization of beliefs is a 
simplification and abstraction. In real life, all four types of ideas may be linked.
172
 
Nevertheless, it is useful for the purpose of my analysis to differentiate these four 
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types of ideas because their ability to change and to influence political outcomes 
depends on their types. Thus, above mentioned categorization might help me to 
understand ideas‘ impact on decisions of conflicting parties to conclude or to 
withdraw from peace agreements in a better way. 
 
Effects of norms and ideas  
 
Different types of ideas and norms have different effects on construction and 
transformation of social reality. For the purpose of my dissertation it is important to 
bear in mind that changes in principled beliefs and world views have a greater impact 
on agents and structures than changes in either causal beliefs or policy prescriptions 
have.
173
 However, the former beliefs are not very flexible and therefore, have smaller 
potential for changes, than the latter have.  
According to constructivism, norms and ideas are important in a many 
different ways. They can have a great number of constitutive and regulative effects on 
agents and structures.
174
 It is possible to underline at least six common effects of 
norms and ideas that are present in a constructivist research design. These are the 
following: 
 
Norms and actors interests 
 
Norms/ideas can shape actors’ interests and preferences.175 Constructivists 
working on this issue often try to show that norms can influence actors‘ preferences in 
ways that not simply reflect interests of strong actors. Constructivists ―produced well-
documented empirical studies showing the effectiveness of norms, which could not be 
easily reduced to interests of powerful states, in such diverse areas as foreign aid, 
opposition to slavery, piracy, trafficking in women, science policy, development, 
racism, and laws of war.‖176 These theorists typically focus on international norms, 
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rather than on domestic rules. It is however obvious those domestic-level norms also 
shape actors‘ interests. For example, Peter Katzenstain in his analysis of states 
responses to terrorism in Germany and Japan has shown the ways of how domestic 
norms and ideas influence the conduct of internal security politics in both countries.
177
  
 
Norms and behaviour of actors 
 
Norms/ideas can regulate actors’ behaviour.178 These types of norms provide 
guiding principles for action. Regulative norms can influence actors‘ behaviour even 
in a situation when no obvious economic or strategic motivations are present. For 
example Martha Finnemore argues that international organizations have power to 
create, promote and interpret norms. She gathered empirical data which show the 
ways of how states adopt norms in their national politics, which not always enhance 
their national interests. The case in point is the ability of international organizations to 
create impersonal rules which provide initiatives for states to participate in 
humanitarian intervention, when their interests are not at stake.
179
 
 
Norms and means  
 
Norms/ideas can affect the ways actors link their preferences to policy 
choice.
180
 In other words, they can help to solve particular policy problems and define 
the means that actors consider acceptable and effective for accomplishing their policy 
goals.  
For example, Nina Helpern analyzed the impact of causal norms in socialist 
countries during the Cold War. She claimed that leaders in countries not under the 
control of the USSR adopted Stalinist ideas as means of solving their post 
revolutionary problems and for achieving their policy goals, namely uncertainty over 
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what was the socialist ways of conducting policy and the need to find an agreement 
on this new policy course.
181
 
It is important to note that not only effectiveness but also the character of 
agents and their normative beliefs determine which means are acceptable. Thus, 
actors can perceive some means as efficient, but still reject them due to normative 
constraints and their self-understanding identities. The case in point is Finnemore‘s 
study of military intervention. She argues that although states now have broader 
humanitarian goals than during the Cold War, they are less willing to conduct 
unilateral intervention due to their normative beliefs about inappropriateness of such 
actions.
182
   
 
Norms and agents  
 
Norms/ideas can constitute agents including their identities.
183
 More precisely, 
norms through process of socialization can become a part of identity. For example, 
Michael Bernett in his paper ―Identity and Alliances in the Middle East‖ has shown 
this effect of norms. According to the author, norms of pan-Arabism strongly affected 
not only inter-Arab politics but also their national identities. Another case in point is 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.  New Thinking course 
pursued by Gorbachev not only shaped the behaviour of the USSR at the international 
as well as at domestic level but had a profound effect on Russian national identities.
184
  
 
Norms and structures  
 
Norms/ideas can change existing structures. According to constructivists‘ 
point of view, both the domestic and the international structures might change 
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dramatically because people and states can start to consider each other differently 
and thus interpret old principles in a new way or invent norms that may not have 
anything in common with the old ones.
185
 For example Burley and Mattlis showed 
the ways of how norms shape legal structure within the EU. According to the 
authors, professional groups working the European Court of Justice (ECJ) through 
their shared understandings create new norms or interpret old ones in new ways. As 
a result, they change the existing legal structures at the level of the European 
Union.
186
  
In my dissertation I will not only attempt to show that beliefs matter but also 
will try to figure out which type of norms or ideas matter and how they influence 
conflicting parties. 
 
Identities and culture 
 
Constructivists emphasize the importance of identities and culture in context 
of construction and transformation of social reality. This distinguishes this theoretical 
framework from other theories of international relations including RCT which treat 
identities as given and pay little or no attention to the issue of culture. ―The 
instabilities of the post-Cold War world have revived interest in culture and identity 
among scholars of world politics. Taking for granted in realist, neorealist and 
neoliberal depictions of an exciting world, questions of state identity, sovereignty, and 
national and ethnic identification have found new resonance, in particular among 
authors who subscribe to a constructivist ontology of becoming.‖187 
At the level of philosophical abstraction, constructivists define culture ―as an 
evolving system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and 
actions...Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of 
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action, culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal 
motives, and that set forth a strategy for success.‖ 188  
The above mentioned specification of culture at the level of philosophical 
abstraction does not provide sufficient information for conducting empirical research. 
Simply assuming that ―culture matters‖ is not enough for my research. It is necessary 
to provide substantive explanation about the impact of culture on political outcomes. 
I believe that it is possible to perceive culture in two ways. First, it can be 
considered as a key factor that shapes identities of actors. Second, it can be seen as an 
essential part of national identities. In my dissertation I will refer to the former 
categorization of culture. Thus, I will not explicitly distinguish effects of culture from 
effects of identities on political outcome.  
Although all constructivists acknowledge the importance of identities in 
determining political outcomes, they, however, did not manage to produce a single 
theoretical framework for analyzing their effects on politics. The main reason of this 
shortcoming is that constructivists differ significantly in the way they employ the term 
identity.  The lack of the agreed definition of this notation produces the ongoing 
difficulty in identity research. As a result, this issue, in contrast to norms and ideas, 
are not very much specified in a constructivist theory and requires a case-by-case 
detail description.
189
 Nevertheless, constructivists still managed to develop four 
general assumptions about identities.  
First, according to constructivism, identities and interests are connected. 
―Identities and interests must be intimately connected for the simple reason that what 
we take our self to be, determines which interests we take our selves to have.‖190 The 
main contribution of constructivism is its ability to demonstrate that identities 
influence actors‘ preferences and behaviour.191 Thus, application of this assumption to 
my cease studies will mean that decision of conflicting parties to conclude or to 
withdraw from peace agreement to a great extent depends on their identities.  
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Second, constructivists seek to show that identities and interests are not given 
by materialistic factors, but instead always socially constructed by beliefs held and 
transmitted by individuals. 
192
In my dissertation I will assume that changes in 
principled beliefs or world views have a profound impact on construction of new 
identities or transformation of old ones.  
Third, according to constructivist ontology, actors may have multiple types of 
identities.
193
 It is, however, important to note that many of actors‘ identities are only 
possible to separate for analytical purpose. 
Finally, constructivists believe that through interaction, identities can change 
over time.
194
 Although it is generally assumed by constructivists that identities of 
actors can change, researchers, however, have different opinion regarding the time 
frame of this change. Some believe that identities are subject to frequent 
transformation, while others argue that they can only evolve slowly. In my 
dissertation I will follow the latter view.  
Above mentioned assumptions are only the starting points of any analysis 
conducted in a constructivist vein. They ways of how authors proceed with these 
stating assumptions depend on the type of their research.  
I think that it is possible to underline two main types of identity research. The 
first one is based on analysis of ―territorially defined identities‖. The second one is 
based on investigation of national identities rooted in religion, class, gender etc.  
Most constructivists are committed to the former type of research, namely they 
focus on ―territorially defined identities‖ i.e. nations-states. The greatest contribution 
to this type of research was made by Alexander Wendt, who managed to identify the 
most prominent kinds of states‘ identities. There are: ―type identities‖ and ―role 
identities‖. ―Type identities‖ refer to some common characteristics of state such as 
types or forms of state. For example, a monarchial state, a communist state, a 
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capitalist state, an Islamic state etc. Thus, one state may have many ―type 
identities‖.195  
According to Wendt, ―role identities‖ are necessarily relational. A person can 
not adequately comprehend oneself without a comparison to others. Formation of 
―role identities‖ entails the understanding of the role of the ―others‖. ―Role identities 
are the product of dyadic relationships among countries. States may be friends, rivals, 
or enemies.‖196 
I believe that an analysis of outcomes of agreement amid at resolution of 
conflicts often requires attention not only to territorially defined identities but also to 
national identities. National identities, however, are not properly defined and often 
poorly addressed by constructivists. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, I 
will apply Wendt‘s classification of ―types identities‖ not only to the level of nation-
state but also to society at home.  
At the national level, ―type identities‖ will be referred to some common 
characteristic of society. For example, Palestinian people have multiple type 
identities- an Arab identity, an Islamic identity and a Palestinian identity.  
1.4 Both theories in the same analytical framework 
 
My analytical framework is mainly based on the combination of two 
theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and constructivist theories.  
Since such an analytical approach to research is quite innovative, it generates a 
few questions that require some explanations. The first question is why I believe that 
these two theories can be applied together without undermining their key theoretical 
as well as methodological assumptions? The second question is why I think that from 
all other theories of international relations these two theories are the most suitable for 
the analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes? The first part of this 
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chapter will be dedicated to the first question, while the second part will address the 
second question. 
 
1.4.1 Applicability of my analytical framework 
 
The first question I already addressed to some extent in the previous section of 
this chapter. Namely, I figured out that rational choice theory can be supplemented 
with other theories as long as we accept the argument that it is based on the concept of 
instrumental rationality.
197
 The instrumental rationality assumption makes no specific 
claims regarding people‘s preferences. According to this concept, actors are not solely 
motivated by economic benefit. They just behave in accordance with their 
motivations, regardless of what these motivations may be. Thus, rational choice 
theory is fully consistent with a broad range of people‘s motivations and 
performance.
198
 
Constructivism in some sense is similar to rational choice theoretical 
framework. It is more than just one theory. It includes a wide variety of different 
theories. Therefore, like rational choice theory, constructivism can be supplemented 
with other theories as long as reality is considered as ―socially constructed‖.199 
Findings of constructivists have diverse results because they are not the predictions of 
constructivism, but of the ―political arguments that inform it‖. In other words, every 
piece of research conducted under constructivist vein requires a variety of substantive 
specifications that can come from different sources.
200
  Thus, the key assumptions of 
constructivism are only a starting point of analysis.  Constructivism ―has a large, 
almost unlimited potential for integrating other theories within it: all kinds of 
structures, unites, or mechanisms can be tolerated as long as they are seen as socially 
constructed. Constructivism thereby has an almost frightening potential as metra-
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theory subsuming all others.‖201 Thus, at the theoretical level these two theories are 
consistent with each other.  
Leaving, however, a theoretical issue behind, I face another problem at the 
methodological level. Rational choice theory is based on methodological 
individualism
202
, while constructivism attempts to find a middle ground between 
methodological individualism and methodological holism. Thus, rational choice 
theory analyse independently existing individuals and their motivations as a starting 
point of analysis of political outcomes. Constructivists in contrast tend to focus on 
intersubjective beliefs which are not always ―reducible to individuals‖.203 Therefore, 
from the first look it seems to be impossible to supplement these dramatically 
different theoretical approaches with each other. Nevertheless, rational choice theory 
does not preclude the possibility that culture socially constructs agents. 
Constructivism, on another hand, assumes that peoples socialize in a certain social 
context which constructs their actions. Thus, it is possible to imagine that individual 
subjective motivations are based on intersubjective understandings rooted in a 
particular society. Therefore, it is possible to supplement these theories with each 
other without undermining its key methodological assumptions. 
Thus, despite that these two theories operate at a different level of abstraction 
and have completely different methodological as well as theoretical foundation, they 
are compatible with each other as long as we accept the notation of instrumental 
rationality and admit the fact that reality is socially constructed.  
 
1.4.2 Two theories to the analysis of peace accords 
 
The fact that these two theories are perfectly consistent with each other, helps 
me to address the second question asked above, namely why I think that from all other 
theories of international relations these two theories are the most suitable for the 
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analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes. It is possible to underline at 
least five reasons why I think this way. 
The first main reason is that rational choice theory and the constructivist 
theoretical framework is applicable to a wide variety of situations because neither 
constructivism no rational choice makes any particular predictions about political 
outcomes.
204
  
They only provide an analytical frame for considering the political world but 
they do not offer any particular specifications regarding the content of social structure 
and agents. ―Like rational choice theory, it (constructivism) offers a framework for 
thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims 
about their specific content. In rational choice analysis, agents act rationally to 
maximize utilities, but the substantive specification of actors and utilities lies outside 
the analysis; it must be provided before analysis can begin. In a constructivist 
analysis, agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the 
political world is so and not otherwise, but the substantive specification of agents and 
structures must come from some other source.‖205 Thus, in contrast to realism, which 
mostly focuses on external conflicts (interaction between states) rather than on 
internal wars, the constructivism and rational choice theories can be applied to the 
analysis of various types of negotiation processes aimed at the resolution of interstate 
conflicts as well as intrastate wars under the condition that each case study will be 
supported with a concrete, specific description of the content of social structure, 
relevant actors and their wishes.  
The second related reason is that both the constructivism and rational choice 
are neutral to conflict and peace.
206
 I believe that the analysis of outcomes of 
agreement aimed at resolution of conflicts requires neutral attitude towards conflict 
and peace. Without having such an attitude I will risk making a wrong assumption 
before I start my analysis. Most theories of international relations, however, make 
particular predictions about this issue. For example, liberalism is based on the idealist 
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assumptions. Thus, it tends to favour a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Realism, in 
contrast, adopts an assumption of ―a Hobbesian war of all against all‖. Therefore, it 
tends to favour conflict rather than peace.  
The constructivism and rational choice theory do not predict peace or conflict. 
They are neutral in a sense that they do not favour a particular result.  
The third reason is that rational choice theory is perfectly designed for the 
analysis of material factors that may determine the outcome of peace accords because 
of three reasons. First, since material interest of conflicting parties might vary from 
situation to situation, it is necessary to pick such a theoretical approach that will allow 
me to undertake a case by case analysis and to cover a great amount of immaterial 
factors such as political, economic and strategic interests. Rational choice theory 
permits me to carry out such an analysis. It does not attempt to explain a particular 
outcome only by focusing on one factor. In contrast to realism, power is not a central 
element of the analysis for rational choice theory. Through the costs and benefits 
analysis it seeks to map a wide variety of material factors without favouring one 
factor over another. Second, rational choice theory is possible to apply at the level of 
individual actors. It aims not only to investigate states‘ actions but also to map the full 
array of individual behaviour. Finally, it is possible to underline the key conditions 
under which rational choice theory is likely to produce the most accurate explanation 
of a specific political outcome. These conditions are present in my case studies. First, 
the courses of action available to relevant individuals should be limited. Second, the 
costs as well as benefits attached to alternative courses of action should be well 
defined.
207
  
The forth reason is that the constructivist theoretical framework is perfectly 
designed for the analysis of immaterial factors that may determine outcome of peace 
accords due to three reasons. First, I believe that the analysis of outcomes of peace 
agreements requires attention to different types of immaterial factors. Constructivism 
is not preoccupied with only ideas or identities. It seeks to address a wide variety of 
immaterial factors such as ideas, beliefs, norms, identities, culture etc.   
Second, constructivist research can be conducted at different levels. It can be 
domestic or international, as well as at individual or nation-state levels.  
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Third, constructivism, in contrast to liberalism, seeks to investigate not only 
regulative but also constitutive effects of immaterial factors on political outcomes. I 
believe that the focus on constitutive effects may enhance my analysis by producing 
some additional explanation about the question why some negotiation processes 
resulted in agreements while other fail to produce such an outcome.  
The final reason is that through application of the constructivist theoretical 
approach and rational choice theory it will be possible not only to link micro level to 
macro level explanations but also material factors to immaterial ones. Rational choice 
is materialistic theory which is based on methodological individualism. Therefore, it 
allows undertaking an effective micro level analysis of material factors. The 
constructivist theory provides analytical tools for linking these micro level 
explanations to macro level analysis by assuming that structure and agency are 
―mutually constituted‖208 and material factors to immaterial ones by arguing that the 
latter give meaning to the former. 
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Empirical part 
 
1.5 The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 
1.5.1 Introduction 
 
In March 1945, Read Army troops entered Austria. The Russians had 
proclaimed that they come as a liberating army and do not want to take under their 
control Austrian territory or to change its political system. In other words the USSR 
argue that they have only one goal in Austria, namely to implement the Moscow 
Declaration of 1 November 1943 under which the Soviet Union and the Western 
Allies assumed an obligation to liberate Austria and to ―restore it as an independent 
democratic state‖.209  
It is definitely right to assume that in the short run the Soviets wanted to 
―liberate‖ Austria from the Nazi, but what was the real, long-term policy of the 
USSR in Austria? 
Before the soviet documents became accessible to the scientists, little 
research could have been conducted to gain insight into this question.  Those who 
investigated this issue were not able to asses Soviet documents and, therefore, had 
to base their assumptions only on official Soviet statements and printed 
information.
210
 After opening to the public the Soviet archive, this issue has become 
a popular question of research.  
There are, however, many questions related to the Austrian problems that 
are still open to different interpretation. Among them are the following:  What goals 
did the Soviet Union pursue in Austria? Why did the USSR agree to sign the peace 
treaty? How it is possible to explain the USSR‘s decision not to apply its official 
policy course of non- evacuation from the captured territory? Why did it agree to 
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pull out their troops from Austria, rather than letting the country to be divided in the 
same way as Germany was? What kind of objectives did the Soviet Union pursue 
by wanting Austria to become neutral country? Why did the USSR agree to 
conclude the State Treaty under the condition that Austria should become a neutral 
country in 1955, while the same proposal was rejected during the Berlin meeting of 
1953?
211
 Since it is very hard to estimate what type of goals shaped the USSR 
foreign policy, historians do not share a common opinion with regard to the 
questions mentioned above.  
In organisational terms this chapter will be divided into three sections. In 
order to answer the above mentioned questions it is necessary to provide an 
historical background of the Austrian treaty negotiations and to understand the 
factors that shaped Soviet foreign policy. Thus, the first section of this case study 
will be dedicated to the historical background of Austrian treaty negotiations. I will 
try to prove that the Soviet policy regarding the Austrian question was rooted in its 
ideological aim, namely to create worldwide communism.
212
  
The overall objective of the second and third sections is to examine the 
conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty through an innovative framework 
elaborated in the theoretical part of my dissertation. I will show that in order to 
understand the USSR decision to conclude the Austrian Treaty in 1955 on terms 
acceptable to the West, it is necessary to apply RCT assumptions as a starting point 
and constructivist approach at the final stage of the analysis. Thus, in the empirical 
analysis below, I will evaluate the entire complex of different reasons that led to the 
conclusion of this treaty. The material factors will be analyzed though RCT, while 
the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework 
 
1.5.2 The Austrian State Treaty negotiation 
 
The aim of this section is to show that the USSR behaviour during various 
negotiation stages of the Austrian Treaty can be at best explained by analyzing the 
ideological aims of the USSR.  Namely, when the USSR considered that the 
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conclusion of the Treaty might prevent the achievement of its ideological aim, it 
begun to raise different conditions or arguments against it. Also, when the Soviet 
Union believed that the conclusion of the State Treaty might help to realise its plan 
aimed at spreading the communist ideology around the world, the Kremlin was 
willing to make some concessions regarding the Austrian question.
213
  
In 1946, the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made the first attempt to 
initiate the discussion with regard to the Austrian State Treaty. Despite his effort, 
however, Austria was not included on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. 
The soviet foreign minister Molotov refused to consider this issue. He used two 
main arguments in order to prevent the resolution of this problem.  The first one 
was that the Soviets claimed that Austria was not democratic enough to grant it 
independence.  The second argument against the resolution of the Austrian problem 
was rooted in the Soviet desire to sign peace treaties with Germany‘s former allies 
first.
214
 After these treaties were concluded, the Soviet Union agreed to an 
American plan aimed at creation of a ―special committee of disputes‖ to prepare the 
Austrian Treaty draft. The Special committee of disputes completed and presented 
its draft treaty version at a Moscow meeting in March and April 1947.
215
   
It is necessary to note that Hungarian and Rumanian treaties included 
provisions that allowed the USSR to keep their troops deployed in these countries 
in order to keep the lines of communication until the Soviet Union leave Austria. 
Therefore, the departure from Austria would undermine the legal right of the Soviet 
Union to keep it under its control. Thus, in the case of a withdrawal from Austria, 
the USSR would be obliged to remove its arm forces from Hungarian and 
Rumanian. Therefore, these clauses made the Soviets even less interested in 
moving forward with the Austrian Treaty negotiations.
216
 Other possible 
explanations of the Soviet reluctance to start the negotiation process may also have 
been grounded in its desire to continue extraction of economic resources from 
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Austria and its belief that the application of the communist political system in this 
country was possible.
217
  
Thus, at the London meeting and during the Moscow conference the USSR 
raised three other obstacles to a settlement of the Austrian question. The first one 
was the Soviet Union support of the Yugoslavian territorial demand on southern 
Austria. It is clear that this enormous request could not have been accepted by 
Austria and the West. They clearly stated that they would not sign a treaty that 
changed Austrian‘s borders established in 1937. However, Yugoslavs were not able 
to abolish the claim because they feared that the USSR would not support the 
compromise suitable to the West.
218
 The second obstacle to the conclusion of the 
Treaty was the Soviet demand for German assets in the eastern zone of Austria. A 
controversial point was the definition of what can be considered as the German 
assets. The USSR defined the German assets in a broad term and wanted to seize as 
much as possible. The Western powers opposed Soviet‘s demand to confiscate all 
property in Austria that had belonged to the Germans in 1945 on the ground that it 
would make virtually impossible to restore an independent Austria.
219
 Finally, the 
USSR and the US were not able to reach an agreement about the size of Austrian 
post-occupation forces. The Soviet Union proposed to allow Austria to have a tiny 
army to be equipped only with ―weapons of national manufacture‖.220  The US 
rejected this proposal. Since the Western powers and the USSR were not able to 
agree about the above mentioned issues, the London and Moscow meetings ended 
without any practical results. As General Mark Clark, a member of the U.S. 
delegation, put it ―the Russians have not given in on a single point since we started. 
They delay the conferences, drag them out, hesitate on discussions, and are unable 
to delegate authority.‖221 
At the end of the Moscow meeting the U.S. secretary of state, George C. 
Marshall proposed to submit the Austrian problem to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations for its resolution. Soviet foreign minister Molotov, however, 
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opposed this suggestion. Instead, he called for the creation of a treaty commission 
in Vienna. The Austrian treaty commission had a lot of sessions over the next five 
months and produced more then seventy different proposals aimed at the resolution 
of the disputed issues.
222
 Its work, however, appeared to be unproductive and 
officially ended on 11 October 1947. A serious of events such as the May 1947 
communist uprising in Austria and communist takeover of Hungary made the 
Western powers reluctant to make any concessions that might help to the USSR to 
transform Austria into a communist state. Russians, on the other hand, continued to 
repeat their previous objections against the conclusion of the treaty.
223
  
The next move in the negotiation process over the Austrian treaty came in 
November 1947 in London. The meeting in London, however, did not result in a 
breakthrough. The USSR and the Western powers were still not prepared to change 
their official position over the definition of German assets. Progress was impossible 
to reach as long as the question of what constituted the German assets remains 
controversial. ―Molotov made the ostensibly generous offer to accept 10 percent 
less than the amount he had originally demanded. Bevin wryly retorted that it 
would be rather difficult for the council to calculate 10 percent of unknown 
quantity.‖224 
After the London meeting of 1947, the Soviet Union suddenly agreed to 
change its official policy course and to reach an agreement on the economic part of 
the treaty. The French proposal, so-called the ―Cherriere plan‖ of ―150$ lump sum 
payment‖ instead of 200$ moved the negotiation process forward.225  However, the 
Soviet Union putted on the agenda the Yugoslavian territorial demands again. The 
West appeared to be uninterested in debating the territorial claims of the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, in 1948 a chain of outside events such as collapse of ―Four-
Power control‖ in Germany and the Berlin blockade made the resolution of the 
Austrian problem less important. As a result, the West did not put the Austrian 
question on the top of its agenda until the Paris meeting of 1949.
226
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At the Paris meeting it seemed that the treaty would be finally concluded. 
The USSR agreed to recognize the Austrian borders of 1938. Already in summer 
1948 the relations between Yugoslav and Soviet communists were terminated and 
the Soviet Union was prepared to stop to support the Yugoslavian demand. 
Moreover, most of the economic provisions of the Treaty were almost resolved. 
The USSR agreed to make three significant economic concessions. Firstly, it 
stopped to demand the right for shares in the shipping company. Secondly, the 
Soviet Union reduced the amount of repayment from $200 million to $150 million. 
Finally, it agreed to extend the time of compensation from two to six years.
227
  
What was behind the Soviet willingness to make concessions at the Paris 
meeting of 1949?  Did it mean that the Soviet Union was finally prepared to sign 
the Austrian treaty? Events that took place outside the negotiation table confirm this 
assumption. In February 1948 the Czechoslovakian coup took place and 
communists managed to come to power without the help of Soviet forces. This 
event probably made Stalin to believe that Austria would follow the same suit.  He 
possibly hoped that the withdrawal of Western states from Austria would prevent 
its participation in the Marshall Plan. Consequently, the USSR would be able to 
secure the victory of the communists in the general election of 1949 in Austria.  
―Assurance of the continued economic presence of the Soviet Union in Austria after 
the signing of the treaty would have given the Russian considerable leverage to 
harass the coalition government and to force the return of the Austrian communists 
to the government.‖228  
However, after the Paris meeting, the negotiations were suddenly stopped. 
The USSR made it clear that it had no intention to move forwards with the treaty 
negotiation. It began to employ the different types of obstacles such as the future of 
Trieste, resurgence of fascist organizations and that the Austrian government still 
had to pay for the use of the ―food-stocks‖ (dried peas) etc.229  What was behind the 
USSR sudden change regarding the Austrian problem? In order to answer this 
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question, it is necessary to analyse the worldwide events that made the USSR to 
reconsider its goals in Austria. Firstly, the Austrian Communist Party lost the 
general election of 1949. It received only 5.08 present of the vote. The defeat of the 
communists probable made the USSR less confident in its plan aimed at the return 
of Austrian communists to the government.
230
 Secondly, the main priorities for 
Russians were to prevent the establishment as well as rearmament of West 
Germany and the creation of NATO.  All other policy aims in Europe were linked 
to these questions. The USSR, however, had failed to prevent the formation of West 
Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At the Paris meeting the 
foreign minister Vyshinsky couldn‘t convince the West to return to ―Four-Power 
control‖ and the West German government was formed shortly after the Paris 
meeting.
231
 At the end of the year Western powers initiated discussions about 
German rearmament and the USSR decided to use the Austrian question for 
bargaining purpose. ―The evacuation of Austria would be a price for the 
abandonment of the rearmament of West Germany if it could not be prevented in 
another way.‖232 
 Moreover, it is necessary to point out that in 1949, the US had also little 
motivation to sign the Treaty under the above mentioned conditions. First of all it 
feared that Stalin might realise its plan of spreading communism in Austria. Due to 
the communist takeover in Prague, the US worried that the Austrian communists 
would attempt to acquire power in Austria in a similar way. Thus, the United States 
launched an intensive program of rearmament of Western zones of Austria in order 
to prevent the Austrian potential communist revolt. Secondly, from the economic 
point of view the draft treaty of 1949 was very heavy in the sense that the Soviets 
wanted a cash payment for its approval to give back the ―German assets‖. Since 
Austria had virtually no money, it would have anticipated the US to pay.
233
  
These above mentioned reasons led to the interruption of talks about the 
Austrian State Treaty at the end of November 1949. 
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In January 1950 due to Austrian pressure, the negotiations were restarted 
again in London. However, the Korean War that took place in 1950 had negative 
effect on the negotiation process. Both the US and USSR had no intention to 
achieve some progress regarding the treaty talks.  
During the Korean War the Truman administration appeared to be more 
interested in military-strategic priorities rather than in diplomatic ones. It called for 
increased military strength in order to prevent the communist spill over around the 
world. In the course of the Korean War the US raised its defence budget from 13 
billions dollars to 52 billons dollars.
234
  
Taking into account military concerns and domestic opposition (Eisenhower 
criticised the Truman passive approach towards USSR expansion in Eastern 
Europe), the Truman administration was capable to negotiate seriously with the 
Kremlin.  ―In such dangerous times abroad and domestically perilous time at home, 
one simply did not compromise with the Kremlin. If the US sat down at the 
negotiation table at all, it was usually with an attitude of presenting maximum 
proposals that the Kremlin could either take or reject.‖235 
The USSR on its part created new obstacles in order to prevent the 
resolution of the Austrian problem. The Soviets blamed western powers for 
rearmament of Austria and Trieste. The Soviets announced that the Treaty could 
not be signed unless the Austria government dropped its policy orientated towards 
the West. The USSR stated that Austrians ―had no right to expect any tender 
consideration from the Soviet Government so long as the Austrian Government 
continued to act as a willing tool of powers unfriendly to Russia.‖236  
In 1951, the conclusion of the Austrian treaty seemed to be hard at best and 
impossible at worst to achieve. The US and the USSR were fully concentrated on 
other issues such as a Japanese peace treaty, future of Trieste, agreement over 
Germany and ―Koran armistice negotiation‖. Thus, in this year not a single meeting 
of deputies over the Austrian problem was held.
237
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In 1952 both the US and the USSR used the Austrian issue mainly for 
propaganda purposes.  In March 1952, the US presented a ―short treaty‖ draft. It 
contained only eight provisions instead of the fifty-nine clauses of the old treaty 
version. This abbreviated treaty draft excluded economical and political obligations 
placed on Austria and ignored such issues as restrictions on the Austrian army as 
well as denazification of Austria. Thus, it is logical to assume that the US did not 
expect the Soviets to agree on this treaty. The US probably used the ―short treaty‖ 
as a propaganda method to blame the USSR for continued failure to agree on the 
Austrian question. The USSR on the other hand used the German question not only 
for a bargaining purposes but also as a propaganda tactic designed to blame the US 
for ―the policy of no- negotiation‖. Thus, the resolution of the Austrian problem 
failed due to the West-East propaganda warfare.
238
  
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the West had hoped that the Soviet Union 
would change its attitude toward the Austrian State Treaty. The Berlin conference, 
however, which began on January 25, 1953 and ended without any results on 
February 18, 1954, confirmed that the USSR were still not prepared to change its 
official policy.
239
 It continued to use the Austrian question as a tool for preventing 
the ratification of the Paris accord aimed at entry of Western Germany into 
NATO.
240
   
 In principle, at the Berlin conference the USSR agreed to conclude the 
Austrian Treaty under three conditions. First of all Molotov insisted that an 
appropriate solution to the German problem should be found before withdrawal of 
the soviet troops from Austria.
241
 By appropriate solution, the Soviet Union 
understood the reunification of Germany under ―free election in a communist 
sense‖. The USSR thought that ―free election‖ should follow after the following 
activities - confiscation of ―the property of war criminals‖, complete elimination of 
―monopolies and combines‖, redistribution of goods from rich to ―poor peasants‖ 
and clean up of the civil administration.
242
 The second precondition for the 
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conclusion of the Austrian Treaty was guarantee that Austrian would never take 
part in any military arrangements and would prohibit the presence of any military 
foundations on its land.
243
 Finally, the USSR didn‘t want to evacuate Austria 
immediately after it signed the State Treaty. This precondition was a trap aimed at 
the incorporation of Austria into the ―socialist camp‖ in a similar way as it was 
achieved with the Baltic countries. After signing the Treaty the control agreement 
would be dropped and the Allied Council would be abolished. As a result the USSR 
would be able to interfere almost without any restriction on the part of western 
countries in the domestic policy of Austria.
244
 ―If communist-inspired riots broke 
out as in September 1950, Soviet troops could occupy the city to ―restore order‖ 
and the Western powers could do nothing without risking direct hostilities with the 
USSR.‖245 
Given these preconditions, it is no wonder that the Berlin meeting ended    
without any practical achievements.  
Only in February 8, 1955 Soviet Union announced its decision to consider a 
possibility of withdrawal of occupation troops from Austrian independently from 
the German problem. The Kremlin however stressed the importance to elaborate 
some guaranties that would prevent a new ―Anschluss‖ and situations where 
Austrian territory would be used for purposes of deploying arm forces of states that 
have unfriendly relationship with the USSR.
246
   
The Austrian government proposed ―a permanent neutrality after the Swiss 
model‖ as a guarantee against an Anschluss.247  The Kremlin accepted this 
suggestion and as a result the negotiation which begun with the Moscow meeting  
in April 1955 had, in the course of the following month, led to the conclusion of the 
Austrian State  Treaty.
248
  
The USSR agreed to evacuate Austria at the latest by December 31, 1955 
and to recognize the Austrian status of neutrality. Moreover, the Soviet Union made 
some important concessions in the economic field, namely it agreed to transform 
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the oil ownership rights back to Austria in return for ―delivery of one million tons 
of crude oil per year for ten years‖.249 Furthermore, the USSR was prepared to 
delete a few articles from the body of the treaty, such as obligations placed on 
Austria to expel some German citizens and war criminals. Finally, the Soviet Union 
accepted the removal of some clauses that placed limits on Austrian land as well as 
air forces.
250
  
As a result, the Austrian State Treaty was signed on the 15th of May 1955 
and took effect in the following days. After the ratification of the treaty, the 
Austrian government submitted the draft on the neutrality of the country to the 
Parliament.
251
  
What was behind this sudden change regarding the Austrian question? Why 
did the USSR agree to conclude the State Treaty in 1955 under the condition that 
Austria adopts the status of permanent neutrality, while the same proposal was 
rejected at the Berlin conference of 1953?
252
  The analysis below is intended to 
explain above mentioned questions through the theoretical framework elaborated in 
the first part of my dissertation.  
 
 
1.5.3 Theoretical part 
 
In this part, the overall objective is to investigate the question of why the 
USSR agreed to conclude the Austrian Treaty in 1955 under conditions requested 
by the West. It is possible to identify two general approaches about Soviet 
behaviour at the international level that might provide some basic explanations of 
the USSR policy in Austria. There are ―hard-line‖ and ―soft-line‖ approaches.  
Supporters of the ―soft-line‖ approach draw their perceptions from the 
defence theory. This theory describes the USSR foreign policy as defensive policy. 
Proponents of this theoretical assumption view the Soviet Union as ―a profoundly 
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conservative state primarily motivated by security concerns; its leaders see to 
stabilize their international relations so as to allow for greater concentration on 
internal problems of development.‖ 253 
Application of this theoretical approach to the Austrian case study suggests 
that the USSR policy in Austria was based on security and economic concerns 
rather than on its determination to change the Austrian political system under the 
example of the Soviet Union.  
 This viewpoint was famous among historians before collapse of 
communism, particularly among Austrian researchers. Many of them believed that 
the Kremlin was not prepared to conclude the Austrian Treaty until 1955 due to 
security and economic disputes. However, after opening soviet archives this 
assumption was seriously undermined. Newly accessible soviet official data clearly 
show that that the Soviet Union had an intention to integrate Austria into the 
―socialist camp‖.254 
Proponents of the ―hard line‖ approach generate their assumption from the 
―communist expansionism‖ theory. This theory suggests that the Soviet aim was to 
create worldwide communism. It assumes that Soviet leaders used any available 
opportunity in order to expand its influence and to impose communist ideology on 
the world. Proponents of this theoretical assumption view the Soviet Union foreign 
policy as offensive. However, supporters of this approach simultaneously 
emphasise that the Soviets‘ aspiration to create worldwide communism, has its limit 
grounded in the Soviet unwillingness to pay a high price for this expansion.
255
 
Application of this theoretical approach to the Austrian case study suggests 
that the USSR aim was to transform Austria into a people‘s democracy as was done 
with East European countries. Indeed, many researchers confirm this assumption 
and suggest that the Soviet Union attempted to incorporate Austria into ―socialist 
camp‖ by different methods. Consequently, the main reason why the Soviet Union 
agreed to conclude the State Treaty in 1955 was the Soviet‘s unwillingness to 
assume risks associated with its aim to include Austria in their sphere of security. 
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I completely disagree with proponents of the first approach and I only partly 
agree with supporters of the second theoretical assumption. I believe that the USSR 
had an intention to create communist order in Austria. However, I disagree that the 
Soviet Union have dropped this idea because it didn‘t want to pay a high price for 
the realisation of this aim. It is certainly true that by that time of the Austrian State 
Treaty conclusion the USSR realised that it can not incorporate Austria into the 
socialist camp by peaceful ways and it was not prepared to initiate a military 
conflict with western countries over the resolution of the Austria problem.
256
  
Moreover, official documents suggest that the USSR did not what to facilitate a 
split of the country.  ―To have forced the division of the country would have 
deprived Eastern Austria of the industrial raw materials and electrical power. 
Without these materials and electrical power, Eastern Austrian‘s industries would 
have been paralysed unless the necessary resources were taken from the already 
hard-pressed satellite economies.‖257 
However, in my opinion the USSR had another option at its disposal, 
namely to keep a status quo. Why the USSR did not follow this alternative?  
I believe that this question has to be analysed through a theoretical framework 
elaborated in the first chapter of my dissertation on the  combination of two 
theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical 
framework. The application of these theories to my case study suggests that Soviets 
leaders abandoned their strategy of delay and agreed to sign the treaty because of 
material and immaterial factors. In the empirical analysis below, the material factors 
will be analyzed though RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist 
framework.  
 
1.5.3.1 Rational Choice Theory 
 
According to rational choice theory, human beings are rational actors and all 
their actions are ‗rational‘ in character. Each actor seeks to maximize his own 
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gains by calculating all costs and benefits of any performance before deciding how 
to act.
258
 Thus, supporters of this theory would probably argue that the USSR made 
a decision to release Austria due to its rational calculation of costs and benefits. 
From the rational choice perspective, the status quo policy was rejected due to 
economic and geostrategic calculation of the Kremlin. Indeed, it is possible to 
mention at least six reasons that can confirm the RCT‘s assumption about the 
USSR‘s rational foreign policy calculations that produced a solution to the 
Austrian problem.   
1)  The Soviet Union feared that the hidden American plan of secret 
Austrian rearmament would facilitate the integration of Western Austria into 
NATO. ―Since the trend towards rearming the Western zones of Austria, and fully 
integrating them into NATO defence planning, would only have strengthened over 
time, it seemed like a prudent decision by the Kremlin masters to stop this creeping 
military integration of Austria into Western European defence and neutralize the 
country.‖ 259 
2) At the time of treaty conclusion the amount of reparations from German 
assets in Eastern Austria was declining.
260
  
3) The USSR became unable to use the Austrian question for bargaining 
proposes in order to prevent the plans of the west concerning the final resolution of 
German question. The Soviet Union failed to prevent the West German 
rearmament and its integration into the western defence community.
261
   
4) The USSR did not want to keep its forces in Austria permanently. In 
summer 1953 the Soviet Union had to assume all costs associated with the 
placement of its arm forces in Austria. Thus, from the economical point of view it 
was logical to leave Austria.  
5) Austria had lost by 1955 its economic attractiveness for the USSR. Since 
by this time the Soviet Union had acquired enough domestic oil, the Austrian oil 
supply was no longer an important commodity for the Russians. Moreover, the 
USIA (Administration for the Soviet property in Austria) industries were in a 
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terrible economic condition. It became increasingly hard for these industries to 
maintain its productivity and to be competitive on the Austrian market.
262
   
6) Finally, the State Treaty placed some difficulties on NATO defence 
strategy and the USSR hoped that it would eventually lead to the dissolution of this 
organisation. After Austria assumed its neutral status, it became hard for members 
of the NATO to maintain an effective communication and supply chain between 
Germany and Italy. After the neutralisation of Austria, NATO resources had to be 
transported through French territory.  ―If France‘s withdrawal of its military forces, 
NATO is eventually followed with a denial of French territory to NATO activities, 
the North Atlantic Treaty area would be split by a neutral belt, a situation that 
would have serious military implications for the West.‖263 
 I believe that economic and geostrategic reasons played a very important 
role in the USSR decision to release Austria. Rationalist assumptions bring 
important assets to the analysis as a starting point. However, in my opinion the 
conclusion of the Austrian treaty cannot be understood nor explained properly 
through the analysis of material factors alone. Opponents of the RCT fail to account 
adequately for the role of immaterial factors and tend to treat ‗national interests‘ as 
exogenously given.
264
 Therefore, they do not provide sufficient explanations about 
the question of why the USSR did not keep the status quo in Austria. I believe that 
the constructivists can contribute to the assumptions elaborated by supporters of 
theories that are grounded in cost-benefit analysis by integrating cultural constructs 
into the research. I think that this theoretical approach allows avoiding a universal 
generalisation of Soviet foreign policy that often produces false explanations of the 
international behaviour of the USSR.  
In this regard, it is argued below, that the conclusion of the Austrian state 
treaty can not be fully explained without an understanding of how ideas helped to 
create vital interests of the Soviet Union.  
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1.5.3.2 The constructivist theoretical framework 
 
Constructivists research design is based on analysis of ideational factors such 
as identity, culture, ideas, believes etc. in world politics. In other words, opponents 
of this theory focus on immaterial factors in their attempt to explain  processes of 
social construction of reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular 
rather than on the power of material and economic resources.
265
 Although 
constructivists do not neglect the power of material factors in determining a certain 
political outcome in international relations, they argue that social factors such as 
ideas, beliefs and identities provide meaning to material ones. ―The thought that is 
involved in international security is more important, far more important, than the 
physical assets that are involved because those assets have no meaning without the 
intellectual component: they are mere things in themselves.‖266 Since, however, 
constructivists do not neglect the influence of material factors on a certain political 
event, they offer one possible way of integrating material and ideational factors into 
the analysis. In other words, constructivism does not neglect explanations of rational 
choice theory regarding the conclusion of the Austrian treaty. It rather complements 
conclusions derived by the former theory.  
The constructivist theoretical framework provides insight on two issues that 
are relevant to my analysis. First of all it explains the evolution and the role of 
ideas in world politics. Secondly, it addresses the question of the structure and 
actors‘ relationship.  
Thus, in the analysis below I will focus on Soviet leaders‘ changing beliefs 
and on domestic structure of the USSR in order to explain the outcome of the 
negotiating process which resulted in the Austrian state treaty. 
 
Soviet leaders’ changing casual beliefs 
 
                                                 
265 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (2001); John Gerard Ruggie (1998); Alexander Wendt (1999) 
266 Jackson: ―Social Constructivism‖, Chapter 6, pp.165, Accessed: 2008,  
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199285433/jackson_chap06.pdf  
 
 83 
According to constructivism, ideas and beliefs play a crucial role in the 
international politics. They create actors and provide guidance for their behaviour. 
Constructivists believe that the international system is created by human beings and 
constituted by a set of ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs.
267
 They define four key 
types of norms and ideas which might have casual as well as constitutive effects on 
agents. There are world views, principled (normative) beliefs, causal beliefs and 
policy perceptions.
268
 For the purpose of my analyses it is necessary to provide 
definition of world views and casual beliefs. 
World views are an organized collection of ideas and beliefs through which 
individuals interpret the reality around them. These views can be based on religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc) or on political ideologies (communism, 
capitalism, fascism etc). Causal beliefs are beliefs which provide policy course for 
individuals on how to maintain or attain their policy aims and objectives.
269
  
The Soviet‘s world views were based on the communist ideology. As a 
result the USSR‘s policy objectives ware aimed at the protection of communism 
domestically and on spreading this ideology around the world. Thus, its concept of 
security was larger than in most western countries. Security needs were closely 
linked to expansionist behaviour.
270
 Therefore, Austria due to its geographical 
location was viewed as a military as well as an ideological shield against the 
―capitalist‖ countries.  
The Soviet leaders‘ new interpretation of the concept of neutrality as a 
means of realizing their key policy objectives aimed at the communist expansion 
facilitated the final outcome of the Austrian problem.
271
 
Neutrality was originally considered within the context of the European 
state system and was related to wartime only. The Hague Conventions of 1907 to a 
considerable extent codify the principles of wartime neutrality. First, it prohibited 
to neutral states to participate in an international conflict either directly or 
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indirectly by supplying belligerents with arms or money. Second, it did not allow 
belligerents to use the territory of the neutral states for transit of their troops or 
military equipment.
272
 These rights and obligations, however, were not applicable 
in times of peace. ―The core of neutrality is non-participation by a state in a war 
between other countries. Hence, classical interpretations hold that in the absence of 
war, the term is devoid of meaning.‖273  
However, in the 20
th
 century the concept of neutrality has undergone a 
dramatic transformation. It was not any longer seen as a wartime phenomenon but 
rather as a policy applicable in times of peace as well.  Nevertheless, despite that 
the implication of the term neutrality became broader, until the 1950s, this term 
remained mainly a western phenomenon. Indeed, the whole concept of neutrality is 
contradictive to the communist ideology.
274
 This concept is derived from the Latin 
language, meaning neither of two. According to the communist ideas, however, all 
human beings must give support to one side or the other because they deemed to 
participate in the ―class struggle‖. Marxism-Leninism ideology tries to postulate 
that man can not ―make himself neutral by deciding to opt out of the ―class war‖ 
altogether. Not to give aid to the ―proletariat‖ in its fight against the ―bourgeois‖ is, 
objectively speaking, to help the latter: He who is not with me is against me.‖275 
Thus, until the mid 1950s Soviet‘s leaders denied the feasibility of a neutral 
position.  
Khrushchev became the first Soviet top politician who managed to integrate 
this concept into the communist ideology. His new interpretation of the term of 
neutrality as means of strengthening the security of the USSR as well as a tool of 
creation of communist political system around the world made the Kremlin 
prepared to sign the Treaty under the condition agreed by the West. The Soviet 
Union believed that by proclaiming its neutrality, Austria would become an 
obstacle for the realization of military plans of the west in Europe and a model for 
other countries around the world.
276
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 In the section below I will explain the complex process of Soviet leaders‘ 
changing casual beliefs in general and their impact on the resolution of the 
Austrian problem in particular through the constructivists understanding of the 
structure and actors‘ relationship.  
 
The structure and actors’ relationship 
 
According to constructivism, structures and agents are ―mutually 
constituted‖. ―The relationship between structures and actors involves 
intersubjective understanding and meaning. Structures do constrain actors, but 
actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in 
new ways.‖277  Thus, according to the constructivist theoretical approach the 
structures and agents do not have a fixed nature. They are always in a process of 
development. Agents socialize in a certain social context which shapes their 
actions. In turn actors shape their own social context when new thoughts and ideas 
expressed by them enter the system.  Thus, according to the constructivists‘ point 
of view, both the domestic and the international system might change dramatically 
because people and states can start to consider each other differently and thus 
interpret old norms in a new way or invent principles that may be completely 
different from the old ones.
278
 
The Soviet Union political and social system was constructed by Lenin. It 
was based on communist ideology and idea of world revolution. These two 
elements were essential for the survival of this structure. (When Gorbachev had 
attempted to change the existing structure in a radical way, the whole system 
collapsed).  
Soviet leaders acquired power from and were socializing the system. Thus, 
their actions and behaviour were shaped by existing rules in the system. In other 
words, Soviet leader‘s interests and identities depended on the context (system) in 
which they found themselves. However, according to the constructivist view, the 
Soviet system was not constant. It was always in a process of development because 
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soviet leaders had the power to include new ideas and means of spreading 
communism around the world. 
I believe that the constructivist assumptions about the interdependent 
relationship between agents and their social context help to understand behaviour 
of the USSR in Austria. It shows that the Soviet leaders depended on the essential 
elements of the system. Thus, their calculation on the Austrian question was linked 
its ideological aim of spreading communism around the world.
279
 However, they 
were altering the system by creating a new means of achieving this ideological 
goal.  The ―mutually constituted‖ relationship between Soviet leaders and the 
political system of the USSR produced a new policy course in the field of foreign 
policy where the principle of neutrality was assigned a unique and more important 
role as an integral element of ―coexistence policy‖. As a result the USSR agreed to 
conclude the Austrian State Treaty and the resolution of the Austrian Problem 
became possible.
280
  
In the following sections, I will show the ways of how Soviet leaders ware 
changing their beliefs on how to realize the aim of strengthening the communists 
political system around the world in general and in Austria in particular in a more 
detailed way. I will prove that both Stalin and Khrushchev have never rejected the 
idea of world revolution, rather they created new strategies on how to achieve this 
objective. Thus, the Stalin doctrine of ―the socialism in one country‖ and 
Khrushchev policy of ―peaceful coexistence‖ were rather propaganda technique 
than a genuine intention on the part of the USSR.
281
  
 
Stalin and his tactic of strengthening the position of communists around the 
world 
 
When the world revolution predicted by Lenin failed to take place, Stalin 
had formulated a new doctrine, the so-called ―socialism in one country‖. The 
priority was given to national security and rapid industrialisation of the USSR. 
―Stalin transformed the Comintern from an instrument seeking world revolution 
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into one serving his domestic policy preferences and his drive to create a personal 
dictatorship.‖282 
 It is necessary to point out the Stalin doctrine of ―socialism in one county‖ 
in no way meant the rejection of the world revolution. ―As Stalin himself stressed 
in his Problems of Leninism, the victory of communism in one country could by 
no means be considered an end in itself or a final goal.‖283It was just temporally 
halted until the economic potential of the Soviet Union would be fully utilised.   
During WWII, Stalin realised that the USSR can not survive without 
economic and military assistance on the part of western allies. Thus, he further 
reformulated Lenin‘s tactics of spreading communism from below (by the working 
class that should be guided by a small group of communist elite). Lenin understood 
the process of power sizing as a result of prompt revolution.  Stalin in contrast 
believed that revolution should be organised from above and to be a long-term 
process lasting many years, if necessary.
284
 
Stalin hoped to spread a Soviet state system in every centimetre of territory 
conquered by the Red Army in World War II. During WWII, Stalin declared that 
―Everyone impose his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be 
otherwise.‖ 285 
Stalin‘s tactics of distribution of the communist ideology was based on the 
creation of national front government consisting of all ―antifascist democratic‖ 
parties including communists and applied to European countries liberated from the 
Nazi. According to the communists, the advantage of the strategy of step by step 
transformation of Central and East European countries into a people‘s democracy 
was that it could be carried out without opposition on the part of the West.
286
  
Thus, in 1945 Stalin decided to set up the provisional government of Karl 
Renner with the hope to form a communist regime in Austria. The Soviet Union 
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hoped at least until 1953 to realise this plan in Austria, namely to create a 
communist government that would insure eventual communist victory.
287
   
The main error of this plan was the Soviet Union decision to hold free 
―election under impartial control‖ in 1945 in Austria.  This mistake was probably 
made because the soviet leaders were overconfident in a significant communist vote 
and feared that the Western Allies‘ would not approve the Renner government 
without free elections. As a result, the KPO gained only 5.4 % of the vote and only 
four sets in the parliament.
288
 
Nevertheless the political goal to weaken the non-communist parties and to 
create the communist political system in Austria remained intact.  
In order to achieve this aim, the USSR started to apply a new tactic. The 
soviet authorities started to look for new partners for the Communist Party of 
Austria by launching contacts with pro-Soviet and pro-communist groups in 
Austria.
289
 
Thus, in 1946, Soviet leaders contacted the social democrat dissident Erwin 
Scharf in order to find a new partner for the CPA. Erwin Scharf was a founder of 
the Workers‘ party. Before the general election of 1949, he formed the ―linksblock‖ 
with the CPA. ―This merger was, as Deputy High Commissioner Aleksei Zeltove 
wrote, inspired and founded by the Soviet element which tried to influence the 
elections in a pro-communist way‖. 290 However, communists couldn‘t gain support 
of the Austrian public and failed to increase the amount of seats in the government. 
They received only 5.08 % of the vote.
291
  
Despite this defeat of the CPA, Soviet leaders didn‘t drop its tactic of 
creating the communist regime in Austria.  In 1950, Soviet leaders invited the pro-
Soviet Democratic Union to join the ―linksblock‖. As a result, a new bloc, the so-
called ―Volksopposition‖ was formed. However, this attempt to strengthen 
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communists‘ influence in Austria was not successful as well. The election of 1953 
appeared to be a third defeat for communists. They acquired only 5.28 % of the 
votes cast.
292
 
The tactic of the national front government formation was designed in order 
to increase communist power in Europe and was applied in Austria until the death 
of Stalin.  
 
Khrushchev: New policy course  
 
After Stalin death, a collective group assumed governance of the USSR 
because there was no strong member of the Party Presidium that could become a 
leader without any objections from his colleagues. The collective group decided to 
adopt a short-term policy of relaxation at the international level in order to be able 
to divert more attention to the internal fight over power. This policy of relaxation 
was also applied to Austria. For example, the USSR eliminated a censorship and 
abolished or eased traffic controls between Eastern and Western zones of 
Austria.
293
  
It is important to point out that in fact the collective group continued to 
follow the tactics announced by Stalin. Namely, they had been convinced that 
sooner or later disagreements would arise between capitalist states which would 
eventually lead to the desolation of capitalist camp.
294
 
Thus, these relatively unimportant Soviet Union concessions were a 
propaganda trick aimed at convincing the West that the USSR political system 
might undertake a fundamental modification. By doing so the Soviet Union hoped 
to achieve some level of reward on the part of Western countries and to worsen the 
relationship between the democratic states.  
The new policy doctrine had been formulated only after Khrushchev had 
managed to defeat Molotov and to establish his influence in the Party Presidium. 
He initiated a new course in the field of foreign policy. He made many significant 
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ideological changes and formulated a new policy approach toward the US, Western 
Europe, the Soviet block, and the third block (neutral counties). He also 
reformulated Stalin‘s ―two-camp theory of international politics‖ by distinguishing 
five types of nations, namely  the USSR, other socialist countries, ―neutral or 
uncommitted countries‖, ―members of regional security pacts with the US and 
American allies‖, and the United States. To each type of nation he proposed 
different roads to communism.
295
 
Khrushchev adopted a new course in the field of foreign policy based on the 
doctrine of ―peaceful coexistence‖. He believed that Soviet influence in the nuclear 
area should be enhanced by some other means rather than a military 
confrontation.
296
 Thus, he reformulated Stalin‘s doctrine of ―inevitability of war‖ 
without, however, losing the hope of further expansion of the Communist 
movement. ―The revision only meant that the Soviet Union did not, as in Stalin‘s 
lifetime, consider war the single or the most decisive factor for the realisation of its 
long-term program: ―the final victory of socialism on an international scale.‖  297 
These fundamental changes in the field of foreign policy immediately 
provided a new and more important role to the concept of neutrality as an integral 
element of the coexistence policy.   
Khrushchev gave a new meaning to the concept of neutrality. He understood 
this term as a tool of achieving world revolution that should be carried out step by 
step. Thus, the word neutrality had to serve the following functions
298
: 
1) Weakening NATO and to preventing countries to enter into this 
or similar military arrangements. 
2) Preventing former colonial states from cooperation with the US 
and its alliances 
3) Attracting countries that assume a neutral status to join the 
―socialist camp‖. 
 
                                                 
295 See Erik P.Hoffman (1991): ―Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev‖, in: 
Frederic j. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird (1991): ―Soviet Foreign Policy. Classic and Contemporary Issues‖, pp.59-
64; Sven Allard (1970): ―Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe‖, pp.204-214 
296 See Sven Allard (1970): ―Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe‖, 
pp.205-214; Abraham Brumberg (1962): ―Russia Under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism, pp.130-131 
297 Sven Allard (1970): ―Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe‖, pp.207-208 
298 See Sven Allard (1970): ―Russian and the Austrian State Treaty, A Case Study of Soviet Policy in Europe‖, 
pp.204-214 
 91 
The constructivist assumption regarding the power of words is clearly 
visible in the case of Austria. The USSR placed special importance on the use of 
the world neutrality. During the negotiation talks of 1955, the Soviet Union insisted 
on this definition. The Austrian delegation in Moscow preferred another definition 
such as ―freedom from alliances‖ or ―the foreign policy based on the principle of 
neutrality‖. The Kremlin however categorically rejected these expressions. The 
Soviet authorities made it clear that the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty 
depend on the acceptance of the word neutrality by Austrian delegation.
299
  
It is important to note that Molotov - like Stalin - considered neutrality in a 
different way. Both of them denied the practicability of this concept. They did not 
believe that it could facilitate world revolution.  
Thus, had Molotov instead of Khrushchev succeeded in a power struggle 
within the Kremlin, it is very likely that the Austrian State Treaty would not have 
been signed in 1955. This assumption could be confirmed by the fact that during 
the Berlin conference, Molotov was mainly responsible for the foreign policy 
agenda. As I already pointed out in the first part of my case study during the Berlin 
meeting Molotov refused to withdraw from Austria and to sign the treaty under the 
condition that it agrees to assume the concept of neutrality.
300
 Thus, the evolution 
of the concept of neutrality undertaken by Khrushchev led to the resolution of the 
Austrian problem.  
1.5.4 Conclusion 
 
This part of my dissertation was dedicated to the analysis of the policy of 
the Soviet Union in Austria between 1945 and 1955. The main goal of my research 
was to understand why the Soviet Union agreed to evacuate Austria in 1955 under 
terms acceptable to the Western countries. I have come to conclusion that RCT 
assumptions about human rationality help to understand this question to some 
extent.  I think that economic and geostrategic reasons played an important role in 
the Soviet decision to release Austria.  However, in my opinion, proponents of this 
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theoretical approach don‘t provide sufficient explanation about the question why 
the USSR did not keep the status quo in Austria. Thus, in order to enhance the 
theoretical explanations elaborated by the supporters of RCT I applied 
constructivist assumptions regarding two issues. The first one was their 
assumptions on the interdependent relationship between agents (Soviet leaders) and 
their social context (the USSR political system). The second issue addressed by 
constructivists is the evaluation and the role of norms.  
In my essay I tried to prove that the ―mutually constituted‖ relationship 
between Soviet leaders and the USSR political system produced a new course in the 
field of foreign policy, where the principle of neutrality was assigned a special and 
more important role As a result, the resolution of the Austrian Problem became 
possible.     
 
.  
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1.6 The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979  
 
1.6.1 Introduction  
 
The Egyptian-Israeli conflict dates back to 1948, when the UN passed a 
resolution aimed at the partition of Palestine into two states, one for Jewish and one 
for Palestinian people. This resolution was categorically rejected by most Arab states, 
including Egypt. Nevertheless, Israel announced its independence on May, 1948. This 
event almost immediately provoked the first Arab-Israeli war which resulted in a 
victory of the Jewish people. Even though Arab states, including Egypt agreed to sign 
armistice agreements with Israel in 1949, a state of war did not come to an end.
301
 
―Officially, no Arab country recognized the armistice lines of 1949 as international 
borders, and no Arab country recognized Israel, diplomatically. Israel, according to 
Arab rhetoric, had no right to exist, and was referred to as "The Zionist entity."
302
 The 
destruction of the state of Israel became the key goal of Arab states headed by Egypt.  
 Since then Israel fought several wars with Egypt, namely the Suez-Sinai War 
of 1956, the Six Day of war of 1967, the War of Attrition of 1969 and the Yom 
Kippur war of 1973. Those wars not only deepen negative perceptions of Israeli and 
Egyptian people towards each other but also produced new disputes.  
The most destructive war for Egypt and other Arab states was the Six-Day 
War of 1967. It resulted in enormous victory of Israel. Israelis managed to occupy all 
of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan Heights.
303
 However, 
Israel‘s success in the Six-Day War did not stop the conflict. On the opposite, it 
increased the level of aggression of Arab nations toward Israel and created a huge 
psychological obstacle to negotiation. In response to its defeat, Arab states established 
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a uniform policy of ―three noes‖, namely no peace with Israel, no recognition of 
Israel, no negotiations with Israel.
304
  
 Consequently the possibility of peaceful resolution of the conflict between 
Israel and Egypt was greatly reduced. It became difficult to imagine that both states 
would manage to solve the conflict in a peaceful way.  
Nevertheless, in November 1977 Sadat decided to go to Jerusalem to talk with 
Israelis directly. This journey and Sadat‘s remarkable speech before the Knesset did 
not only shock Israelis and the West but also the USSR, African states and the entire 
Arab world. This trip led in the following year to the Camp David Accords and to a 
peace agreement between these two countries, the first such treaty between Israel and 
Arab state.  
Although the history of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and peace diplomacy is 
quite well documented, there are still some questions that are open for different 
interpretation. Among them are the following:   
 Why did Egypt, a creator of the pan-Arabism ideology and an Arab 
commitment to seek Israel‘s destruction, become the first Arab country which 
established the negotiation line with Israel? Why did Egypt agree to recognise Israel, 
after so many years of denying the right of it to exist? Why did Sadat agree to move 
alone without support of other Arab states in achieving a bilateral peace agreement 
with Israel? Why did Israel agree to give Sinai back to Egypt without requesting in 
return nothing else but just an official peace treaty? Why did the negotiation process 
take so many years? Why various efforts over the years to settle the conflict had 
failed? 
In this case study, I will mostly focus on these questions. In order to answer 
the above mentioned questions it is necessary to provide historical background of 
Egyptian-Israeli peace process and to understand the factors that shaped both the 
Egyptian and Israeli foreign policy.  
Thus, the first part of this chapter will be dedicated to the historical 
background of Egypt-Israeli peace diplomacy. I will show that Israelis and Egyptians 
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were not able to conclude a peace agreement before 1979 because of two key 
obstacles. During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser the key obstacle was Egypt‘s 
resistance to accept the right of Israel to exist. During Sadat's presidency the key 
obstacle to the successful resolution of the conflict was the Palestinian issue of self-
determination. Sadat faced a controversial question of how to promote Egyptian 
interest while not sacrificing the demands of the other Arab states in general and the 
Palestinian people in particular. Israelis, on the other hand, wished to conclude a 
peace agreement with Egypt but not at any price. They were not prepared to give back 
Judea and Samaria (the West Bank and Gaza) to a foreign control.  
The second and the third parts of this chapter will be dedicated to the 
theoretical explanation of Israel‘s and Egypt‘s decision to conclude the peace 
agreement in 1979. My analysis of this historical event will be based on the 
combination of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice theory and the 
constructivist theoretical framework. I will evaluate the entire complex of different 
reasons that led to the conclusion of this treaty. The material factors will be 
analyzed though RCT, while the immaterial ones through constructivism.  
 
 
1.6.2 Negotiating process 
 
 
Before the Six-Day War of 1967 almost no serious effort aimed at the 
resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict had been made. Only after the June War the 
international community began to realise the urgent need to find the solution to this 
conflict. Moreover, this war made negotiation unavoidable.
305
 It opened up new 
possibilities for breaking the diplomatic deadlock that had been present during many 
years. The occupied territories provided to Israel a powerful bargaining advantage. 
For the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict Israel had something to 
offer to Arab states in return for recognizing the right of Israel to exist. ―For the first 
time, there appeared to be a basis for a final settlement that would be acceptable to 
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both sides….Israel now had the leverage to pursue a peace based on partition, since it 
held all of the land that might form any future Palestinian state.‖306 
The first serious attempt to settle the disputes between these two countries 
was initiated by the American president. On June 19, 1967 Johnson elaborated five 
key principles aimed at the conflict resolution in the Middle East.
307
 There were: ―the 
recognised right to national life; justice for refugees; innocent maritime passage; 
limits on the arm race; and political independence and territorial integrity for all.‖ 308 
Israelis and Egyptians, however, had no motivation to recognise Johnson‘s 
principles. Nevertheless, this peace initiative became a basis for the UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 aimed at the conflict settlement in the Middle East, which 
was passed unanimously on November 22, 1967.
309
 This resolution adopted the ―land 
for peace‖ formula and became a basis for all subsequent peace negotiation between 
Arab states and Israeli. ―The land for peace formula provided the foundation for every 
serious effort at peacemaking from the end of the 1967 war to the Oslo Accord of 
1993 and even after.‖310 
 In order to achieve an unanimous vote, the content and language of the 
resolution 242 was very ambiguous. It left enormous area for conflicting 
interpretations and provided only a general outline from which specific negotiations 
could be initiated.
311 Thus, both countries, Israel and Egypt had the possibility to 
interpret this resolution to their own benefit. Egypt accepted the paragraph which 
called for Israeli withdrawal from ―territories occupied in the recent conflict‖, but 
ignored all other principles of this resolution. In other words, Egyptian leaders argued 
that the resolution implies total Israeli withdrawal without a need of further 
negotiation. They stated that the resolution does not call for formal peace treaties with 
Israel.
312
  Israel, for its part, argued that this resolution is only an outline for future 
negotiation aimed at achieving formal peace agreements and it can not be applied to 
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all involved countries in the conflict.
313
 Therefore, the following diplomatic efforts 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s have been an attempt to identify the common 
language and to find a middle ground between those completely different views 
regarding the resolution 242.  
In early 1969 Nixon became the president of the US and tried to initiate an 
active Middle East diplomacy. He was fully committed to find a solution to the 
Middle East conflict. This commitment was grounded not only in his personal 
motivation to end the conflict but also in his desire to reduce the role of the USSR in 
the region.
314
 Thus, he authorized a secretary of State William Rogers to draft a plan 
for the resolution of the Middle East conflict.  
On December 9, 1969 William Rogers produced a ―package settlement‖ for 
the Middle East based on two accommodations. The first one was aimed at ending the 
state of war between Egypt and Israel, while the second one was dedicated to the 
resolution of the conflict between Israel and Jordan. This ―package settlement‖ called 
for Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian land occupied in the War of 1967, for 
establishing demobilized sectors and for providing both Israel and Jordan with the 
authority to govern Jerusalem.
315
  
This peace plan was formally accepted by Egypt. Israel, however, rejected 
Rogers' plan without even considering it as an option. It was unacceptable for Israel 
because of two reasons. Firstly, the US did not consult Israel before introducing the 
―package settlement‖ publicly. Secondly, Israelis disliked the content of this plan. 
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir responded to this initiative by saying that ―It would 
be irresponsible for any Israeli government to support such a plan.‖316 Israelis were 
not willing to return to pre-June 1967 borders nor did it want to share Jerusalem with 
Jordan. There were no sufficient reasons for them to break the status quo. Moreover, 
this plan did not foresee any formal peace treaties between concerned parties.
317
 As a 
result, the US Congress had to dismiss this peace initiative. 
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In April 1969 Egypt launched the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal 
against Israel in order to break the diplomatic deadlock. Egypt‘s goal was to impose 
on Israel as many damages as possible in order to liberate Sinai.
318
 Israel, however, 
was very successful in counterattacks. ―The fundamental weakness of the ―attrition‖ 
strategy was Israel‘s ability to escalate the conflict when costs grew onerous and 
make the Egyptian costs too great to bear.‖319 Thus, Nasser had to accept another 
Roger‘s initiative aimed at cease-fire on the Israel-Egypt front.320  Although the 
cease-fire ended an active fighting, a state of war remained in effect. Egypt still 
demanded total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories without granting it a 
formal peace treaty and recognition of its right to exist. Israel, in contrast, insisted on 
full peace without being committed to a complete removal of its troops from the 
conquered land.
321
  
In September 1970, Nasser died of a hard attack and Anwar Sadat became 
the president of Egypt. Israelis as well as Americans viewed him as a follower of 
Nasser. They consider him as a ―minor political player‖ and believed that he will 
continue to follow the foreign policy goals elaborated by Nasser, namely orientation 
towards Arab states, willingness to destroy Israel and alliance with the USSR. Indeed, 
this assumption was confirmed by Sadat in earlier speeches and interviews.
322
 For 
example, in the speech to the ASU of November, 1970, Sadat repeated ―Nasserite 
principles‖ of anti-imperialism and Arabism. ―On anti-imperialism, Sadat promised 
that all efforts, manpower, and economic resources will be mobilized until victory 
against Zionism and imperialism is achieved.‖323 During his speeches and interviews 
he describeld Israel as ―illegitimate, a foreign body artificially implanted in the 
Middle East by empirical or colonial powers.‖324 Thus, it was hard to imagine that 
Sadat would move the negotiating process forward. He, however, was unsatisfied with 
the situation of neither war nor peace. Thus, he had to choose between the former and 
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the latter. Since Egypt could not afford another war with Israel, Sadat opted for a 
diplomatic solution to the conflict in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 
242. ―Having decided that the year 1971 or 1972 would be a year of decision for war 
or peace, and realising that he could not wage war, Sadat was prepared to launch a 
peace initiative.‖325 Thus, the year 1971 produced two Sadat‘s profound peace 
proposals.  
The first peace proposal was announced by Sadat in December 1971. He 
called for a total withdrawal of Israeli forces form Sinai by two stages. The first stage 
foresaw the retreat of Israel from the Suez Canal to about fifteen kilometres. 
According to Sadat‘s plan, after completion of the first stage, the Suez Canal would 
be open again and six hundred Egyptian policemen would be placed on the east side 
of the canal. The second stage envisaged a final withdrawal of Israeli armed forced 
from the Sinai.
326
  
Although Moshe Dayan tried to convince Israeli Primer Minister Golda 
Meir to agree on a partial withdrawal from Sinai, Golda Meir rejected Sadat‘s offer. 
Dayan believed that such a step on the part of Israel might lead to a peace treaty. He 
argued ―that if Israel withdrew from the canal area ―far enough so that we do not sit 
on their (Suez Canal) neck‖ and receive an Egyptian promise to rebuild the canal 
cities and open the canal, which has been closed since the June 1967 War, this would 
be the best assurance that Egypt‘s intentions were not to launch another war, and 
perhaps even would bring about negotiations.‖327  
Golda Meir, however, had other arguments at her disposal. First, she did not 
believe that Sadat was serious about his initiative and feared that it was just a 
manoeuvre. ―We retreat one inch from the canal….we will in no time land at the 
international border.‖328Second, Sadat offered to little for the Sinai Peninsula. He did 
not promise a written peace treaty entitled recognition of Israel. Sadat declared that 
unless Israel withdrew from all occupied territories, including Jerusalem, he would 
not sign such a treaty. Israelis, however, were not prepared to return to the 1967 
                                                 
325 Joseph Finklestone (1996): ―Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared‖, pp.75  
326 See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): ―Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace‖, pp.59 
327 Kenneth W. Stein (1999): ―Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace‖, pp.59 
328 Gideon Rafael (1992), in: Kenneth W. Stein(1999): ―Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the 
Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace‖, pp.59 
 100 
borders, nor did they want to give up Sinai for only a ―non belligerent‖ treaty with 
Egypt.
329
 Therefore, Sadat‘s peace initiative came to nothing.  
This failure in the diplomatic realm, however, did not reduce the desire of 
Sadat to liberate Sinai. Thus, in April 1971 he made another proposal with regard to 
interim agreements concerning Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in stages. At that time, 
however, he did not care about the lengths and total amount of stages as well as about 
the character of withdrawal. He just wanted a complete Israeli‘s armed forces removal 
from the Egyptian land. ―The only thing that‘s important is that I have the ultimate 
commitment now, before any action takes place, that there is going to be a final 
withdrawal.‖330  
In return, Sadat offered a non-belligerency agreement to Israel. According to 
his proposal, the interim agreement would be concluded with the help of mediators 
but without any direct contact between Israelis and Egyptians.  
This proposal, however, had the same destiny as the first one. The Israeli 
Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected it because of four key reasons. Firstly, Israel was 
not prepared to link the first stage of withdrawal to the second one. Golda Meir did 
not want to accept the condition under which the withdrawal from one occupied 
territory has to lead to the withdrawal from another piece of land. Secondly, the USA 
did not actively support this plan. Since the administration wanted a comprehensive 
settlement of the Middle East conflict suggested by Rogers, rather than interim or 
phased agreement proposed by Sadat, it did not invest a lot of time or effort in the 
Israeli-Egyptian negotiations of 1971. Thirdly, Israel wanted a peace treaty as well as 
diplomatic relations with Egypt in return for Sinai, while Sadat had only offered the 
interim agreement. Finally, Sinai was strategically important territory for Israel. It was 
viewed as a key strategic area. Since, however, Golda Meir did not trust Sadat and did 
not believe that he had true intention to stop fighting Israel, she feared of even partial 
withdrawal of Israeli armed force from Sinai. Therefore, Sadat‘s second peace 
initiative did not lead to any practical achievement.
331
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After the failure of those two plans, Sadat became convinced that Israel 
would not make any kind of arrangement with him unless Egypt showed that it still 
had enough military strength to start a war against Israel. Thus, he changed his policy 
and launched the war in October 1973.
332
 The aim of this war, however, was not to 
destroy Israel but to start a negotiation process with Israel. ―Sadat did not seek a total 
military victory, or even the recovery of Sinai by forces; his aim was to change the 
psychological relationship by showing that Egypt could still inflict heavy costs on 
Israel so long as it continued to occupy Sinai-while at the same time removing the 
burden of humiliation that limited Egyptian flexibility.‖ 333 
Israelis did not believe that Sadat intended to launch a war against them.
334
 
Thus, they did not mobilise their armed troops at time. This failure provided Egypt 
with considerable initial success during the Yom Kippur war.
335
 ―Only in the early 
hours of 6 October did Israeli government receive information that finally convinced 
the Prime Minister and Defence Minister that Egyptian and Syrians intended to attack 
that very day. But they still got the hour of the attack wrong-a mistake which was to 
cost many lives.‖336 
At the middle of the Yom Kippur war, Sadat produced another peace offer 
which was greatly influenced by the initial triumph of Egyptian army. Therefore, this 
proposal was more hostile toward Israel than his previous two offers of 1971.
337
 He 
called for an international conference aimed at a cease-fire and final settlement of the 
Middle East conflict based on two key conditions, namely on immediate Israeli return 
to pre-June 1967 borders and self-determination for the Palestinians. In return, Sadat 
did not even offer a non-belligerency agreement to Israel. He only promised to stop 
the active fighting. He stated that there would be no recognition of Israel and no 
diplomatic relations with it. ―Calling for an international conference after Israeli 
withdrawal was a precondition for negotiations without either non-belligerency or 
peace promised from the Egyptian side. Sadat certainly was not signalling 
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compromise to Israeli listeners.‖338 Israelis, however, started to achieve success in the 
battle field by surrounding the Egyptian Third Army. Thus, it has no motivation to 
accept this offer. 
Thus, the military result of the Yom Kippur war was not obvious. Egypt 
managed to replace the memories of the defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967 by placing 
its troops in the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israelis, on the other hand, managed to 
complete their plan aimed at surrounding of the Egyptian Third Army.
339
 Since the 
distraction of this army would mean a complete defeat of Egypt and another Arab 
embarrassment, the international community tried to prevent such an outcome at any 
price. ―The destruction of the Third Army had the potential of destroying Sadat‘s 
presidency, not to mention jeopardizing his newly expanded opening to the United 
States.‖340  
Therefore, on October 21, Kissinger and Brezhnev wrote a cease-fire 
resolution aimed at termination of the war within twelve hours and the 
implementation of the UN Resolution 242. This draft became the UNSC resolution 
338, which was accepted unanimously on October 22, 1973.
341
 
 Egypt had no other option as to accept a cease-fire agreement immediately. 
Israelis, however, did not want to implement this resolution before they fully enclose 
the Egyptian Third Army. Although they had no intention to defeat this army, they 
still wanted to surround it before accepting the UN resolution for the future strategic 
benefit in the negotiating process. Since the cease-fire resolution did not include any 
enforcement mechanisms, Israel managed to violate it. 
342
 
Thus, on October 23, the United Nation Security Council passed another 
cease-fire resolution, known as resolution 339. Unlike the first cease-fire resolution, 
this one included some enforcement measures. It called for arrival of United Nations 
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observer forces to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire agreement by the 
conflicting parties. Nevertheless, Israel ignored this resolution as well.
343
 
This provoked very negative response on the part of the Soviet Union, 
which believed that there was an American support behind Israel‘s violation of cease-
fire resolutions. This produced a very dangerous situation of a direct clash between 
the Soviet Union and the Unites States. Fortunately, Israelis finally agreed to accept 
the cease-fire resolution which put an end to the possibility of a superpower 
confrontation. 
344
 
 At the end of October, Israeli leaders proposed to start direct military talks 
with Egypt. To their surprise, Egypt agreed to this proposal.
345
 Thus, on 28 October 
the direct communication line between military officials of two countries was 
established. Those discussions became known as ―Kilometre 101 Talks‖.  
Israel had two issues on its agenda for negotiations. The first one and the 
most important was the return of prisoners of war. The second issue was the 
abolishment of the Egyptian ―naval blockade of Israeli shipping at the Bab al-Mandab 
Straits.‖ Egypt‘s agenda was the delivery of non military supply to the Third Army 
and its final liberation.
346
 Those military talks were unique in a sense that they were 
organised without a third party in a mediation role.
347
 Moreover, the ―Kilometer 101 
talks‖ were the first direct negotiation attempt conducted by Egypt and Israel since 
1948. Furthermore, although the ―kilometre 101 talks‖ were closely monitored by 
Sadat and Meir, delegations from the Egyptian and Israeli armies went through a 
greater amount of issues than they initially supposed to discuss. They discussed not 
only strictly agreed military related issues but also some of the political questions.
348
  
Unfortunately, however, the ―Kilometre 101 Talks‖ were suddenly 
interrupted due to the US request to stop discussion at the bilateral level. Americans 
convinced Golda Meir to transform the negotiations to the multilateral arrangement of 
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the Geneva conference. ―The cease-fire remained in effect, but all of the details-
withdrawal, how far, and who did what to whom-were to be the subject of the Geneva 
Conference……The United States had missed an opportunity to pressure Sadat into 
making peace with Israel when the Israeli Army was at kilometre 101.‖349  
Nevertheless, the ―Kilometre 101 Talks‖ resulted in the six-point agreement aimed at 
the cease-fire.
350
 It became the first agreement signed by Israel and Egypt since the 
1949 Armistice Agreement. Moreover, the success of the ―Kilometre 101 Talks‖ had 
shown that Egyptian and Israeli leaders not only want to conclude the disengagement 
agreement but also willing to achieve more comprehensive solution to the conflict. On 
December 1, 1973, the Geneva conference on the Middle East took place. It was 
sponsored by the United Nation secretary general, with the US and the Soviet Union 
as co-chairmen. The agenda for this conference was not less ambiguous as to find a 
comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict and to establish a durable peace in 
the Middle East. 
Although both Egypt and Israel favoured the Geneva Conference, they did 
not pursue such an unrealistic aim as a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Golda 
Meir did not want any substantive discussion due to the Knesset parliamentary 
elections, which had to take place in December 1973, while Sadat because of the 
opposition on the part of the Arab world. 
351
 
For Israel participation in the Geneva Conference was very important due to 
at least four reasons. Firstly, Meir did not want to negotiate with Sadat alone. She 
wished to have the US as a guarantor of what might be decided during the discussion. 
Secondly, Golda Meir wanted to maintain good relations with the US and to receive 
economic aid from Washington. Thirdly, she hoped that this conference might to 
some degree help to improve relationship with Egypt. Finally, Golda Meir hoped to 
gain the sympathy on the part of the international community through the 
international media reporting.
352
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For Egypt it was very important to hold this conference due to at least three 
reasons. Firstly, Sadat wanted to attract attention of the USA to the negotiation 
process and to deepen relationship with it. Secondly, he hoped that the conference 
would help him to define an agenda for further bilateral negotiations with Israel based 
on his national interest of liberating the Sinai Peninsula rather than on the Palestinian 
course. In order to achieve this aim he insisted that discussions which might appear 
from the conference to be dealt in geographic committees which would allow to each 
country to reach its own independent agreement with Israel rather than in functional 
ones aimed at inter-Arab issues such as Israel‘s withdrawal from all territories 
occupied in 1967. ―The goal of Sinai‘s return would therefore not be held hostage to 
some topical or functional committee dealing with ―territories‖ or ―withdrawal‖ or 
―the Palestinian question‖ in which all participating Arab parties could exercise a veto 
over Egypt‘s prerogative.‖353 It is, however, necessary to note that Sadat‘s desire to 
help the Palestinian people did not reduced. He, nevertheless, was an Egyptian 
nationalist and, therefore, his national policy priorities were far more important than 
Palestinians ones.
354
 Thirdly, Sadat though that the conference would help him to 
weaken the expected opposition on the part of Arab world that might appear should 
Egypt conclude a bilateral peace agreement with Israel. He wanted to hide his real 
motivation aimed at the liberation of the Sinai at any price by showing at the 
conference that Egypt is not dropping the Palestinian problem. This fact can be 
confirmed by looking at the behaviour of members of the Egyptian delegation during 
the conference. They acted in a very antagonistic way toward Israel and demanded its 
full withdrawal from all occupied territories as well as the Palestinian right of self-
determination.
355
 
Thus, the outcome of the Geneva conference was not a durable peace in the 
Middle East. It did not even produce a disengagement agreement between Israel and 
Egypt. This conference, nevertheless, helped to outline an agenda for further 
negotiations. It was agreed to form political as well as military committees aimed at 
the conclusion of a disengagement agreement. Moreover, both Sadat and Meir partly 
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managed to achieve their above mentioned objectives which positively affected the 
consequent negotiations. 
On December 26, 1973 the Egyptian-Israeli military committee was formed 
and continued to work until January 9, 1974. During this period, six meeting have 
been held by Israeli and Egyptian with a main focus on the unresolved issues such as 
the distance of withdrawal of troops, limitations of the force and arms etc. The work 
of this committee was very successful and resulted in the disengagement agreement, 
known as Sinai I which was signed on January 18, 1974. 
356
 
Although this agreement was not regarded by Egypt and Israel alike as a 
final peace treaty, the significance of this accord should not be underestimated. It 
became the first agreement which was made between Israel and an Arab neighbour in 
accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242. Moreover, it constituted a 
first step toward the final peace treaty. 
The Sinai I, however, did not immediately lead to further substantive 
diplomatic breakthrough. The conflicting parties could not agree on issues concerning 
the realisation and time frame for the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, 
Sadat was still not prepared to give Israel a commitment to non-belligerency in return 
to its withdrawal from the passes and the oil fields (offer made by Rabin on February 
7, 1975).
357
Furthermore, the relationship between Israel and Egypt became worst after 
Sadat endorsed the Arab Summit resolution of October 28, 1974 aimed at approval of 
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people with the right 
of establishing an independent national authority over all liberated territory.
358
 As a 
result, the March 1975 negotiations on another Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement 
failed but attempts to resolve disputes continue during the following months. 
In September 1975, with the help of the US as a mediator, Israel and Egypt 
could finally find a compromise on the duration of the agreement as well as other 
issues such as authority over Israeli early-warning station and the length of Israel‘s 
withdrawal.
359
 It is important to note, that the role of the USA in achieving the Sinai II 
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was very profound. It gave to each party some guarantees which were necessary for 
concluding the second disengagement agreement.  
The USA promised to Israel financial assistance, oil supplies and guarantees 
not to negotiate with the PLO before it recognises Israel‘s right to exist, while to 
Egypt to continue its efforts aimed at the conclusion of a second disengagement 
agreement between Syria and Israel and to pay some attention to the Palestinian 
question.
360
  
As a result, on September 4, 1975, the second Egypt-Israel disengagement 
agreement, known as the Sinai II was signed. The significance of this agreement was 
very profound. Unlike other Arab-Israeli agreements, it covered more than just an 
issue of disengagement of forces and was concluded not immediately after the war. 
―The second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement set important precedents in 
Arab-Israeli negotiations: it was the first Arab-Israeli agreement not negotiated at the 
conclusion of a war.‖361 Moreover, this agreement made the possibility of another war 
between Israel and Egypt extremely unlikely because Sadat agreed to sign a ―non-use 
of force‖ clause, which was almost equivalent to the non-belligerency agreement in 
return to removal of Israeli force from some parts of the occupied territories.
362
  
In 1976 U.S. presidential election took place and Jimmy Carter became a 
new President of the USA. At the beginning Sadat was disappointed with the outcome 
of the election. He preferred Ford over Carter because the former promised to him to 
pursue a comprehensive settlement of the conflict, while the position of latter toward 
the Middle East problem was unknown to Sadat. Nevertheless, to Sadat‘s surprise and 
satisfaction, Carter appeared to be a supporter of a comprehensive solution to the 
Middle East conflict, Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boarders and creation of a 
Palestinian state.
363
 According to Jimmy Carter, the basic meaning of the United 
Nation Security council resolutions 242 and 338 are ―that Israel‘s acquisition of 
territory by force is illegal and that Israel must withdraw from occupied territories; 
that Israel has the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries; that 
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the refugee problem must be settled; and that the international community should 
assist with negotiations to achieve a just and durable peace in the Middle East.‖364 
Thus, through the whole 1977, all diplomatic efforts on the part of the USA 
were directed at achieving a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict 
through the restarting of the Geneva Conference. Since Israelis didn‘t want a 
comprehensive settlement of the conflict or another Geneva Conference, they were 
disappointed with a new political course undertaken be the USA in general and Carter 
in particular. Israelis preferred Kissinger‘s ―step-by –step approach‖ to the conflict 
resolution and prefer to conclude a peace accord with Egypt first.
365
 
 Nevertheless, despite Israel‘s dissatisfaction, in October 1977 the US 
together with the Soviet Union elaborated key points for the future Conference. Israel 
did not like the substance of this working paper. The key disagreement between Israel 
and the USA was the Palestinian state. Begin was uncompromising with regard to the 
future of the West Bank. He announced that Israel did not accept the American 
opinion that the presence of Israel in the West Bank is illegal. Begin believed that 
Israelis have legitimate right to stay in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, Begin 
complained that the joint US-Soviet document has no reference to UNSC resolutions 
242 and 338. Furthermore, the USA and the Soviet Union did consult neither Egypt 
nor Israel during elaboration of this paper. As a result, Israelis immediately dismissed 
this document as an inadequate framework for a future conference.
366
 They stated that 
they would not participate in the Geneva should it be conducted under the joint US-
Soviet working paper and with the participation of the PLO. ―There cannot be a 
Geneva without Israel, we shell not go if the PLO there. We shall not negotiate with 
the PLO. And if the Arabs will not be willing to go to Geneva without the PLO, then 
there will not be Geneva.‖367 
Thus, the USA had no other choice as to comply with Israel‘s demand. It 
drafted together with Israel another working paper with the reference to UNSC 
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resolutions 242 and 338 and provided assurance that representatives of the PLO 
would not be included in the Arab delegation in a Geneva session.
368
   
Although, in contrast to Begin, Sadat was in favour of Jimmy Carter‘s idea 
of conducting an international conference, he was frustrated with some aspects related 
to its preparation. Firstly, Sadat was unsatisfied with the involvement of the USSR in 
a future conference and the US-Israel preparatory draft. Secondly, he was displeased 
with a high level of bureaucracy of the preparation process of the negotiations. ―I 
prefer not to go to Geneva if there are not good preparations for the conference.‖369 
Frustrated by the USA sponsored diplomacy, Sadat decided to try to 
negotiate with Israelis directly. He wanted the whole Sinai immediately and was not 
prepared to wait until Israel concludes peace agreements with other Arab states.  
Thus, on November 9, 1977 President Sadat made a very important speech 
in front of the People‘s Assemble Chamber (Egyptian Parliament). He openly 
announced his aspiration to travel to Israel and to talk with Israelis directly in order to 
achieve his goal aimed at liberating Sinai. In the course of his speech, he said, ―I am 
ready to travel to the ends of the earth if this will in any way protect an Egyptian boy, 
soldier, or officer from being killed or wounded. I say that I am ready for sure to go to 
the ends of this earth. I am ready to go to their country, even to the Knesset itself and 
talk with them.‖370 
Some of Sadat‘s advisers were deeply shocked by his speech, while other 
did not believe that he indeed intend to go to Israel. For instance Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel did not think that Sadat´s trip to Israel is more than 
just a manoeuvre.
371
 Another case in point is the official Egyptian radio‘s 
announcement that ―Egypt remained firmly committed to the strategic aims of the 
Arab world, and that the purpose of Sadat‘s visit to Jerusalem was to unmask the true 
face of Israel, who presents herself as a lover of peace.‖372 
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For Israeli leadership, therefore, was very hard to take Sadat‘s intention to 
visit Jerusalem seriously. ―It was not clear to the Government whether Sadat‘s 
statement was one of operational intent- a clear acceptance of Israel‘s long-standing 
appeal for direct negotiations- or simply an exercise in propaganda.‖373 Some 
members of the government even believed that this visit is a trick aimed at drawing 
away Israel‘s attention from planned Egyptian military attack agents Israel.374 
Nevertheless, Begin decided to take a risk and on November of 13 and 14 he issued 
an oral invitation to Anwar Sadat to visit him in Jerusalem in order to conduct talks 
for a permanent peace between Israel and Egypt.  On November 16, he repeated his 
invitation in a written form.  
Thus, on November 19, 1977 the president of Egypt arrived to Jerusalem. 
Sadat‘s journey to Israel and his speech of historical importance before the Knesset 
shocked the whole world. It was a unique historical event which led to the peace 
treaty. Although Sadat claimed that this visit is nothing else but just a part of the 
preparations for organizing a new Geneva Conference
375
, he did not manage to avoid 
opposition from most of Arab states.
376
  It was for the first time in the history of Israel 
that an Arab leader visits the Jewish state.   
This dramatic event in Israeli-Arab conflict did not, however, lead to the 
immediate resolution of all disagreements. Boutros Boutros-Chali, the minister of 
state for foreign affairs of that time, wrote that Egyptian delegation believed that the 
President Sadat visit to Jerusalem would solve all problems. This however did not 
happen. ―The Israelis were clearly disappointed with President Sadat‘s speech and the 
Egyptians were shocked by Begin‘s response….It was evident how wide a gap 
separated the Egyptian and Israeli positions.‖377 
 Sadat and Begin had completely different solutions regarding the Middle 
East settlement. Sadat‘s attempt to address issues such as the Palestinian question, the 
status of Jerusalem and Israeli complete withdrawal from all occupied territories in 
return to recognition and a peace treaty. ―I have not come here for a separate 
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agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not a part of the policy of Egypt....I have 
not come to you to seek a partial peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency 
at this stage and put of the entire problem to a subsequent stage…I have come to you 
so that together we should build a durable peace based on justice…There are Arab 
territories which Israel has occupied and still occupies by force. We insist on 
complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem…. 
Achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to 
self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.‖378 
In response to Sadat‘s speech, Begin clearly expressed Israel‘s view on the 
resolution of the conflict, which was completely different from that of Egypt. He was 
not willing to except Sadat‘s demand of a full territorial withdrawal from territories 
occupied in 1967, to give up control over the whole Jerusalem and to address the 
Palestinian issues. He, nevertheless, stated that everything can be negotiated and he is 
ready to precede with the peace talks at any place and time. 
379
 
 Sadat‘s journey to Jerusalem was a very important event in a sense of 
symbolic value. It was for the first time that an Arab leader agreed to establish a direct 
contact with Israel and to recognise the right of the Jewish state to exist in peace and 
security. Moreover, during this visit Sadat clearly endorsed the ―land-for-peace 
concept‖ as a basis for further negotiation.  Furthermore, this visit created a 
possibility to continue direct as well as bilateral diplomatic contacts between Israel 
and Egypt. During Sadat‘s trip, the Israeli minister of defence Ezer Weizman and the 
Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Boutros Boutros-Chali agreed to 
communicate with each other directly without a third-party mediator. ―The most 
immediate response catalyzed by the visit was the transfer of the negotiating process 
into the shoulders of the protagonists; the geographic locus of diplomatic activity, at 
least temporarily, shifted to the region. A series of bilateral and direct Egyptian-Israeli 
contacts expanded.‖380  
Thus Sadat‘s dramatic journey to Jerusalem created the basis for a peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel by moving the negotiating process ahead. ―Sadat‘s 
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journey to Jerusalem marked a beginning of new phase of ponderous and sometimes 
acrimonious peacemaking between Egypt and Israel with the United States acting as a 
third party.‖381 This visit resulted in various peace initiatives. Among the most 
important were the Cairo preparatory conference, Ismailia meeting, political and 
military committee talks.  
Shortly after Sadat‘s speech in Jerusalem, the president of Egypt announced 
in the People‘s Assemble his decision to organise an informal meeting at the technical 
level in Cairo in order to prepare the agenda for a Geneva Conference on the Middle 
East. 
382
 
Sadat invited Israel, the US, the USSR and the representatives from Syria, 
Jordan, Palestine Liberation Organisation and other Arab states to participate in this 
conference. This peace initiative, however, received a negative response on the part of 
the most Arab and communist countries. The USSR, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Syria, 
Libya and South Yemen refused to participate in the Cairo meeting, while he PLO did 
not even reply to the invitation.
383
  
Nevertheless, despite the opposition of Arab states to the Cairo preparatory 
conference, otherwise known as the Mena House Talks, still took place from the 14 to 
17 of December of 1977 with only four participants, namely the United States, Israel, 
the United Nations and Egypt.
384
  
This conference did not result in any substantive progress. It became a total 
failure because it lacked a clear defined list of items, was badly organized and both 
parties had exaggerated demands. ―It was path-breaking because the Israelis were in 
Cairo, but the talks were terrible unproductive. The two sides talked past each 
other.‖385 During this meeting Israelis introduced a draft of a peace treaty which 
didn‘t address any of the important issues such as borders, the Palestinian question, 
Israeli settlement in Sinai, demilitarized zones etc. The Egyptians, on their part, 
presented their draft of a peace agreement, which included items such as Israeli 
withdrawal to the 1967 boarders and creation of an independent state for the 
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Palestinians under the PLO authority.
386
 Thus, it is not surprising that the delegation 
of both states immediately rejected each others drafts and no agreement was reached 
on a single disputed question. 
Nevertheless, this conference was very important because it strengthened a 
direct communication line between Cairo and Jerusalem
387
 and contributed to the 
improvement of the relationship between Egypt and Israel. ―Yet despite its failure, the 
Cairo parley had one side-effect that was to prove positive in the long run. People in 
both Egypt and Israel began to accept and became accustomed to the fact that their 
representatives met each other face to face, and talked together as friends; that Israelis 
could walk freely through the streets of Cairo and Egyptians do the same in 
Jerusalem.‖388 
The next move in the peace process came at the end of 1977. On Saturday, 
December 24, the Israeli prime minister went to Ismailia in return to Sadat‘s trip to 
Jerusalem. It became a historic event which was broadcasted by hundreds of press and 
television reporters.
389
 
During this summit Begin had a chance to present his draft of the Egyptian-
Israeli agreement which consisted of two parts. It was aimed at establishing full 
diplomatic as well as cultural relationship between the two states.  
The first part of the draft was dedicated to the Sinai problem. In this part 
Begin stated that Israel is ready to withdraw from Sinai under three conditions. The 
first one was Egypt‘s commitment to demilitarize the whole of Sinai east of the Mitla 
and Geddi Passes. The second condition was Egypt‘s conformity with Israeli civilian 
settlements between Rafah and El-Arish, and Eilat and Sharm-El-Sheikh. Finally, 
Begin demanded that Israeli military airport and early-warning, which would be 
changed into civilian facility, to be allowed to remain in Sinai and under Israeli 
control.
390
  
The second part of Begin‘s draft was dedicated to the Palestinian question. 
According to Begin‘s plan the Palestinian Arabs would be given a limited 
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administrative self-rule. In this document he clearly stated that Judea and Samaria can 
not be granted to foreign control and that this point can not be negotiated. At the same 
time, he was not prepared to give to the Palestinians Israeli citizenship because that 
would change the demography of the state. Therefore, the only possible solution for 
him was to provide to the Palestinians some kind of minimal independence. Thus, 
Israel demanded a separate peace with Egypt without granting the Palestinians the 
right of self-determination.
391
  
Sadat immediately rejected Begin‘s peace plan. A key point of disagreement 
between two states was Egypt‘s insistence on a comprehensive, rather than on a 
bilateral peace treaty. Thus, Egypt presented counter-proposals based on 
comprehensive peace which included items such as Palestinian self-determination and 
Israel‘s full withdrawal from the all land occupied in 1967 war. Sadat also made some 
amendments to the first part of Begin‘s peace proposal, namely he insisted on a 
complete removal of Israeli settlements from Sinai.
392
   
Thus, the Ismailia meeting was a complete disaster. The conflicting parties 
were not able to narrow their positions even on a single issue. The only positive result 
of the Ismailla summit was an agreement to establish two working committees. The 
first committee was aimed at political and civil affairs, while the second one was 
dedicated to military issues.
393
  
The political committee began to work on January 17, 1978. Despite that it 
was agreed at the Ismailia meeting that the military committee would be bilateral, it 
included not only Israel and Egypt foreign ministers but also an American delegation 
as well as a representatives of the UN. The UN representative, however, had only an 
observer position, rather than a full member status because most of the Arabs states 
did not want that the UN provide the legitimacy to the Sadat‘s peace initiative.394 
The debate, which took place during the political committee work, was very 
similar to the debate, which had led to the collapse of previous meetings. Egyptian 
delegation demanded the same things as before, namely an independent Palestinian 
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state and Israel‘s total withdrawal from all occupied territories. Israelis, on their part, 
tried to prove that they have a right to keep a part of territories occupied in 1967 
war.
395
  
International law of the nineteenth century distinguishes defensive and 
aggressive war. Consequently since the 1967 war was a defensive war, Begin believed 
that Israel has the right to keep a part of the land that was occupied during this 
conflict.
396
  
Thus, it is not surprising that talks conducted in the political committee had 
the same destiny as the previous negotiation attempts.  During the political committee 
work no progress had been achieved and the Egyptian delegation left the meeting 
even earlier as it was supposed. According to Boutros Boutros-Chali, ―everyone 
seemed happy to be getting out; the enthusiasm for negotiating with the Israelis had 
vanished.‖397  
Although the political committee work ended very suddenly, it is clear that 
Sadat did not want to stop the negotiating process after his dramatic journey to Israel. 
Indeed, President Sadat demanded from his foreign minister Ibrahim Kamel to explain 
to the Israeli Prime Minister that the sudden termination of the negotiations has a 
temporary character. ―I was to make clear to him that this did not constitute a rupture 
of the talks, but it was a temporary recall for further consideration of the situation.‖398   
One possible explanation for the termination of the political committee talk 
could be Sadat‘s unwillingness to hand over control over the negotiations to high-
ranking Egyptian officials who were strongly against of a bilateral peace agreement. 
He probably understood that in order to get Sinai back he would need to sign a 
separate agreement with Israel which would require his overall supervision over the 
whole negotiations process.
399
  
The next move in the peace process came on 18 July 1978 at Leeds Castle in 
England, where the Egypt-Israel-US conference took place. This conference, 
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however, did not result in a step forward. Both sides were still not prepared to make 
compromise and to change their official position. Egyptian delegation demanded a 
compressive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Israel‘s total withdrawal 
from all occupied territories including East Jerusalem, while Israel insisted on a 
Palestinian autonomy plan as well as on a bilateral agreement between Israel and 
Egypt.
400
 Thus, the Leeds Castle conference did not result in any significant 
achievement.  
In August, 1978, the US decided to initiate another attempt to break the 
deadlock in the negotiation. Thus, in early August Cyrus Vance went to Israel and to 
Egypt in order to invite Begin and Sadat to a summit meeting at Camp David. Jimmy 
Carter recalled ―our efforts to rejuvenate the overall peace process were fruitless 
during the spring and summer. My next act was almost one of desperation. I decided 
to invite both Begin and Sadat to Camp David so that we could be away from routine 
duties for a few days and, in relative isolation, I could act as a mediator between the 
two national delegations…..I hoped to achieve a permanent peace between the two 
countries based on full diplomatic recognition as would be confirmed by a bilateral 
peace treaty.‖401 
 Both Sadat and Begin accepted this invitation without delay and the summit 
at Camp David took place on September, 5 and continued to work until September 17. 
This summit became a key event in the peace process. ―The differences between the 
stands taken by Carter, Sadat and Begin were abundant, wide and basic, and all three 
parties had to resolve agonizing psychological and ideological crises in order to reach 
an agreed arrangement. It meant abandoning long-held traditional viewpoints and 
outlooks and taking up new positions.‖402 
This summit became not only the most productive event in the long history 
of conflict between those two states but also a very difficult phase in the Egypt-Israeli 
negotiations. It had more than a few occasions, where it was close to collapse. As 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser of President Carter, put it 
―on a number of occasions, it looked as if the whole thing would blow up, either 
because Sadat and the Egyptians were intransigent……..at one point, Sadat was even 
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quite literally packing his bags and was getting ready unilaterally to pull out….and 
there were times when Begin was totally obdurate and unwilling to make any 
compromises whatsoever. So there were a great number of times at which we all felt 
that the whole thing was going to come to naught.‖403 
During the first tripartite meeting at Camp David Sadat had an opportunity 
to submit his peace proposal, known as "The Framework for a Comprehensive 
Peaceful Settlement of the Middle East Problem". This proposal was based on Egypt‘s 
hard line negotiation demand. It was even more ambiguous than the peace offer 
presented at the Leeds Castle Conference. In this draft Sadat had outlined eight 
provisions for a peaceful settlement. They were the following:
404
 
 
1. Israel‘s departure to the 1967 borders, namely from Sinai, Golan, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. 
2. Removal of all Israeli settlements from the captured land. 
3. Establishment of appropriate security measures. According to this provision, 
all concerned parties should sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear weapons. It is important to note that Egypt signed the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1981 while Israel refused 
to endorse the treaty. Moreover, in 1974 Egypt put forward a proposal aimed 
at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (MENWFZ) 
and from this time onwards it became the strongest opponent of Israel‘s status 
as a nuclear state. 
4. Recognition of the Palestinians right to form their own state. Abolition of the 
Israeli military government in the West Bank and Gaza and the transfer of 
authority to the Arab parties during a transitional period of five years at the 
end of which the Palestinians people would have a possibility to determine 
their own destiny. According to this plan, freely elected representatives of the 
Palestinian people would share power with Jordan and Egypt during the 
transitional period. 
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5. Implementation by Israel of UN General Assemble Resolution 194 concerning 
the Palestinian refugee problem which was approved in December 11, 1948. 
The article XI of this resolution states that ―refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the 
property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property 
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good 
by the Governments or authorities responsible.‖405 Thus, this resolution 
covered not only the Palestinian refugees who had fled the country during the 
war of 1967, but also these who left the country in 1948.  
6. Israel‘s withdrawal from East Jerusalem and hand over of authority to a joint 
municipal council for the city, which would consist of both Palestinians and 
Israelis.  
7. Israel‘s material compensation to Egypt and other Arab states, which 
territories had been occupied during the June War of 1967 
8. Creation of friendly relations between the parties concerned, including ending 
of the Arab boycott, full recognition of Israel and free passage through the 
Sinai Canal.  
 
The Israeli Prime Minister Begin had rejected almost all articles in the 
draft presented by Egypt. Moshe Dayan‘s notes recall that ―after reading this 
document, no member of our delegation held any opinion other than that the 
Prime Minister Begin that the Egyptian proposal should be rejected outright….It 
was not a practical basis on which we were prepared to conduct peace 
negotiations. Had we been ready to discuss those dramatic demands, there would 
have been no need for a Camp David summit.‖406 
Thus, Sadat‘s peace initiative made the talks at the Camp David almost to 
collapse.  Fortunately, the US President Carter, who understood that the 
differences between Israeli and Egyptian positions ware very broad and only 
pressure on the part of the USA could narrow their positions, produced his own 
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suggestion for peace.
407
 The substance and language of some parts of Jimmy 
Carter‘s peace proposal, however, was very vague. It provided only a general 
framework from which comprehensive negotiations concerning the Palestinian 
question could be conducted. 
The American plan contained two main parts. The first one was dedicated 
to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This section foresaw Israeli 
withdrawal from Sinai in three years.  The second part of the draft addressed the 
Palestinian question. In contrast to the first part, the second one was far less 
comprehensive and certain. Moreover, those parts were not linked. As Boutros 
Boutros-Chali put it:  ―the first section of the plan –withdrawal from Egyptian 
land-would not necessary be followed by the second-withdrawal from Palestinian 
land.‖ 408 
The Egyptian delegates were truly shocked by Carter‘s peace proposal, 
which was much closer to Israel‘s demand, rather than to Egyptian one. They 
were virtually frustrated with almost all aspects of the American paper and 
especially with the following provisions:
409
 
 
1. The resolution 242 was mentioned only in the preamble and it did not say 
that it applied to all involved parties in the conflict. 
2. The American plan did not foresee an immediate removal of Israeli 
settlement from Sinai. According to American plan, Sinai had to be return 
to Egypt in stages. Thus, Israeli settlers were to allow remaining in Sinai 
for another three years. Moreover, it anticipated Israel‘s control of two of 
the airfields in the Sinai for the same length of time. 
3. Uncertain solution to the Palestinian question as well as to refugee 
problem. 
4. Lack of reference to Israel‘s withdrawal from Jerusalem.  
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Israelis, on their part, were also frustrated with some provisions mentioned in 
the US peace project. There are the following:
410
  
     
1. Demand to freeze Jewish settlement in the territories for five years. 
American plan called for stopping establishing additional settlements as 
well as adding new people in already existing villages. 
2. Reference in the preamble of the American document to the resolution 242 
concerning Israel‘s withdrawal from the territories occupied in the War of 
1967. Israelis were not willing to oblige themselves to withdraw from the 
West Bank and Gaza and, therefore, considered this reference in the 
Preamble as a serious threat to their national interests.  
3. Determination of the definitive status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
after a five year period.   
 
 
Begin and his delegation most of all disliked issues concerning settlements
411
, 
while Sadat most of all attacked provisions aimed at the resolution of the Sinai 
problem.
412
  It is important to note that Sadat, in contrast to some members of his 
delegation, was less frustrated with provisions for the Palestinian question than with 
articles which were dedicated to the Sinai problem. The latter placed some limits on 
Egyptian authority in Sinai and, therefore, were unacceptable for Sadat.  According to 
Moshe Dayan, during their private meeting at Camp David, Sadat told him that ―will 
not agree to any foreign regime on our soil, neither American forces in the Sinai 
airfields, not to your settlements, not even one, not even for a brief period. …..I am 
now ready to make peace with you, a full and true peace, and ignore the opposition of 
the Arab states, but you must take all your people out of Sinai, the troops and the 
civilians, dismantle the military camps and remove the settlements.‖413 In fact, Sadat‘s 
frustration with the American‘s provisions regarding the Sinai problem was so 
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profound, that he again decided to withdraw the whole delegation from the talks and 
to leave Camp David. Fortunately, president Jimmy Carter managed to convince him 
to remain and to proceed with negotiations.
414
  
Thus, the following days were dedicated to attempts to narrow the differences 
between Israelis and Egyptians and to bring about a final peace agreement.  
Eventually, after thirteen days of negotiations, the conflicting parties managed to 
produce the Camp David Accords. It, however, was not a peace accord. It only 
provided the framework from which concrete negotiations regarding the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel as well as the question of autonomy for the Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza could be conducted.  
The Camp David Accords included three main parts, namely a preamble and 
two documents. The preamble pointed out to the Resolution 242 concerning Israel‘s 
withdrawal from the territories occupied in the War of 1967. This reference, however, 
was not a serious concession on the part of Israel because it was reformulated in 
accordance with Israel‘s initial position, namely it did not stipulate that it applies to 
all fronts in the conflict.
415
 Moreover, according to international law, provisions of the 
preamble are less obligatory than the articles in the body of the agreement.  
The first document of the Camp David Accord, known as ―The framework for 
Peace in the Middle East‖, was dedicated to issues related to the West Bank and Gaza. 
It was aimed at establishing an autonomous self-governing authority (administrative 
council) in these territories. The content of this document, however, was not very 
clear and it provided to the conflicting parties the opportunity of completely different 
interpretations of its provisions.
416
 Thus, it gave Israelis the chance to block the 
creation of an ―administrative council‖.  
This document represented a great compromise on the part of Egypt. Firstly, 
this agreement did not stipulate a comprehensive peace. It had no reference to Syria 
and Lebanon.
417
 Mohamed Kamel‘s notes recalled ―the Americans project leads to a 
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separate peace between Egypt and Israel which would be completely independent of 
what might happen in the west Bank and Gaza‖.418Secondly, it did not secure rights of 
the Palestinians. It did not stipulate Israel‘s commitment for total withdrawal from the 
West Bank and Gaza.
419
 Moreover, this document did not provide any specific 
schedule for the development of the self-governing authority. Furthermore, no 
reference was made to the PLO as well as to the refugee problem. ―The portion of the 
Camp David Accords focused on the Palestinian/West Bank-Gaza dimension was 
only an interim outline or framework of what might be done immediately, without any 
commitment for a final determination on the future sovereignty of territories.‖420 
Thirdly, it did not address the question of settlements. Israelis rejected virtually all 
proposals delivered on the part of the USA concerning the settlements problem. 
Israelis were not willing to remove existing settlements nor were they prepared to 
cancel the establishment of new ones. The only minor concession they agreed to make 
was a commitment to ban the construction of new settlements during the period of 
negotiation with Egypt, namely for the next three months.
421
 Finally, ―A framework 
for Peace in the Middle East‖ left the question of Jerusalem unresolved. The destiny 
of Jerusalem was only mentioned in the letters attached to the agreement, in which 
Egypt, Israel and the United States had an opportunity to express their views 
regarding this question. Thus, in the exchanged letters Israel stated that ―Jerusalem is 
one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel‖422, while Egypt announced that 
the whole of East Jerusalem should be subject to Arab control. The United States 
position on the Jerusalem question was similar to that of the Egypt. It considered East 
Jerusalem to be conquered territory and supported a united Jerusalem. These letters, 
however, were not of an ―operational character‖. They did not include any legal 
obligations and, therefore, had only a symbolic value.
423
   
The second Camp David document was dedicated to Egyptian-Israeli 
relations. It became known as ―Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty 
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between Egypt and Israel‖. This document called for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. 
Israel agreed to remove their settlements, including evacuation of 4,500 civilian 
population and airfields from the Sinai within the period of three years. This provision 
was a great concession on the part of Israel. In return, Israel received an Egyptian 
commitment to recognize Israel‘s right to exist and to establish diplomatic relations 
with it. This document also anticipated demilitarisation of most of Sinai and provided 
to United Nations force a responsibility to monitor the process of demilitarisation as 
well as to ensure free transit through the Golf of Eilat.
424
  
Although the second Camp David document was much more comprehensive 
and clear than the first one, it also left some important questions unresolved. Among 
them were the conditions under which Egypt would deliver oil from oilfields in Sinai 
to Israel as well as the character of armed forces that would be placed in Sinai.
425
  
Thus, the Camp David conference did not produce a real peace treaty and the 
validity of the agreed framework still depended on the consent of Israel‘s Knesset as 
well as on the ratification of Egypt‘s parliament.426 Moreover, the Camp David 
documents allow the conflicting parties to interpret its provisions in a very different 
ways. ―Just like the prelude to Camp David, at Camp David, and afterwards, there 
was mistrust between Egyptians and Israelis, differing interpretations of what needed 
to be accomplished and what was accomplished and promised at Camp David.‖427 
Nevertheless, this summit was a very significant event in the history of Egyptian-
Israeli relations. It showed that Sadat was prepared to make serious compromises with 
regard to the Palestinian issue, to improve relations with Israel and to negotiate a 
bilateral peace treaty. Israelis, in return, agreed to remove their troops from Sinai and 
to recognise the right of Egypt over this territory.  
Shortly after Begin‘s returned to Israel, the Camp David Agreements were 
approved by the Knesset by the majority of vote. 84 of members of Knesset were in 
favour of agreements, 19 against and 17 withheld their votes.
428
 As a result, it became 
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possible to continue the negotiation process.  Thus, the next move in the conflict 
resolution came on 12 October 1978 at the Blair House talks in Washington. The aim 
of this conference was to turn the Camp David framework into a peace treaty. This 
task, however, was not easy to accomplish and initial optimism achieved at the Camp 
David disappeared due to many controversial issues on which Egypt and Israel could 
not agree. There were the following: 
 
 
1. Timing of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai. Israel wanted to accomplish this 
process within the period of three years, while Egypt wanted a quicker 
withdrawal.  Sadat insist on Israelis returned of El Arish within six months 
after the signing the treaty. Since Israelis did not trust Egyptians, additional 
time for evacuation was very important for them as a means of tasting Sadat‘s 
true intention. Thus, they were against of changing the timetable of withdrawal 
agreed upon at the Camp David summit, according to which El Arish had to be 
evacuated after nine months.
429
  
2. Timing of the creation of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and 
Israel. Israelis insisted that diplomatic relations have to be established at the 
level of ambassadors at the same time as their withdrawal to the El Arish-Ras 
Mohammad line, namely after the completion of the first stage of Israel‘s 
withdrawal from Sinai. Egyptians, in contrast, insisted on a stage by stage 
process of the establishment of diplomatic relations, which could be listed up 
to three years period. At the first stage (one month after Israel‘s withdrawal to 
El Arish line) Egypt agreed only on diplomatic recognition as well as on the 
creation of ―charges d‘affaires‖. According to Sadat‘s opinion the exchange of 
ambassadors had to be contingent on the establishment of the Palestinian 
autonomy. 
430
 
3. The question of UN force placed in the Sinai. Israelis feared that the 
Security Council would fail to authorize a transfer of UN troops to Sinai. They 
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stated that they would not withdraw from Sinai in case it had to be supervised 
by Egyptian arms alone.
431
  
4. A legal link between the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and a comprehensive 
settlement (including the issue of settlements, the Palestinian question, the 
refugee problem as well as the final status of Jerusalem).  Israel was 
against any legal bonds between the two treaties.  It claimed that the Israel-
Egypt peace might lose its validity in case no progress would be reached on 
the Palestinians question. Thus, they insisted on removing the sentence from 
the preamble which made continuation of peace with Egypt dependent on the 
implementation of agreements with the Palestinians as well as with Jordan. 
Egypt, on its part, argued that lack of such ties between the treaties would 
ultimately lead to the opposition on the part of Arab world and eventually to 
isolation of Egypt. Thus, Sadat argued that instead of removing this sentence 
from the preamble, it has to be added to the body of the text of the treaty, since 
language in the preamble is less compulsory than in the body.
432
  
5. Egypt’s duty under earlier mutual defence treaties or security agreements 
signed with different Arab states, which oblige Egypt to go to war with 
Israel in case other Arab countries undertake this action. Since in 
international law earlier treaties have precedence over the later ones, Egypt-
Israel peace treaty would be ―null and void‖ in case of war. Thus, Israelis 
insisted on a written confirmation that their agreement with Egypt would be 
given a priority. Egypt, on its part, claimed that in order to provide such a 
confirmation it would have to make invalid around fifty treaties signed with 
Arab states, including the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950, and, 
therefore, this demand is unacceptable.
433
   
6. A date for the completion of Palestinian autonomy negotiations. Egypt 
wanted to complete the talks aimed at creation of the Palestinian 
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autonomy within six months. Israel was against of any fixed date for the 
completion of talks regarding implementation of the autonomy project. 
434
 
7. Oil supplies from Sinai to Israel. The evacuation of western Sinai would 
mean for Israel the loss of oilfields. Thus, Israelis demanded some binding 
commitments on the part of Egypt that it would sell to them an annual fixed 
amount of oil produced in Sinai at the fixed price defined by the international 
market. Egyptians refused to grant any special right to Israel regarding 
Egyptian oil on the ground that the use of national resources is the subject of 
its sovereignty.
435
   
8. The right of each party to review and to change articles regarding “the 
security arrangements” in Sinai. Egypt insisted on a possibility of 
modifying issues regarding security after a five years period, while Israel did 
not want to accept an obligatory date for any amendments concerning this 
issue. 
9. Creation of Egyptian “liaison officers” in Gaza. Egypt demanded that it 
would be allowed to place their liaison officers in Gaza in order to influence 
people to support the autonomy project. Israel rejected this demand on the 
ground that the Camp David Accords have no reference to this issue.
436
  
10. The U.S commitments to Israel. Israelis requested a bilateral agreement 
between them and the United States aimed at economic aid and the U.S. 
responsibility in supervising the implementation of the peace accord with 
Egypt.
437
 
 
The inability to find solutions to above mentioned disputed issues at the 
Blair House almost caused the peace talks to break. The U.S. had to intervene in 
the negotiation process again and to continue to carry drafts of agreements to both 
involved parties in the conflict from 1978 until 1979. Although negotiations for 
the Egypt-Israel peace treaty were difficult, the conflicting parties with the help of 
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the president Carter eventually managed to find the following acceptable solutions 
to all disputed questions:
438
 
 
 
1. Timing of Israeli withdrawals from Sinai. Israelis agreed to make 
concession on this question. They changed their initial position and promised 
to Egypt to evacuate their forces from the area of El Arish, including the town 
of El Arish and its airfield within two months and to withdraw from east El 
Arish to Ras Mohammed in nine months after signing the treaty. Egypt, on its 
part, guaranteed to allow free transit of non-military cargo to and from Israel 
through the canal.  
2. Timing of the creation of full diplomatic relations between Egypt and 
Israel. Israelis managed to succeed in convincing Sadat to accept their 
demand regarding this issue. Thus, Egypt agreed to establish full diplomatic 
relation with Israel including exchange of ambassadors upon the completion of 
the interim withdrawal, namely after nine months. 
3. The question of monitoring Sinai under the UN supervision. In order to 
find a solution to this question the United States had promise to Israel than in 
case the Security Council failed to approve their mission in Sinai, they would 
send international troops from Canada or other ―friendly country‖.  
4. A legal link between the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and a comprehensive 
settlement in the Middle East. Although both parties had to compromise on 
this issue, Egypt‘s concession on this question was far more profound than 
Israel‘s ones. The Israel-Egypt treaty has no legal ties to a comprehensive 
peace and its fulfilment did not dependent on the implementation of 
agreements with the Palestinians as well as with Jordan. The article 6 of the 
treaty states: ―the Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations 
under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and 
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independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.‖439 On the other hand, 
the Israel-Egypt treaty provides some political link to the Palestinian problem. 
The attachment to the treaty states that: ―the provisions of Article VI shall not 
be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in 
the Middle East agreed at Camp David.‖440 Thus, Israelis managed to avoid 
any legal connection between the treaties while not a political ones.   
5. Egypt’s legal obligations under earlier treaties. With regard to this issue Egypt 
had to make great amount of concession. Begin received some legal 
guarantees that Egypt would not joint their allies in case they undertake a 
military action against Israel. The article VI states: ―subject to Article 103 of 
the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of 
the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the 
obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.‖441 The 
attachment to the agreement, however, specifies that neither this treaty nor 
earlier treaties have precedence over each other in a peaceful time.  It states: 
―It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails 
over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail 
over this Treaty.‖442 Thus, this treaty does not nullify Egypt‘s obligations 
under earlier agreements.  
6. A date for the completion of Palestinian autonomy negotiations. After long 
consideration Israel agreed to make concessions on this issue. However, it did 
not accept either Egypt‘s proposal of the six month limit nor did it agree to the 
American‘s ones which called for 9 months time for the end of the autonomy 
talks. Israelis agreed to end those talks in one year after the ratification of the 
peace treaty, namely three months after the start of normalised relations with 
Egypt. By doing so, Israel won additional time of three months for testing 
Sadat‘s true intention and his commitment to peace. 
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7. Oil supplies from Sinai to Israel. Egypt refused to give to Israel some written 
commitments regarding this question. It, however, agreed on proposed by 
Israel addendum to Appendix III which is dedicated to the creation of normal 
economic relation between the parties. It states that ―such relation will include 
normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully 
entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic 
oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids 
made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such 
oil.‖ 443 Although this provision does not oblige Egypt to sell oil to Israel, the 
maintenance of this note was very important for Israel. It signifies a 
termination of the Arab boycott against it. Moreover, Sadat gave to Begin 
some oral guarantee that Egypt would sell oil to Israel according to the fixed 
international price and permanently. He also agreed to confirm this 
commitment in a written form after signing the peace treaty. Furthermore, 
Americans agreed to sign a fifteen-year agreement with Israel, which would 
oblige the U.S. to supply oil to Israel in case it‘s become unable to secure 
delivery of oil from Egypt. 
8. The possibility of the revision of the security arrangements in Sinai. 
Israelis agreed to make a minor change in the treaty regarding to this question. 
This amendment, however, does not grant to Egypt any right of modification 
of the security arrangements in Sinai without Israel‘s permission. The Article 
IV states that the security arrangements ―may at the request of either party be 
reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.‖444 
9. Creation of Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza. Sadat agreed to make 
compromise on this issue and to drop his request to build Egyptian liaison 
offices in Gaza. Thus, any reference to this question was excluded from the 
peace treaty. 
10. The U.S commitments to Israel. On the issue of economic aid, American 
promised to finance the two new airfields. On the question of obligation, the 
U.S agreed to conclude an agreement with Israel, which established the U.S 
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obligations in case of the violation of the peace treaty by Egypt. The 
Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments  of the United States of 
America and the State of Israel states: ―should it be demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of 
violation of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations 
between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such 
remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, 
economic and military measures…‖445 This memorandum provides only 
support to Israel. ―The United States will provide support it deems appropriate 
for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations 
of the Treaty of Peace.‖446 Egypt was not able to accept the same guarantee on 
the part of the U.S because its status of non-aligned country prohibited the 
formation of any security arrangement with a superpower. Thus, Egypt 
objected this agreement. It argued that it represents an alliance between Israel 
and the United States against Egypt and would have a negative impact on the 
whole peace process.  
 
As is visible from the above, during the last stage of the negotiation process 
Sadat made a greater amount of compromises than Begin did. As a result the 
conflicting parties managed to resolve all disputed questions and finally to agree to 
sign a peace treaty in Washington on March 26, 1979. It contains nine articles, a 
military annex, agreed minutes and an annex aimed at defining the consequent 
relation between the countries.  
March 26 became a historical day in the history of the Arab-Israel conflict. On 
this day, Egypt, a country that wanted to destroy Israel at any price, became the first 
Arab country to recognize the right of Israel to exist. The Israel-Egypt peace accord 
was a very impressive achievement, which ended 30 years of war! 
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1.6.3 Theoretical part 
 
The key task of my dissertation research is to investigate the outcome of 
different negotiations and the way of how various factors influence the decision of 
conflicting parties to conclude peace agreements.  
Thus, in this case study my goal is to figure out what kind of factors caused 
Israel and Egypt to sign the peace treaty. There have been many attempts to answer 
this question from a variety of angles and through the application of different theories. 
I believe that the analytical framework on the combination of two theoretical 
approaches, namely rational choice theory and the constructivist theoretical 
framework is the most suitable approach for analysing conflicting parties‘ decision to 
enter the negotiations and to accept the outcome of the bargaining game. In the 
empirical analysis below, the material factors will be evaluated though RCT, will 
immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.  
 
1.6.3.1 Rational Choice Theory    
 
Rational choice theory states that human beings are rational actors and all 
their actions are ‗rational‘ in nature. Thus, each actor seeks to increase his own gains 
and to pick the most appropriate alternative that would help him to achieve as much 
as possible benefits. In order to achieve this aim actors tend to calculate all costs and 
benefits of any performance before deciding how to act.
447
  
Application of this theoretical approach to my case study suggests that both 
Egypt and Israel started the negotiation process and sign the peace treaty because 
they started to consider it as a better choice than the use of force or status quo. Both 
sides come to this conclusion after undertaking costs and benefits analysis of the 
existing situation. According to RCT, the outcome of their calculation was based on 
minimization of costs and maximization of material benefits such as political, 
economic and strategic profits.  
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 See John Scott (2000): ―Rational Choice Theory, Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present‖, 
Accessed: 2008,  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~scottj/socscot7.htm 
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Since, however, ―it is not possible for individuals to achieve all of the various 
things that they want‖448, both Sadat and Begin had to make trade-offs and 
concessions. By doing so they tried, however, not to harm their most important 
interests derived from their instrumental rationality.  
In accordance with the rational choice theory, the analysis below will be 
divided into the following three sections.  
 
1. In the first section I will survey the entire complex of material factors that 
have influenced the willingness of conflicting parties to enter the 
negotiation process. 
2. In the second section I will undertake analysis of the bargaining process 
and the outcome of this process.  
3. In the final section I will review the entire complex of different material 
factors that made the conflicting parties to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining process.  
 
1.6.3.1.1 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to enter 
the negotiation process. 
 
Many supporters of RCT focus their attention on the most favourable toward 
peace moment in conflicts in their attempt to explain why certain conflicts can be 
settled, while others not. They argue that successful conflict resolution depends on 
the ripeness of a conflict i.e. a situation in which conflicting parties are prepared to 
conduct peace talks.
449
  
Indeed, after the analysis of different documents, memories as well as 
research papers I realized that the conflicting parties entered the negotiation process 
at the period of ripeness and figured out key factors which created this situation. The 
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core reason for Israel was the outcome of the October War of 1973
450
, while for 
Egypt it‘s rapidly deteriorating economy. 451 
 
Israel  
 
The October War showed to Israelis that they can not keep status quo in the 
conflict with Egypt any longer. This war improved a bargaining position of Egypt 
which was greatly damaged in the earlier war of 1967. 
The Six-Day War of 1967 resulted in enormous victory of Israel. Israelis 
managed to gain all of Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank and Golan 
Heights.
452
 The achieved military dominance and the occupied territories provided 
Israel with a powerful bargaining card. ―The perception of a strong bargaining 
position combined with a decisively superior military force led to a new overly 
confident Israeli position that proved to be counterproductive to the peace-making 
process.‖453 
Thus, Israelis had little motivation to break the status -quo by entering the 
negotiation process.
454
 The October War of 1973, however, changed the existing 
situation. It provided new possibilities for breaking the diplomatic stalemate. 
Egyptians managed to achieve their limited objectives aimed at demonstrating that 
they are still able to impose a lot of damage on Israel so long as it continued to 
occupy Sinai.
455
 These costs manifested themselves in three ways.  
Firstly, Egypt managed to achieve some strategic success during this war. 
Egyptians obtained the east bank of the Suez Canal. This success increased Israel‘s 
concern over its security. It showed to Israelis that Arab solders can fight properly 
and that their military dominance was not a strong deterrent against Egypt. 
―Everyone had the illusion that this would be a short war, another Arab humiliation, 
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and there was no way they could obtain significant territories.‖456 This perception, 
however, appeared to be wrong. The Egyptian solders fought much better than the 
Israelis had predicted.
457
 Thus, Israelis need peace in order to enhance its security 
Secondly, Egypt managed to impose serious economic casualties on Israel. 
During ―the first ten days of the war, Israel lost around two-thirds of its mechanized 
forces‖458 and ―more than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days 
of fighting.‖459 ―The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as 
a consequence of mobilization came to nearly US$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel's 
gross national product for an entire year.‖460 Thus, Israelis need peace in order to 
resupply its weapons and other military equipments which were damaged during the 
war.   
Thirdly, Egypt found new bargaining power. The members of the 
organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) raised the price per barrel of 
oil in 1974 in order to boycott Israel and states which provided any kind of support 
to Israel. The OPEC members ―mounted an oil embargo against all those states 
supporting Israel in the war - and used the resulting oil shortage as a lever to force up 
the price by three times.‖461 The reduction in the international supply and increased 
oil prices produced worldwide inflation and caused some states of Western Europe 
as well as Japan to become more favourable towards the Arab cause. ―The post-1973 
pro Arab posture of Japan and some EEC countries in relation to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict can be attributed, if not wholly then partially, to these countries‘ dependence 
on Arab oil.‖462 As a result Israel became more dependent on the United States for 
economic and military aid as well as for diplomatic assistance. 
Finally, the October War produced a very dangerous situation of a direct 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the Unites States. It became clear to the 
international community in general and to the U.S. in particular that as long as the 
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Middle East conflict remained, there was a possibility of massive confrontation 
between the superpower. As a result, the Unites States became more interested in 
pressuring conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process by all possible means. 
463
 
The outcome of the October War can therefore be posited as a primary 
determent of Israel‘s decision to accept peace talks with Egypt.464  
 
Egypt  
 
Sadat realized that the legitimacy of his leadership depends on his ability to 
improve the economy of Egypt as well as to regain Sinai to Egyptian control through 
any available means at his disposal.
465
 Thus, the situation of ―no war no peace‖ was 
unacceptable to Egypt.
466
 Egypt, however, had no recourses to fight Israel.  It was 
suffering from unemployment, overpopulation, inadequate social services, 
underdevelopment and corruption.
467
 Sadat knew that he can achieve his objectives 
only through peace with Israel 
Since the war of 1969 the Egyptian economy was worsening very rapidly 
because of various reasons. Among them were the following: 
The first reason is Nasser‘s economic reforms aimed at creation of the 
socialism system in Egypt. Nasser‘s nationalisation program in a combination with 
Egypt‘s lack of raw resources as well as the quick increase in population had very 
negative effect on the economy of Egypt. It resulted in increased reliance on foreign 
aid, corruption, political repression as well as in a lack of foreign investments and 
reduction of the foreign community in Egypt. A profound rise in imports led to the 
trade deficit and to the reduction of Egypt‘s gold as well as currency reserves.468 
The second reason is the outcome of 1967 war. As a result of this war, 10,000 
soldiers and 1,500 officers were lost
469
 and 80% of military equipment was 
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destroyed
470
 . Apart from the oil deposits which are mostly located in Sinai, ―Egypt is 
a poor country in terms of natural resources and raw materials‖. Thus, the canal‘s 
income is economically very important for Egypt.
471
 Moreover, Egypt had to increase 
its spending in order to admit displaced people who had been forced to flee after the 
war 1967 from their homes located along the canal.
472
 Furthermore, the war had a 
negative impact on the tourist sector. ―Because of its unique pharaonic and Islamic 
history, Egypt counts on tourism to generate revenues and foreign exchange; 
however, tourism declined sharply after the 1967 war and the War of Attrition, and it 
remained depressed when the Arab-Israeli tension were high, which was certainly the 
case in the early 1970s.‖473   
The third reason is Egypt‘s enormous defence expenditure. The bad economic 
situation had been greatly worsened by Egypt‘s astonishing spending on its armed 
forces and military equipments. ―Egypt‘s defence expenditure as a percentage of her 
Gross National Product has risen from 13.5 in 1967 to a crippling 34.1 in 1975. 
According to the director of the Central Bank of Egypt, the country has spent, or has 
borrowed in order to spend, no less than $25,000 million on military equipment and 
operation during the period 1967-75.‖474  
In order to overcome various economic problems Sadat launched the policy of 
liberalisation and modernisation. The short term-result of Sadat‘s ―open door‖ policy, 
however, had negative result. It did not stop Egypt‘s growing inflation. For example 
from January 1973 to September 1974 the price index of food and beverages 
increased by 19.8 on the countryside areas and by 29.0 in the cities.
475
 Moreover, 
Sadat‘s policy resulted in an increased corruption. The gap between the rich and the 
poor became more profound. The growing costs of living led to a number of strikes, 
protests and riots.
476
 The population of Egypt in general and industrial workers in 
particular were dissatisfied with the outcome of new economic program launched by 
Sadat. ―Economic reform and moderate liberalisation produced no tangible 
improvements and the people were becoming restless. War costs continued without 
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war. The private sector fell into a recession. Reform of the public sector did not even 
appear to be implemented. The students were back out on the street. The government 
was lambasted in the press and the assembly.‖477  
Thus, because of above mentioned reasons Sadat could not keep status quo in 
the conflict nor could he initiate another war with Israel. ―A week before the 1973 
War, Sadat estimated that the Egyptian economy was ―at zero, with commitments till 
the end of year which we will not be able to fulfil with the bank.‖478 Therefore, in 
order to improve Egypt‘s economy, Sadat had to start a peace process.  
The economic motives can therefore be considered as a key reason of 
Egypt‘s decision to enter the peace process479. 
1.6.3.1.2 The bargaining process and its outcome  
 
In this part I will undertake the analysis of the outcome of the bargaining 
process. I will show that the peace treaty was much closer to the Israel´s vision of the 
final resolution of the conflict than to the Egypt´s position.  
Sadat presented his opening bargaining position for the first time during his 
trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.
480
 The following month during the Ismailiyya 
summit, Israelis introduced their initial demands as precondition for the peace treaty. 
In the table below I underline all things that conflicting parties tried to achieve 
from negotiations and the outcome of barging process.
481
 From the table below it is 
visible that the gap between Egypt‘s and Israel‘s initial bargaining position was 
tremendous.  
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Table: Initial bargaining position and the outcome of negotiations  
Issue Egypt’s demand Israel’s demand Outcome 
 
The Camp David Framework 
Nature of peace 
Type of settlement 
 
Comprehensive 
peace agreement of 
the Middle East 
conflict based on 
UN Resolution 242 
 
Bilateral 
agreement 
between Israel 
and Egypt 
Israel's original 
demand 
Recognition of Israel 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognition of Israel 
depends on the 
implementation of a 
comprehensive 
settlement  
 
 
Recognition of 
Israel in return 
for the Sinai 
Israel's original 
demand 
Security arrangement 
in the Middle East  
Establishment of  a 
nuclear-weapon-free 
zone in the Middle 
East, Israel should 
sign the NPT 
This question is 
not a basis for 
negotiations  
Israel's original 
demand 
                                         Golan/West Bank-Gaza dimension 
Israel‘s withdrawal  
from Golan, West 
Bank and Gaza Strip  
 
Occupation is 
illegal, Israel‘s 
withdrawal from all 
occupied territories   
Right to keep 
these territories, 
no withdrawal 
Israel's original 
demand 
Jewish settlements in  
Golan, West Bank 
and Gaza Strip  
Settlements is 
illegal, evacuation of 
all civilian 
settlements from the 
occupied territories   
No removal of 
Jewish 
settlements 
Israel's original 
demand 
Establishment of new 
settlements in Golan, 
West Bank and Gaza 
Strip 
Suspension of 
creation of new 
Israeli settlements 
and prohibition to 
add new members to 
existing villages. 
No restriction on 
the 
establishment of 
new settlements  
Israel’s slight 
compromise 
Temporary 
prohibition to 
build new 
settlements 
during 
negotiations of 
the peace treaty 
(only 3 months) 
The Palestinian question 
 139 
Right of the 
Palestinian people  
The Palestinians 
have the right to 
establish their own 
state at the end of 
the transition period 
of autonomy (5 
years) 
Autonomy 
instead of self-
determination as 
a final status  
Israel’s slight 
compromise 
Vague language 
of the agreement, 
possibility of 
different 
interpretation482  
The jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian self-
governing authority 
during the transitional 
period 
 
 
 
 
Territorial and 
functional 
jurisdiction 
Only functional 
jurisdiction. 
Autonomy refers 
not to the land 
but only to the 
people 
Israel's original 
demand 
The scope of the 
functional jurisdiction 
of the Palestinian self-
governing authority 
Broad power of the 
self-governing 
authority with 
executive and 
legislative duties 
 
 
 
Limited power 
of the self-
governing 
authority with 
just 
administrative 
duties.  
Israel's original 
demand 
The election of self-
governing authority 
during the transitional 
period.   
 
 
 
 
All Palestinians 
including refuges 
permitted to vote 
Only  inhabitants 
of the West 
Bank and Gaza 
can vote 
Israel's original 
position 
Administration of the 
West Bank and Gaza 
during the transitional 
period   
Administration of 
the West Bank by 
Jordan and Gaza by 
Egypt in cooperation 
with representatives 
of the Palestinian 
people 
 
No foreign 
administration 
on the territory 
of Israel  
Israel's original 
demand 
Question of Jerusalem 
Status of  East 
Jerusalem  
East Jerusalem  
should be subject to 
Arab sovereignty, 
Israel‘s withdrawal 
No withdrawal  
from East 
Jerusalem 
Israel's original 
position. 
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Domestic opposition argued that despite of uncertain language of the agreement, the accords do acknowledge that the autonomy 
project has only a temporary nature 
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Administration of 
Jerusalem  
Establishment of a 
joint municipal 
council with an 
equal number of 
Palestinians and 
Israelis 
 
City status is 
non-negotiable, 
remained under 
Israeli control   
Israel’s original 
demand 
Rights of Arab living 
in East Jerusalem to 
participate in the 
autonomy 
negotiations.  
Participation of the 
Palestinian residents 
of Jerusalem in the 
autonomy 
negotiations  
No participation 
of the Palestinian 
inhabitants of 
Jerusalem in the 
autonomy talks  
Israel’s original 
demand 
The refugee problem 
The right of the 
Palestinian refugees 
to return to Israel. 
 
 
All refugees have 
the right to return to 
their homes, 
implementation of 
UN Resolution 194  
 
The Palestinians 
fled voluntarily, 
Israel is not 
responsible for 
their decision 
Israel’s original 
demand 
The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty 
Nature of the Egypt-Israel treaty 
Conditions of the 
maintenance of the 
Treaty 
The maintenance of 
peace with Egypt is 
conditional upon 
implementation of 
agreements with the 
Palestinians as well 
as with Jordan 
The maintenance 
of peace with 
Egypt is not 
conditional upon 
implementation 
of the Camp 
David  
framework for 
peace in the 
Middle East 
Israel’s slight 
compromise 
Only political 
link between the 
treaties. No legal 
provisions. 
 
The question of  Sinai 
Type of evacuation Full evacuation 
including civilian 
settlements 
Evacuation 
without removal 
of Israeli civilian 
settlements  
Egypt’s original 
demand 
Security arrangement 
in Sinai  
No foreign troops in 
Sinai  
Placement of UN 
or other 
international 
troops in  Sinai 
Israel's original 
demand 
Revision of the 
security arrangements 
in Sinai 
Possibility to modify 
―security 
arrangements‖ after 
five years 
No obligatory 
anticipated date 
for the revision  
Israel’s slight 
compromise 
Security 
arrangement can 
be amended but 
only by mutual 
agreement of the 
parties. 
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Oil supplies from 
Sinai to Israel 
No written 
commitments to 
Israel regarding 
Egyptian oil  
Written 
obligation on the 
part of Egypt 
that it would sell 
oil from Sinai to 
Israel at the 
international 
price. 
Egypt’s original 
demand 
Recognition of Israel 
Diplomatic relations 
between the two 
states  
 
 
  
Establishment of full 
diplomatic relations 
at the ambassadorial 
level conditional 
upon the creation of 
the Palestinian 
autonomy 
Establishment of 
full diplomatic 
relations at the 
ambassadorial 
level upon the 
completion of 
the first stage of 
Israel‘s 
withdrawal from 
Sinai. 
Israel's original 
demand 
 
As is visible from the table above, the outcome of the bargaining process ―was 
much closer to Israel‘s initial position than to Egypt‘s‖.483 The only significant 
concession on the part of Israel was its commitment to pull out from the Sinai. Israelis 
agreed to remove all settlements, including evacuation of all civilian residents and 
airfields in the Sinai within the period of three years.
484
  
In all other fundamental issues, however, Egypt eventually had to accept 
Israel's original demands. The peace treaty did not anticipate a comprehensive 
solution of the conflict based on the implementation of U.N. resolution 242. Israel 
refused to withdraw from all the land occupied in 1967 and to recognize the 
Palestinian rights to form their own state. Moreover, the accord failed to address the 
refugee problem and the status of Jerusalem.
485
  
Thus, Sadat agreed to make a lot of concessions. He agreed to normalize 
relations with Israel and to establish full diplomatic contacts by exchanging 
                                                 
483 Jonathan Oakman (2002): ―The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation‖, pp.7, Accessed: 
2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 
484 See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-
pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm; Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖; 
Jonathan Oakman (2002): ―The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation‖, pp.7, Accessed: 2008, 
http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 
485 See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt, Accessed: 2008, http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-
pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm; Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖; 
Jonathan Oakman (2002): ―The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation‖,pp.7, Accessed: 2008, 
http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 
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ambassadors in return for Sinai.
486
 Sadat, therefore, dropped his commitment to 
pursue the Arab course in general and the Palestinian question in particular. By doing 
so, he reduced a number of potential benefits and increased the costs associated with 
the peace treaty. Indeed, the peace treaty with Israel led to Egypt‘s suspension from 
the Arab League, the transformation of the Arab league secretariat from Cairo to 
Tunis and to the termination of Arab economic assistance as well as diplomatic 
relations with most of Arab states.
487
  
  
1.6.3.1.3 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to accept 
the outcome of the bargaining process 
 
In the final stage of my costs and benefits analysis I will evaluate factors 
which influenced the decision of conflicting parties to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining game.   
It is possible to underline at least four key reasons of why Israel accepted the 
outcome of the negotiation process. There are: strategic consideration, economic 
benefit from cooperation with Egypt, Jimmy Carter‘s diplomacy and the U.S. 
financial aid packet. 
 It is, however, important to bear in mind that the peace treaty was much 
closer to Israel‘s initial position than to Egypt‘s.488 Therefore, Israel‘s victory of the 
bargaining game can be posited as a primary determent of Israel‘s decision to accept 
the accord.  
Although Egypt lost the bargaining process, it, nevertheless had much to 
achieve from the peace treaty. It is possible to call at least four reasons which 
influenced Egypt‘s decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process. There 
are: territorial benefit, Carter‘s diplomacy and American economic assistance. 
 
                                                 
486 See Jonathan Oakman (2002): ―The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation‖, pp.7, 
Accessed: 2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 
487 See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): ―Egypt‘s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat‘s Story of the Struggle for Peace in 
the Middle East‖, pp.223; Shibley Telhami: ―The Camp David Accords: A case of International Bargaining‖, Accessed: 2008,  
James Jankowski: ―Egypt: A Short History‖, Accessed: 2008, http://www.oneworld-publications.com/books/texts/egypt-a-short-
history-ch8.htm 
488 See Jonathan Oakman (2002): ―The Camp David Accord. A Case Study on International Negotiation‖, pp.7, 
Accessed: 2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/campdavid.pdf 
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Israel  
 
Reason I: Strategic consideration  
 
The key factor which influenced Israel‘s decision to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining process was strategic consideration, which manifested itself in three ways.  
First, Israel‘s attitude towards the importance of the occupied territories can be 
considered through its concern over security. Although the strategic value of the Sinai 
Peninsula is important, it, nevertheless, less significant than the strategic value of 
other territories occupied in the war of 1967.
489
 The geography of the Sinai places 
some limitation on Egypt‘s ability to launch a successful surprise attack across the 
Sinai. In contrast to Israel‘s boundaries with Jordan, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt‘s 
borders with Israel is not very close to the most populated areas of Israel. Moreover, 
the Sinai has only a few roads which are vulnerable to air and land attack.
490
  
The second strategic consideration was that the peace treaty took into account 
Israel‘s concern over its security. The accord mandated the demilitarization of much 
of the Sinai territory and transfer of U.N arm forces to Sinai to monitor this 
process.
491
  Moreover, the peace agreement placed some restriction on the troops 
Egypt can locate on the Sinai. Furthermore, the peace agreement resulted in the 
Unites States‘ commitment to undertake some action in case of Egypt‘s unilateral 
withdrawal from the treaty.
492
 Finally, the treaty foresaw a slow Israeli withdrawal 
from Sinai. Thus, it provided Israel with additional time for tasting whether or not 
Sadat is truly committed toward peace.
493
  
Third, Israel achieved some strategic benefit from the peace treaty by 
changing the balance in the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel. Israelis saw the 
peace agreement with Egypt as a means of enhancing security of the state.
494
 Since 
Egypt is the most densely inhabited as well as powerful state among other Arab 
                                                 
489 See Jemes l.Gelvin (2005): ―The Israeli-Palestine Conflict. One Hundred Years of War‖, pp.183 
490 See Anthony H. Cordesman (1996): ―Perilous Prospects. The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military 
Balance‖, pp.211-212 
491 See Peace treaty Between Israel and Egypt (1979), Article VI, Appendix to Annex I (article I, III, IV),  
http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/docs-pix/mar-cdavid-accord.htm 
492 See ―Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments  of the United States of America and the State of 
Israel‖, Article II,III, Accessed: 2007,  
http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp 
493 See Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖; pp.224 
494 See David W. Lesch (2001): ―The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East‖, pp.41- 44 
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countries, it represented the most serious military threat imposed by Arab states to 
Israel.  
A large size of population enabled Egypt to have a very important position in 
the Arab world
495
 and it represented a source of strength in term of military potential. 
The table below shows the size of Egypt‘s population in comparisons to the other 
Arab countries.
496
 It clearly demonstrates Egypt‘s advantage in terms of the 
demographic factor.  
 
Table II 
Population of Egypt in comparison to other Arab states, 1955-1975 
(millions)  
 
Years Population of Asian 
Arab states (Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia) 
African Arab 
states (Algeria, 
Libya, Morocco, 
Sudan, Tunisia) 
Population of 
Egypt 
1955 17.2 25.4 23.0 
1958 18.2 27.5 24.7 
1961 19.3 29.9 26.6 
1964 23.0 49.9 28.9 
1967 26.0 48.3 30.9 
1970 29.5 52.6 33.3 
1971 37.1 53.4 34.2 
1972 39.4 55.7 34.9 
1973 41.1 56.7 35.7 
1974 42.0 58.4 36.6 
1975 43.5 60.2 37.5 
 
Another factor which gave Egypt the most important role in the Arab world 
was its high spending on defence. Egypt‘s expenditures greatly exceeded the 
expenditures of other powerful Arab states.
497
 The table below shows Egypt‘s 
expenditures in comparison to some other powerful Arab states.
498
 It clearly 
demonstrates Egypt‘s dominance in term of military capabilities.  
 
                                                 
495 See A.L. Dawisha (1976): ―Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy‖, pp.183 
496 A.L. Dawisha (1976): ―Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy‖, in: Lecture in International 
Politics University of Lancaster, 1976, pp.80, 183 
497 See A.L. Dawisha(1976): ―Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy‖, pp.185 
498 A.L. Dawisha (1976): ―Egypt and the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy‖, in: Lecture in International 
Politics University of Lancaster, 1976, pp.87, 185 
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                                                        Table III 
Defence Expenditure of Egypt in Comparison to Some Selected Arab states, 
1958-75 ($million) 
 
Year Iraq Syria Jordan Egypt 
1958 83.5 65.0 38.0 211.0 
1960 103.5 66.5 60.0 280.0 
1962 125.0 73.0 53.0 314.0 
1964 170.0 91.1 59.8 267.1 
1966 237.9 82.6 60.5 425.5 
1968 253.9 101.3 106.9 506.9 
1970 399.4 161.4 104.8 568.3 
1971 237.2 176.0 90.4 1.495.0 
1972 237.2 206.5 90.4 1,510.0 
1973 338.0 216.0 119.2 1,737.0 
1974 803.0 460.0 142.0 3,117.0 
1975 803.0 668.0 155.0 6,130.0 
 
Thus, from the tables above it is visible that the success of the Arab armies 
from any potential confrontation with Israel heavily depended on the participation of 
Egypt. Therefore, Israelis wanted to reduce the possibility of Egypt‘s participation in 
future Arab-Israeli conflicts. ―Separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world had 
been a long-standing Israeli goal as a way to weaken Arab bargaining power and 
remove the greatest single military threat to Israel, which, for many in the Likud party 
especially, would make it easier to hold onto the rest of the occupied territories (after 
presumable returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt) and to downgrade, if not totally 
ignore, the Palestinian situation.‖499 Thus, Israel believed that the peace treaty with 
Egypt would transform the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel. Indeed, the 
credibility of an Arab war against Israel fundamentally decreased after the removal of 
the most powerful Arab state from the military arrangement.  
Thus, even though Israel‘s decision to give back Sinai to Egypt in return to the 
peace treaty was associated with great economic costs (―loss of oilfield which 
supplied ―some two million barrels of oil a year‖500, the cost of replacing installations 
about three billion eight hundred million dollars
501
 and the trauma of forcing some 
                                                 
499 David W. Lesch (2001): ―The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East‖, pp.43-44 
500 Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖, pp.180 
501 See Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖, pp.232 
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Israeli residents to leave Al-Arish
502), it nevertheless was consistent with Israel‘s 
concerns over its security and even represented a strategic benefit.  
 
Reason II: Economic benefit from cooperation 
 
Israelis hoped to achieve not only strategic benefit from peace with Egypt but 
also economic one in terms of cooperation. For years the Israeli economy had suffered 
from the Arab boycott. A boycott was introduced in 1948 by the Arab League. It was 
directed against Israeli-made goods. It prohibited the importation of Israeli-origin 
goods and services into boycotting states. In 1952 the Arab boycott was broadened to 
include non-Israelis who maintain economic cooperation with Israel. Thus, the Arab 
league prohibited to companies as well as to individuals to conduct any business 
relation with Israel.
503
 
The economic boycott had a very devastating effect on the Israeli economy. 
―According to an estimate of the Israel chamber of commerce, the boycott cost Israel 
$20 billion in potential exports and $16-32 billion in lost investments. Another 
estimate put the combined cost of the Arab boycott at $40 billion since 1948.‖504 
Thus, for Israel it was very important to conclude peace with a leading Arab state. 
During negotiations Israel was prepared to exchange peace for land. It demanded 
from Egypt a broad peace accord with agreements on such issues as tourism, trade 
and diplomatic ties. Israelis political economists expected a great direct benefit from 
bilateral relationship with Egypt. Yet, the ―cold peace‖ between Egypt and Israel did 
not fulfil Israelite‘s expectation. The process on normalisation of relation was very 
slow and in 1980s the peace produced only minimal economic contacts between the 
two states. ―Almost no tourism from Egypt to Israel materialized and few commercial 
deals were negotiated. Academic and cultural exchanges were stillborn.‖505  
Nevertheless, the relaxation of boycott positively affected the Israeli economy in 
                                                 
502 See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): ―Egypt‘s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat‘s Story of the Struggle for Peace in 
the Middle East‖, pp.219; Wikipedia, online encyclopaedia: ―Camp David Accords‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_David_Accords_(1978) 
503 See Ofira Seliktar (1998): ―The Peace Divided, The Economy of Israel and the Peace Process‖, in : IIan Peleg 
(1998): ―The Middle East Peace Process, Interdisciplinary Perspectives‖, pp.225; Dalia Dassa Keye (2001): ―Beyond the 
Handshake: Multilateral Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process‖, pp.36-38  
504 Ofira Seliktar (1998): ―The Peace Divided, The Economy of Israel and the Peace Process‖, in : IIan Peleg (1998) : 
―The Middle East Peace Process, Interdisciplinary Perspectives‖, pp. 225  
505
 Kenneth w. Stein (1997): ―Continuity and Change in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, 1973-97‖, in: Israel affairs, pp. 
266-320, Accessed: 2008, http://www.ismi.emory.edu/JournalArticles/IAsum97.html 
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general and some industries in particular. For example in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s Israel began to receive foreign cars for the first time. The estimation shows that 
in case ―boycott had continued to be enforced, and these cars did not enter the Israeli 
market, the Israeli car market would have been 12% smaller leading to a $790 price 
increase per car. Total welfare loss for the study year, 1994, would have been $89 
million.‖ 506 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that economic variable although was not a 
primary determent but still played an important role in Israel‘s decision to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process.  
 
Reason III:  Jimmy Carter’s diplomacy of 'Carrots and Sticks'. 
 
When Jimmy Carter became the president of the US, he had little knowledge 
about the Middle East, the Jewish and conflict. However, he, very quickly acquired 
knowledge on these issues. Carter was very determined to solve the Middle East 
conflict and was willing to participate in the conflict resolution process directly as 
well as to use all necessary means for accomplishing this goal.
507
  
Thus, Jimmy Carter managed to find effective strategies of persuading the 
parties to conclude the peace agreement. Therefore, it is possible to posit that another 
key factor which influenced Israel‘s calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the 
peace accord was Jimmy Carter‘s ―directive strategies‖ of conflict resolution. This 
tactic is the most powerful type of involvement in the conflict resolution
508
 which is 
conducted by ―offering each party in conflict incentives, promises of support, or 
threats of diplomatic sanctions….. Directive strategies take the form of promises of 
rewards or threats of withdrawals, if certain agreements are not made or actions are 
not taken.‖ 509 
                                                 
506 Martin A.Weiss (2006): ―Arab League Boycott of Israel‖, in : CRS, Report For Congress, pp.4, Accessed: 2008,  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/65777.pdf 
507 See Kenneth W. Stein (1999): ―Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace‖ 
508 See Jacob Bercovitch (2004): ―International Mediation and Intractable Conflict‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/ 
509 Jacob Bercovitch (2004): ―International Mediation and Intractable Conflict‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/ 
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This kind of diplomacy might change the calculation of conflicting parties of 
costs and benefits.
510
 It may add up a number of potential benefits from concluding an 
agreement and reduced the costs associated with this particular action. Carter very 
effectively used the combination of sticks and carrots in order to make Israel to accept 
the outcome of the bargaining process. 
The stick was Carter‘s threat to withdraw the U.S support for Israel in case it 
refuses to accept the outcome of the negotiation process. Moshe Dayan notes recalls 
that Jimmy Carter told to Israelis that ―the failure of talks would be catastrophic for 
relations between Israel and the United States. He would be obliged to report to 
Congress that Israel was not prepared to take the necessary steps to achieve peace.‖511 
The Carrot was Carter‘s promise to provide to Israel some economic support 
and to monitor the implementation of the peace treaty in order to be able undertake 
certain actions in case of its violation by Egypt.
512
 
Taking into consideration the fact that traditionally the US economic as well 
as political support has been very important for Israel, there are no doubts that 
Carter‘s diplomacy played an important role in changing Israel‘s perception with 
regard to the peace treaty.   
 
Reason IV: American economic aid.  
 
Another very important factor which influenced Israel‘s decision to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process was the U.S financial aid packet.  
Until 1971 the United States economic support to Israel was not very high. 
―Between 1948 and 1973, the U.S. provided Israel with an average of $122 million a 
year, or a total of $3.1 billion for the entire period. In fact, more than $1 billion of that 
amount consisted of loans for military equipment before and during the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973.‖513 The situation, however, changed dramatically after Israel agreed to 
accept the outcome of the peace process and to withdraw from Sinai.  
                                                 
510 See Jacob Bercovitch (2004): ―International Mediation and Intractable Conflict‖, Accessed: 2008,  
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/ 
511 Moshe Dayan (1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖, pp.173 
512 See ―Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments  of the United States of America and the State of 
Israel‖, Accessed: 2007, 
http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1979_us_israel_memorandum_of_agreement.asp; Moshe Dayan 
(1981): ―Break-through. A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations‖ 
513 Yuval Levin: American Aid to the Middle East: A Tragedy of Good Intentions‖, pp.11, Accessed: 2008,  
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The Israel-Egypt agreement resulted in the United States committing a $2.2 
billion loan and $ 800 million grant package to the government of Israel
514
. This 
amount of economic aid helped Israelis to cover expenses associated with their 
departure from Sinai. The tables below show the U.S. economic assistance to Israel 
for the years 1949-1996.
515
 
Table IV 
The United States economic assistance to Israel, 1949-84 
($million) 
 
Year Total aid*  Year Total aid* 
1949 100.0  1967 23.7 
1950 None  1968 106.5 
1951 35.1  1969 160.3 
1952 86.4  1970 93.6 
1953 73.6  1971 634.3 
1954 74.7  1972 430.9 
1955 52.7  1973 492.8 
1956 50.8  1974 2.621.3 
1957 40.9  1975 778.0 
1958 85.4  1976 2.337.7 
1959 53.3  1977 1.762.5 
1960 56.2  1978 1.822.6 
1961 77.9  1979 4.888.0 
1962 93.4  1980 2.121.0 
1963 87.9  1981 2.413.4 
1964 37.0  1982 2.250.5 
1965 65.1  1983 2.505.6 
1966 126.8  1984 2.631.7 
 
*Total aid includes military loan, military grant, economic loan, economic grand, FFP (food 
for peace) loan, FFP grant 
 
The tables above clearly illustrate a sudden increase of economic aid to Israel 
immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Egypt. Thus, it can be 
posited that the U.S. financial aid packet played an important role in changing Israel‘s 
calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace treaty. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.iasps.org/strat11/strategic11.pdf  
514 See Daniel Feith (2006): ―The Costs of U.S. Aid to Israel‖, Accessed: 2008 
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hireview/content.php?type=article&issue=spring04/&name=feith  
515 Jeremy M. Sharp (2009): ―U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel‖, CRS Report For Congress, pp.21- 22,  Accessed: 2009, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/134987.pdf 
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Egypt  
 
Reason I: Egypt’s territorial benefit 
 
The key factor which influenced the decision of Sadat to conclude the peace 
treaty, which was based mainly on Israel‘s initial position than to Egypt‘s, was 
territorial consideration.
516
  
Sadat wanted Israel‘s withdrawal from the Sinai at any price. ―The Sinai 
Peninsula was considered to be part of sovereign Egyptian territory: its return would 
justifiably signify a renewal of Egyptian territorial integrity, as well as of the honour 
lost during the previous years of war.‖517 
 The Sinai is a relatively little area, which is about 60,000 km². However, 
because of its unique geographical location and natural resources, its importance 
should not be underestimated. The Sinai provides a ―land bridge‖ to Southwest Asia 
because it lies between the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea.
518
 Thus, traditionally the 
Sinai has been very important territory for Egypt for various reasons such as cultural, 
economical and security.  
Historically, it was an area which provided security along the Nile. In the 
twentieth century Sinai became an important land due to the economic reasons.
519
 
Thus, by regaining control of the Sinai, Egypt received at least three sources of an 
economic benefit. 
The first economic benefit comes from large reserves of oil and natural gas 
founded in the west side of the peninsula. In addition to it, in 1990 Egypt started to 
acquire coal from Sinai.  Since Egypt has almost no natural recourses
520
, profits from 
the Sinai represents an important source of income for the government of Egypt.
521
  
The second source of revenue came from opening the Suez Canal, which was 
closed since the Six-Day War.
522
 Since the canal allows ―the fastest crossing from the 
                                                 
516 See Kenneth W. Stein (1999); Jonathan Oakman(2002); David W. Lesch (2001) 
517 Clarissa C. Eagle: ―Optimal Behaviour in International Negotiation: An interdisciplinary study of Camp David‖, 
Accessed: 2008, http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/CampDavid.pdf 
518 See Sharm El- Sheikh: Sinai- A brief History, Accessed: 2010, http://www.diveafrica.com/redsea/history.html 
519 See Boutros Boutros-Chali (1997): ―Egypt‘s Road to Jerusalem, A Diplomat‘s Story of the Struggle for Peace in 
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521 See David W. Lesch (2001): ―The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East‖, pp. 36 
522 See David W. Lesch (2001): ―The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East‖, pp. 36 
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Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean‖, it is constantly used by international ships. The 
government of Egypt in return to its permission to cross the canal gains significant 
income from taxes paid by ships. 
523
 
The final economic benefit came from the tourist sector.
524
 The Sinai attracts a 
great amount of tourists due to its beautiful nature. Tourism is one of the most 
dynamic sectors of the economy of Egypt. According to the official data it accounts of 
11.3% of GDP. Moreover, this sector provides a great amount of jobs.
525
 Therefore, 
the government of Egypt received an important source of income from opening the 
Sinai to tourists. 
 
Reason II: Jimmy Carter’s diplomacy of “Carrots and Sticks” 
 
Another key factor which influenced Egypt‘s calculation of costs and benefits 
in favour of the peace accord was Jimmy Carter‘s directive strategies of conflict 
resolution. As I already noticed in the section above, this tactic is the most powerful 
type of intervention which includes promises of rewards or threats or the combination 
of both.
526
 Carter applied directive strategies not only to Israel but also to Egypt. He 
used the combination of sticks and carrots in order to convinced Sadat to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process. 
The stick was Carter‘s threat to terminate the U.S support in case Egypt 
refuses to accept the outcome of the negotiation process, while the carrot was his 
promise to provide all kind of political as well as economic support to Egypt in case it 
accepts the treaty. 
Boutros Boutros-Chali notes recalls that at the Camp David Summit the 
president Carter told to Sadat that if the Camp David negotiation collapsed, it would 
lead to the end of his political career. He would not have a chance to be re-elected for 
a second term. Consequently, Egypt would be left without his political support. ―But 
                                                 
523 See Egypt: Facts and Figures, International Business Intelligence, Accessed: 2010 
http://www.lingo24.com/international_business_intelligence/egypt.html 
524 See David W. Lesch (2001): ―The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East‖, pp.36 
525 See ―Invest in Egypt, Tourism, Value Preposition‖, pp.3, Accessed: 2010, 
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if the Camp David talks succeeded, Carter said to Sadat, then in his second term he 
would insure that the agreement fulfilled all Sadat‘s expectations.‖527 
Moreover, it is also important to note that Sadat was not able to justify his 
rejection of unwanted paragraphs during the bargaining process due to the centralised 
political system of Egypt. In contrast to Begin, he could not avoid unwanted 
concessions on the grounds that they have to be ratified by the parliament first and 
accepted by his electorate. ―Sadat could not credibly reject a certain agreement on the 
grounds that he could not mobilize domestic support behind it. Because everyone 
knew that his hands were not tied politically, he had little room to manoeuvre 
strategically.‖528 
Thus, Carter‘s diplomacy in a combination with the political system of Egypt 
played an important role in the negotiation process and Sadat‘s decision to accept the 
peace treaty.  
 
Reason III: American political and economic support  
 
Another very important factor which influenced Egypt‘s decision to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process was the U.S financial support. Indeed, the peace 
treaty resulted in grants and military aid packages to Egypt.  
In 1951 the U.S. began to provide economic support to Egypt. However, 
between 1951 and 1973 the U.S. provided to Egypt only a very limited amount of aid 
and almost terminated its assistance in 1967 when Nasser rejected the U.S. economic 
support and turned toward the ―Soviet camp‖.529 
 After the death of Nasser the U.S. restored its support to Egypt. When 
president Sadat showed his aspiration to improve relations with the United States in 
1974, the latter provided to the former $700 million.
530
 In the following year a large –
scale U.S assistance for Egypt continued to increase. After Sadat agreed to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process and to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, 
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Egypt received about $2,6 billion annually.
531
 Thus, it became the second largest 
recipient, after Israel, of U.S. aid.
532
  
The tables below show the U.S. economic assistance to Egypt for the years 
1949-1996. It clearly illustrates an increase of economic aid to Egypt after the 
conclusion of the peace accord.
533
 
 
Table V,  
The United States economic assistance to Egypt, 1949-84 
($million) 
 
 
Year Total aid*  Year Total aid* 
1949 None   1967 12.6 
1950 None  1968 None 
1951 0.1  1969 None 
1952 1.2  1970 None 
1953 12.9  1971 None 
1954 4  1972 1.5 
1955 66.3  1973 0.8 
1956 33.3  1974 21.3 
1957 1  1975 370.1 
1958 0.6  1976 464.3 
1959 44.8  1977 907.8 
1960 65.9  1978 943.2 
1961 73.5  1979 2.588.5 
1962 200.5  1980 1.167.3 
1963 146.7  1981 1.681.2 
1964 95.5  1982 1.967.3 
1965 97.6  1983 2332 
1966 27.6  1984 2.470.8 
 
*Total aid includes military loan, military grant, economic grant, I.M.E.T(International 
Military Education and Training) grant, D.A (development assistance) loan, D.A. grant, ESF loan 
(Economic support founds), FFP (food for peace) loan, FFP grant. 
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The U.S. economic support helped Egypt to finance its defence budget, to 
rebuild its military equipment and to improve the state‘s infrastructure. 
Thus, it can be posited that the U.S. financial aid package played an important 
role in changing Egypt‘s calculation of costs and benefits in favour of the peace 
treaty.  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
As I showed above, both parties had sufficient reasons to enter the negotiation 
process and both of them achieved some material benefit from the peace treaty. Thus, 
this case study is consistent with the rational choice approach. However, in my 
opinion RCT have some important shortcomings.  
Firstly, opponents of this approach fail to address the question regarding the 
role of immaterial factors. Since it is impossible to prove that immaterial factors play 
no role in shaping state behaviour, their inability to address important aspects of 
social life such as identity, culture, norms and ideas reduces the explanatory power of 
the RCT.  
Secondly, rational choice theory tends to treat ‗national interests‘ as 
―exogenously given‖. According to this theory, people act according to their 
preferences that are assumed to be fixed and exogenously given. Constructivists, in 
contrast, believe that interests are not fixed and, therefore, their nature and creation 
have to be properly investigated.
534
  
Finally, supporters of RCT fail to provide an adequate explanation regarding 
the question of external as well as internal opposition to the peace process. In other 
words, why, if the material benefits of concluding the peace accord with Israel were 
obvious, many Egyptians criticized this agreement and most of Arab states did not 
accept the peace treaty nor did they want to follow the Egypt‘s example.535 For 
example, although Syria could have gained a lot of material benefit from the peace 
treaty with Israel (such as Golan Heights, American economic support as well as 
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opportunity to reduce its extraordinary spending on armed forces), it did not even 
want to consider the possibility of launching a negotiation process with Israel.  
In this regard, it is argued below, that the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty is incomprehensible without an understanding of how cultural factors help to 
construct vital interests of the conflicting parties.  
 
1.6.3.2 The constructivist theoretical framework 
 
Constructivists recognize the central importance of identity, culture, ideas, 
believes etc. in world politics. Supporters of this approach argue that behaviour of 
people and their interactions can not be understood properly through the analysis of 
material factors alone. Constructivists believe that human relations are constructed 
mainly by ideational and social factors such as ideas, identities, norms, beliefs etc. 
These factors provide meaning to material aspects in world politics. Constructivists, 
however, do not neglect the influence of material factors on the outcome of certain 
political event.
536
 By doing so, they offer one possible way of integrating material and 
ideational factors into analysis.  
Thus, Constructivism does not dismiss explanations of rational choice theory 
of a specific political outcome. It complements conclusions derived by the latter 
theory by integrating cultural elements into analysis.  
Although Constructivists agree with each other on the key assumption that 
immaterial factors play a very important role in world politics, they focus on different 
immaterial factors in their attempt to explain processes of social construction of 
reality in general and certain political outcomes in particular.
537
 In this case study I 
will focus on identities in order to explain Israel‘s and Egypt‘s decision to conclude 
the peace treaty.  
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In accordance with the constructivists theoretical framework, the analysis 
below will be based on the following assumptions elaborated by the supporters of this 
theoretical framework regarding issue of identity: 
  
1. Constructivists argue that identities and interests are connected.538 They shape 
actors‘ preferences and actions.539 It is a starting point of any analysis of 
identities conducted in a constructivist vein. Application of this hypothesis to 
my case study means that Israel‘s and Egypt‘s decision to conclude the peace 
agreement to a great extent depended on their identities. 
2. According to constructivist ontology, actors may have multiple types of 
identities. It is, however, important to bear in mind that actors‘ identities can 
cut across and often overlap with each other. According to constructivism the 
most prominent kinds of states‘ identities are ―type identities‖ and ―role 
identities‖. ―Type identities‖ refer to some common characteristics of state 
such as types or forms of state.
540
 The most important ―type identities‖ of 
Israel are Jewish and democratic identities. The most important forms of 
identification of Egypt are Egyptian nationalism, Islam and Arabism.
541
 Those 
identities constitute policy preferences and the way of how conflicting parties 
considered the peace process in general and the outcome of bargaining process 
in particular. 
3. Constructivists believe that through interaction, identities can change over 
time.
542
 Since identities and interests are connected, the transformation of 
identities would lead to the construction of new interests and policy 
preferences. Egypt‘s decision to conclude the peace treaty with Israel confirms 
this assumption. 
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4. According constructivism, structures and agents are ―mutually constituted‖.  
Constructivists believe that both domestic and international structures can 
have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Actors may shape 
their own social context (structures) when new thoughts and ideas expressed 
by them enter into this system.
543
  
 
1.6.3.2.1 Israel (identities)  
 
 I believe that the Likud agreed to conclude the peace treaty with Egypt 
because of its interpretation of the prominent ―type identities‖ of Israel, namely 
Jewish and democratic ones through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism.  
In the first part of this section I will analyse above mentioned ―type identities‖ 
of Israel in the historical context and how these identities are viewed domestically. 
In the second part I will try to prove that Israel‘s decision to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining process was consistent with the Likud‘s interpretation in 
general and Begin‘s in particular of Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and democratic state 
through a lenses of a revisionist version of Zionism.  
 
Historical background  
 
Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and democratic state are derived from a Zionist 
ideology. Zionism is the Jewish national liberation movement which was created in 
the late 19th century in response to increasing anti-Semitism in Europe. The term 
"Zionism" was derived from the biblical word "Zion", which means a synonym for 
words Jerusalem and the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael).
544
 Supporters of this 
movement advocated return of Jewish people to their original homeland.  
Zionism is not a monolithic ideology. There are various strands of Zionist 
such as religious, cultural, political or socialist Zionism. It is also not a static 
movement. Zionism is a dynamic ideology which has the capacity to change. ―Zionist 
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ideas evolved over time and were influenced by circumstances as well as by social 
and cultural movements popular in Europe at different times, including socialism, 
nationalism and colonialism, and assumed different "flavors" depending on the 
country of origin of the thinkers and prevalent contemporary intellectual currents.‖ 545 
Although Zionist ideology is subject of frequent reinterpretation and modification, its 
key basis remain unchangeable, namely creation and protection of the Jewish state.  
The tragedy of Holocaust, increased persecution of Jews and rejection of the 
Arab world the right of Israel to exist reinforced Jewish identity of Israel which is 
based on some ideas derived from the various strands of Zionist ideology.  
Firstly, Zionists view Jewish as a distinct people connected to each other by 
common history and destiny.
546
 Jews are ―distinct people with a continuous identity 
expressed in language, culture, genealogy, and religious practice.‖547  This belief of 
Jewish people leads to a feeling of mutual responsibility aimed at preservation of 
Jewish culture and promotion of the unity of the Jewish people.  
Secondly, Zionists believed that anti-Semitism can not be eradicated and only 
creation as well as preservation of a Jewish state might secure Jews survival. The 
Holocaust reinforced this belief and the memories of this tragedy still have a profound 
impact on the Jewish identity. Thus, demography became a key element which helps 
to secure the safety of the state.  
Thirdly, Zionists do not ignore any Jewish people anywhere. They take 
responsibility with regard to the right of all Jewish people. ―Zionism is concerned 
with the fate of Jews everywhere…. In the Zionist view means that as many Jewish as 
possible should be settled in the Jewish homeland, and it may also entail a complete 
exodus of Jews from countries in which danger threatens.‖548 
Finally, supports of a more religious or revisionist variation of Zionism have a 
very strong attachment to the ancient land of Israel (Eretz Israel).
549
  Religious circles 
consider Israel as the biblical and historic homeland of the Jewish people. This 
attachment to the land of Israel goes back almost 4,000 years to the time of Abraham. 
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―In the Bible, Israelite peoplehood is inextricably tied to the Land. God promises the 
Land to Abraham and his descendants, though the gift is contingent on virtuous 
behaviour.‖550  Proponents of a religious variation of Zionism argue that religious law 
prohibits the return of the territory of Eretz Israel to the Palestinian. Some even view 
the capture of additional parts of Holy Land in 1967 as a sign of arrival of Messiah 
within a short period of time and, therefore, strongly oppose the return of the captured 
territory on the ground that this land can accelerate the coming of the Messiah. 
Supporters of revisionist Zionism, in contrast to religious groups, drew their 
attachment to the territories because of historic claims of Jewish people rather than 
due to their religious beliefs.
551
 Nevertheless, majority of them also advocate the 
creation of a Jewish state which would include the West Bank as well as all or some 
parts of Jordan.  It is important to note that Jerusalem as the capital of David and 
Solomon‘s kingdom plays a key role in the Zionist ideology. All above mentioned 
ideas derived from the Zionist ideology and are visible in Israel‘s Jewish identity as 
well as in the laws, traditions, and norms of the state. For example the Star of David is 
painted in the flag of Israel, ―the national anthem describes the millenia-old Jewish 
hope of freedom and return to the homeland‖552, Judaism is the official religion of the 
state, Hebrew is the most widely spoken language and Israelis keep the calendar of 
the land from which they had been forced out for two thousand years. Israeli 
memorial days and holidays are connected to the Jewish common memory. There are 
holocaust day, Jerusalem day, Sabbath etc.
553
 Only Kosher food is allowed to be 
served in government institutions
554
, Arab and Israeli children attend different schools 
and there are no civil procedures for matters related to birth, marriages as well as 
death. Moreover, Israeli diplomats assume responsibilities not only in relation to 
Israeli citizens but also to the Jewish community in the countries to which they are 
placed.
555
  Furthermore, according to Israeli law, Israel does not belong only to its 
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citizens but to all Jewish worldwide. The Law of Return, adopted on July 5, 1950, 
provides every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen. ―Even 
Jewish converts to Christianity or Islam should be considered Jewish by nationality 
and be granted citizenship.‖ 556 
Israel‘s identity as democratic state is also derived from the Zionist ideology. 
A Zionist approach seeks to postulate the idea that Israel has to exist not only as a 
Jewish but also as a democratic state. ―Israel's Jewish and democratic values are both 
grounded in its existing constitutional documents. In the Declaration of Independence, 
Israel's founders proclaimed both the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel‖.557 
 Democratic ideas are especially visible in earlier Zionist movement.  For 
example, Theodore Herzl, the founder of modern political Zionism, was committed to 
―the secular, progressive ideas of the Enlightenment, envisioning a democratic policy 
which would be, in effect, Jewish by name only.‖558 
 Thus, the laws and norms of the state seek to embrace in various different 
ways not only the Jewish identity but also the democratic one. Barak writes that ―The 
values of Judaism and democracy have broad jurisprudential importance in Israel…..  
They have constitutional status, influencing both the determination of the extent of 
human rights and the protection accorded them in Israeli jurisprudence.‖559  Indeed, 
Israel has all elements of a democratic state. There is free and regular elections in 
which all citizens (not only Jews) have the right to participate, there are a separation 
of power, a competitive party system, a free press, an independent judiciary, an active 
parliament as well as civil society.
560
 
Thus, Israel‘s dual identities as a Jewish and democratic state are fully 
integrated into the laws and customs of the state of Israel.  
 
Link between Israel’s identities and the peace treaty 
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Various political parties of Israel represent the above mentioned prominent 
type of identities differently depending on their interpretation of the Zionist ideology. 
Their ideological diversity affects the character of government policies significantly. 
The Likud party originally occupies the right of political spectrum. It embraces a 
revisionist variation of Zionism which is based on a historical connection to the 
ancient land of Israel.
561
  
I believe that the Likud agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining 
process, namely to pull out from Sinai and to implement the Palestinian autonomy 
project because of its interpretation of the prominent type of state‘s identities through 
the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism. By doing so, Begin believed that he 
would manage to keep the democratic and Jewish character of the state, while at the 
same time create a possibility to integrate the biblical and historic homeland of the 
Jewish people into Israel. 
Indeed, it is possible to underline two pieces of evidence which confirm this 
assumption. 
Firstly, Israelis have never had an emotional attachment to the Sinai Peninsula. 
They did not consider Sinai as the biblical and historic homeland of the Jewish 
people. ―The Sinai had never been part of the ―land of Israel‖, and although it does 
play a role in Jewish historical memory (after all, Moses did receive the Ten 
Commandments there), that role is hardly overwhelmingly positive: For most Jews, 
the Sinai has represented a place to get out of, even if it takes forty years.‖562 Israelis 
have always been prepared to pull out from some territories occupied in the War of 
1967 in case those territories were relatively unimportant in term of their biblical 
claims and historical connection. The case in point is Israel‘s proposal of the 60s to 
return the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement. Thus, Israel‘s 
decision to pull out from the Sinai did not undermine its ideology. It did not contradict 
Israel‘s Jewish identity. Moreover, since this decision was in accordance with the 
democratic ideas, it helped to strengthen Israel‘s character as a democratic state, 
enhance its legitimacy as well as security.  
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Second of all, Begin‘s Palestinian autonomy project was consistent with the 
Likud‘s interpretation of the prominent type of state‘s identities through the lenses of 
a revisionist variation of Zionism. The Likud leadership argued that Israel could not 
grant the West Bank to a foreign authority because of it religious connection to this 
land. Judea and Samaria had always played a special symbolic role in the Zionist 
ideology. Begin pointed out: ―You can annex foreign land. You can not annex your 
own country, Judea and Samaria are part of the land of Israel, where the nation was 
born.‖563 It is however, important to note that the Likud party, in contrast to religious 
circles, believed that Israeli control in the west Bank and Gaza must be preserved 
because of nationalistic reasons rather than Israel´s religious claims.  
The democratic nature of Israel, however, required some attention to the 
humanitarian rights of the Palestinians. On the other hand, Israel was not prepared to 
treat the Palestinians equally to Jewish within the Israeli political system because that 
would undermine the Jewish character of the state. Therefore, the only possible 
solution to the Palestinian problem was to provide them some kind of minimal 
autonomy. Thus, Begin‘s plan called for granting the inhabitants of the West Bank 
and Gaza the authority to run only their own internal affairs within the borders of 
Israel.  ―For Begin, Palestinian autonomy was the only acceptable formula that would 
not compromise philosophical requirements of keeping Judea and Samaria under 
Israeli control while not providing the Palestinians with full political rights in the 
Jewish state.‖564 According to his plan, Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza 
would have the free option to receive either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Likud, 
however, argued that most of Arabs will prefer to leave rather than to stay under 
Israeli control. Therefore, the Jewish character of the state would be sustained. The 
proponents of this approach claim that the Palestinians who, nevertheless, decided to 
stay would still not pose a demographic threat because the preservation of the West 
Bank and Gaza would intensify Jewish immigration from abroad and reduce the high 
Arab birth due to economic development produced through integration of the 
occupied territories into Israel.
565
  
                                                 
563 Begin, in: James Ciment (1997): ―Palestine/Israeli: The Long Conflict‖, pp. 130 
564 Kenneth W. Stein (1999): ―Heroic Diplomacy. Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli 
Peace‖, pp.233 
565 See Mark Tessler and Ann Mosely Lesch (1989): ―Israel‘s Drive into the West Bank and Gaza‖, in: Ann Mosely 
Lesch and Mark Tessler (1989): ―Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians : From Camp David to Intifada‖, pp.207 
 163 
Thus, the peace treaty with Egypt was consistent with the Likud‘s 
interpretation in general and Begin‘s in particular of Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and 
democratic state through the lenses of a revisionist version of Zionism. Thus, it can be 
posited that immaterial factors, such as Israel‘s identities as Jewish and democratic 
state were constitutive to the construction of Israeli interests and played a crucial role 
in Israeli‘s decision to pull out from the Sinai.  
 
1.6.3.2.2 Egypt (identities)  
 
Constructivists present a unique opportunity to investigate origin of interests 
rather than by assuming them fixed and defined by material factors. Opponents of this 
theoretical approach argue that identities and interests are connected.
566
 They shape 
actors‘ preferences and actions.567 Application of these assumptions to my case study 
suggests that Egypt‘s decision to conclude the peace treaty with Israel was a result of 
a dramatic transformation of its prominent ―type identity‖. It is possible to underline 
three prominent ―type identities‖ of Egypt. There are: Egyptian nationalism, pan-
Arabism, and Islam.
568
   
Under Nasser the Pan-Arabism ideology played a key role in the establishing 
of Egypt‘s policy preferences and interests. However, after the death of Nasser, 
Egyptian foreign policy has undergone substantial evolution based on values, ideas, 
beliefs as well as perceptions of the new country's presidents. Thus, it can be posited 
that Egypt‘s decision to accept the outcome of the bargaining process was based on 
Sadat‘s commitment to Egyptian nationalism.  
 In the first part of this section I will analyse the Pan-Arabism ideology in the 
historical context and how this ideology was articulated under Nasser‘s regime.  In the 
second part I will investigate the process of transformation of Egypt‘s identity as an 
Arab state into a national one. I will show the ways of how Sadat modified the 
principles elaborated by Nasser such as anti-imperialism, Socialism and the Arab 
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unity. In the final part of the section I will try to prove that Egypt‘s decision to sign 
the peace agreement with Israel was a result of construction of a new realty, in which 
Egypt‘s identity as national state became much more important than the Arab one.   
 
Historical background 
 
Pan- Arabism  
 
The occupation of Egypt by Britain dates back to 1882. The period of British 
authority in Egypt led to the rise of feeling of cultural connection between Egypt and 
the other Arab states and aspiration for independence. ―As Egyptians began to grasp 
the idea of being Arab, there was a rise in the thinking of the need for Arab unity and 
that Egypt was the natural leader of that unity.‖569  
 After long struggle, Arab nationalist conducted a military coup against 
existing government in Egypt. They eliminated the monarchy, managed to terminate 
the British occupation and established a new republican regime. The major figure in 
the new government became Gamal Abdel Nasser. He adopted and contributed to the 
development of the ideas associated with the Pan-Arabism ideology both in Egypt and 
throughout the Middle East. This ideology became a dominated national identity of 
Egypt.
570
  
The Pan-Arabism ideology is a cultural and political nationalist movement 
aimed at the political unity between the Arab nations in the Middle East. ―Arabism is 
an amorphous concept based primarily on emotional and sentimental attachments to a 
perceived entity called ―the Arab nation‖. It presupposes a high level of homogeneity 
among the inhabitants of the Arab states based on mutual perceptions of a common 
cultural, linguistic and religious heritage.‖571  
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It is possible to underline five key elements which are present in the Pan-
Arabism ideology and were integrated into Egypt‘s foreign policy-making as well as 
to national identity. They are the following:  
 
Arab unity   
 
Arab unity is a central element of the Pan-Arabism ideology.
572
 The notation 
of Arab Unity is based on the idea of the creation of a single state which would 
comprise all people speaking the Arabic language in the Middle East and North 
Africa.   
Nasser‘s attitude about the need of the Arab unity were often expressed in his 
speeches. However, the identification of Egypt with the Arab nations and his 
nationalism became more evident in 1955 because of the Baghdad Pact, a military 
agreement which was signed by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom. In response to this Pact, Nasser formed an alliance with Syria as a first step 
towards a broader integration of the Arabs countries. The same year, Nasser 
concluded two military pacts, one with Syria and another with Saudi Arabia.
573
 In his 
speech of 1957, he declared that Egyptian national interests are deeply rooted in Arab 
nationalism. ―Our policy is based on Arab nationalism because Arab nationalism is a 
weapon for every Arab state. Arab nationalism is a weapon employed against 
aggression.‖574 The same year, Nasser signed the ―Treaty of Arab Solidarity‖ with 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. In 1958 he accepted Egyptian-Syrian union. 
575
 
Egypt‘s active participation in the nationalist movement aimed at unification 
of the Arab world remained throughout the whole period of Nasser‘s rule. The idea 
that Egypt is a part of the Arab entity was vigorously promoted by Nasser. For 
example the first article of the 1956 constitution stated ―Egypt is a sovereign, 
independent Arab state…and the Egyptian people are an integral part of the Arab 
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nation.‖576 The Egyptian national charter drafted in 1962 also had an explicit Arab 
character, dedicating in its opening to ―The Arab People of Egypt‖.577 
 
Anti-imperialism 
 
 Anti-imperialism is a key element on which the whole Pan-Arabism 
movement is based.
578
 The principle of anti-imperialist has been permanently present 
in the perception, attitude and behaviour of Nasser. Anti-western feelings and anti-
imperialist policies are clearly visible throughout his presidency.  For example, in 
1961 he exercised his anti-imperialist polices by participating in the Arab Security 
Force against Iraq. Another case in point is the Czech arms deal of 1955 aimed at the 
elimination of the Western arms monopoly and proclamation of Arab 
independency.
579
  
Even in relatively peaceful atmosphere, Nasser continued to express his anti-
imperialist attitude. For instance in 1965 he stated that ―throughout the years, the 
imperialism was working for the division of the Arab world. Imperialism wanted to 
sow the seeds of dissent among the Arab states…‖580 
 
Distraction of Israel  
 
Anti-Israel ideas in the Pan-Arabism ideology are rooted in anti-imperialism 
principles
581
 and perception that Israel, along with the Western counties, has 
colonists‘ ambitions. According to supporters of the Pan-Arabism ideology ―Israel 
was internationally inflicted upon them by the same imperial powers that had denied 
Arab independence and self-determination to the former Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire after World War I. Zionism was an illegitimate national movement, 
Israel an artificial offspring of colonialism. Arab anti-Semitism was not directed at 
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Jews, but at Israel as a whole.‖582 Nasser as president of the most powerful Arab state 
became the recognized leader of the Arab world‘s aim to destroy Israel. Anti-Israeli 
statements were always expressed by the president. However, the highest point of his 
antagonism toward Israel was reached at the Khartoum summit of 1967. At that 
summit the Arab league adopted main principles (known as ―three noes‖), by which 
the Arab States agreed to unite their political efforts aimed at fighting Israel. Those 
principles, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with 
it eliminated every possibility that might lead to a peaceful settlement.
583
 
 
The centrality of the Palestinian course 
 
The entire Arab world is considered as a single world. According to the Pan-
Arabism ideology the loss of Palestine was a colonist aspiration of western countries. 
Egypt‘s concern over the Palestinian question has always been strong. It produced the 
1956 and 1967 wars. Nasser actively supported the UNSC Resolution 242 as well as 
Palestinian claims of self-determination. In 1964 he helped to form the Palestine 
Liberation Organization.
584
 Nasser considered the PLO as a tool of advancing Egypt's 
goal of uniting the Arab nations.  
 
Separation of religion from politics  
 
The Pan-Arabism tends to be a secular movement based on socialist or fascist 
ideology. It emerged as an alternative to the ideology of Pan-Islam, with the main 
focus on the Arabs rather than on Muslims.  
Throughout his presidency, the president Nasser articulated his aspiration to 
create a socialist state and his desire to separate religion from politics.  In 1954 Nasser 
stated that ―after eighteen months in power, I still don‘t see how it will be possible to 
govern according to the Koran….I don‘t think it is suitable as a source of policy and 
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political doctrine.‖585 Thus, Nasser rejected a religious foundation for the conduct of 
the national politics and in the late 1950s he began to form his state policy in 
accordance with socialist line. In 1952 and 1961 Nasser introduced the land reform 
aimed at reducing the amount of land that an individual could have in their 
possession. He nationalised foreign-owned banks as well as insurance companies and 
forced out foreigners from Egypt. He established free education programmes and 
introduced the universal medical service for all citizens. From 1958, Egypt became 
dependant on Soviet military as well as economic aid. ―Like many other Arab 
nationalist leaders, Nasser was a strong proponent of Arab Socialism, and his 
economic policies were characterized by a centrally planned economy, state subsidies, 
and state ownership of businesses.‖586 
 
Transformation of identity    
 
On October 15, 1970 Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt. Most of 
Egyptian and foreign analysts thought that Sadat would follow a similar policy course 
as Nasser did. They believed that the new president would continue to distribute 
principles of the Pan-Arabism ideology both in Egypt and throughout the Middle 
East. Almost nobody could predict that Sadat will alter Egypt‘s political course 
dramatically by transforming the existing Egypt‘s identity as a socialist state with 
Pan-Arabism orientation into national one. Indeed, during the initial period of his 
presidency, Sadat continued to pursue Nasser‘s principles. However, as his power 
increased he initiated various reforms aimed at transformation of Egypt‘s political 
system.
587
 Sadat began to modify ―Nasserite‖ principles such as anti-imperialism, 
Arabism, Socialism and the Arab unity.  
  
Revision of anti-Western orientation 
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Sadat almost totally changed Nasser‘s anti-imperialist i.e. anti-Western 
attitude. The United States became Egypt‘s ally. Sadat terminated his friendly 
relationship with the Soviet Union and expelled their military advisers out of Egypt. 
At the end of March 1976 he withdrew from the Egyptian Friendship Treaty with 
Moscow. After those steps, Sadat turned toward the US and in November 1973, the 
US-Egyptian relationship was re-established. He became the first Arab leader who 
manages to create positive relations with the US. The latter started to consider its 
relationship with Egypt as one of the most important diplomatic priorities in the 
Middle East.
588
 
Similarly, Egypt‘s approach towards European counties as well as the pro-
Western Arabs regimes became much more positive. ―Egypt‘s relations with the 
Western community as a whole, including the West European countries, became 
overtly warm and cordial. This transformation at the global level induced a 
modification in Egyptian attitudes at the regional level, as a result of which the pro-
Western, conservative Arab regimes, who had formed Nasser‘s major regional 
enemies, became Sadat‘s main allies and supporters.‖589 
 
Revision of Arab Nationalism  
 
As Sadat‘s domestic power increased, he started to pursue an ―Egypt first 
policy.‖ ―Nasser, like Caesar, preferred to be ―first in his village‖, meaning the village 
of the third world. Sadat accepted being ―second in Rome‖, meaning the capitals of 
great world power.‖590 Thus, the value of ―Egyptian Patriotism‖ replaced Nasser‘s 
notion of Arab unity. For example, in 1971 he changed the name of the country from 
the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt.
591
  
 The principle of Patriotism and attention towards domestic affairs became 
even more pronounced after the post-1973 period because of two reasons. Firstly, the 
1973 war helped to Sadat to regain national honour by removing the embarrassment 
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experienced by the Egyptian army during the Six-Day War. Secondly, the enormous 
costs of the October War, made Egyptians to believe that they had made enough 
contribution to the Arab course in general and to the Palestinian question in 
particular.
592
  
 
Revision of socialist economic policy and system 
 
During his presidency Sadat often expressed his ideas about the need of 
democracy, capitalist‘s economic policy and liberalized political system. Already in 
1971 he started economic reform aimed at abolition of the socialist system in Egypt. 
He opened up a free currency bank, made it easy to buy land, launched reforms in the 
agriculture sector, drafted laws designed to attract foreign investment, abolished all 
legal prohibitions against the creation of private enterprises and reduced the 
government control over industrial sectors.
593
 Sadat‘s new economic policy, which 
became articulated in the October Working Paper of 1974, rested on three principles 
such as Arab capital, Western technology and Egyptian resources. According to 
Sadat, the combination of those principles would eventually lead to development and 
progress.
594
 As is visible from above, the changes introduced to a new economic 
policy were very profound and were based on new ideological principles.  
 
Egypt’s identity as national state and peace treaty   
 
I believe that Sadat agreed to accept the outcome of the bargaining process 
because of the transformation of Egypt‘s identity as a leading Arab state into an 
independent, national state.  
As I showed above, Sadat revised Egypt‘s identity which was based on 
―Nasserite‖ principles of anti-imperialism, socialism and the Arab unity. Identities 
and interests are not fixed and constructed by materialistic factors, but instead always 
socially constructed. Sadat transformed the existing state‘s identity by integrating new 
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ideas, such as Egyptian Patriotism, open economy and western alliance into social 
context (structures).  
 By rejecting old principles of Pan-Arabism, Egypt didn‘t need to seek the 
destruction of Israel on the basis of the principle of anti-imperialism or to follow the 
aspiration of Palestinians to form their own state. New norms such as Egyptian 
Patriotism, open economy and western alliance even stimulated Egypt to seek a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict with Israel. Egypt‘s new identity as a national state 
helped to transform the interests of Egypt. The need of financial, military, 
technological as well as diplomatic assistance on the part of western countries 
required a peaceful accommodation with Israel. Since the state of war with Israel was 
not a favourable condition for attracting foreign capital to Egypt, Sadat had to accept 
the right of Israel to exist in accordance with the Resolution 242 and to make a 
bilateral peace with Begin.  
 
1.6.4 Conclusion 
 
The key argument of my study has been that the conclusion of the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel has to be analysed through a theoretical framework on the 
interplay between a mixture of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and 
the constructivist theoretical framework. This analytical frame allowed evaluating 
decisions of the conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process and to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining game through the entire complex of material and 
immaterial factors.  
The empirical analysis showed that RCT provides some significant asset for 
the analysis. Indeed, both parties entered the negotiation process at the favourable 
moment in the conflict. The core reason for Israel was the outcome of the October 
War of 1973, while for Egypt its stagnating economy. The bargaining process was 
very difficult and long. During various meetings different peace proposals and the 
positions of each side on each issue were examined and modified. Eventually, the 
bargaining game resulted in Israel‘s victory. Egypt accepted Israel's original position 
on almost all fundamental issues such as the Palestinian problem, borders, the status 
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of Jerusalem, the nature of peace etc.  The most significant concession that Israel 
agreed to make is to pull out from the whole Sinai.  
Nevertheless, in my analysis I showed that both parties had much to gain from 
the peace treaty. For Egypt it was territorial benefit and American economic 
assistance, while Israel‘s decision was grounded in security concerns, strategic 
consideration, economic benefit from cooperation with Egypt as well as the U.S. 
financial aid. Another key factor which influenced parties‘ calculation of costs and 
benefits in favour of the peace accord were Jimmy Carter‘s strategies of conflict 
resolution.   
In my study I proved that RCT has some important shortcomings which can be 
resolved by constructivist assumptions. Rational choice theorists tend to treat 
ideational factors as secondary important. These factors have no independent 
explanatory strength in their analysis. Actors use them strategically, like any other 
resource in their disposal in order to enhance their material benefit.   
Constructivists, in contrast, seek to analyze the wide variety of ideational 
factors that shape actor‘s outlooks (such as identities, beliefs and ideas). Moreover, 
they provide an understanding of micro-macro relationship and investigate nature and 
construction of interests rather than regard them as defined and fixed. Furthermore, 
supporters of this theory take into account different time periods and investigate social 
processes of transformation.  
 In my thesis I argued that conclusion of the peace treaty cannot be understood 
nor explained properly without taking into consideration the identities of both sides. I 
showed that Begin‘s interpretation of Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and democratic 
state through the lenses of a revisionist version of Zionism and transformation of 
Egypt‘s identity from Arab state to national one were constitutive to the construction 
of the conflicting parties‘ interests and played a crucial role in their decision to accept 
the outcome of the bargaining game.  
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1.7 The Oslo Accord of 1993 
 
1.7.1 Introduction  
 
The origin of Israeli and Palestinian conflict dates back to the late 19
th 
century, 
when the Zionist political movement was formed and proclaimed its desire to create 
the land of Israel in Palestrina. From this time onwards, Jewish people started to 
immigrate to the Palestrina that was first under the Ottoman ruling and later under 
British authority. This produced a negative reaction on the part of Arab population.  
After the end of the WWII the British government made a decision to live 
Palestine and the conflict became a key preoccupation of the international community. 
In 1948 the UN passed a resolution aimed at the partition of the territory into two 
states, one for Jewish and one for Palestinian people. However, this proposal was 
categorically rejected by most of Arab states, including the Palestinians. Nevertheless, 
Israel declared its independence on May, 1948. This event almost immediately 
provoked the first Arab-Israeli war which resulted in a victory of Jewish people.
595
  
Since then Israel went through several wars, namely the Six Day war of 1967 
and the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Those wars not only increased the level of 
antagonism of Israeli and Palestinian people towards each other but also produced 
new disputes such as the Palestinian refugee issue, the question of occupied territories 
and the status of Jerusalem. Consequently, the likelihood of peace between Israel and 
Palestinians has been greatly reduced. It became difficult to imagine that both parties 
in conflict would come to favour any peaceful agreement.  
Nevertheless at the end of August 1993 Israel and the PLO agreed to sign a 
peace agreement, the so-called Declarations of Principles (DOP) that called for 
mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
and the creation of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority.  
The conclusion of the Oslo Accord in Washington D.C. by Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman 
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Yasir Arafat, took many people by surprise. As Rabin expressed during this event-it 
was a ―historic moment which hopefully will bring about an end to 100 years of 
bloodshed and misery between the Palestinians and Jews, between Palestinians and 
Israel.‖596 
Despite of various efforts over the years to settle the conflict between Israel 
and PLO, ―the Oslo agreement makes the first comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian 
peace accord in an almost 100–years-old conflict.‖597 How it is possible to explain 
this sudden change of Israel and the PLO behaviour? Although the History of Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and peace diplomacy is very well documented, the above 
mentioned question is still possible to interpret in a different way and through the 
application of different types of theories.  
Thus, the key aim of this case study is to answer the question of why Israelis 
and Palestinians after many years of conflict and non-recognition, decided to accept 
each other and to conclude the Oslo Accord in 1993.  
In organisational terms this chapter will be divided into three parts. The first 
provides historical background of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and investigates 
various aspects that shaped both the Palestinian and Israeli foreign policy. The overall 
objective of the second and the third parts is to examine the conclusion of the Oslo 
Accords through an innovative framework elaborated in the theoretical part of my 
dissertation. I will first provide an understanding of Israel‘s and PLO‘s decision to 
enter the negotiation process and to agree with the outcome of the bargaining game 
through rational choice theory and second through the constructivist theoretical 
framework. The material factors will be analyzed through RCT, while the immaterial 
ones through the constructivist framework. 
 
1.7.2               Negotiating process 
 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the international community paid little 
attention to the Palestinian demand to build their own state. The Palestinian conflict 
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was generally equated with the refugee problem and the International community 
believed that the solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict would eventually lead to a 
settlement of the Palestinian question.
598
 ―The objective Palestinian, if used at all, was 
utilized primarily as modifier for ―refugees‖, and that this was the context in which 
the Palestinians were best known.‖599  The famous Resolution 242 aimed at conflict 
settlement in the Middle East did not even mention the word ―Palestinian‖. It only 
briefly pointed out to the refugee problem without even providing the definition of the 
concept of a refugee. 
The war of 1967 has changed the situation dramatically. It became a key factor 
which stimulated the construction of Palestinian national identity. This war made 
many Palestinians to believe that they have to rely on their own in their struggle with 
Israel over Palestine. ―Most Palestinians saw the Arab state defeat as justification to 
apply their philosophy of ―armed struggle‖ to the liberation of Palestine.‖600  Acts of 
terror as a means of liberation of Palestine and distraction of Israel made the 
international community to pay attention to the Palestinian problem. 
Nevertheless, the first serious attempt to address the Palestinian question was 
only made in 1978 at the Camp David summit.  The Camp David Accords not only 
provided the framework for the conclusion of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, but also 
set a possibility of resolving the Palestinian problem. It approve Begin‘s concept of 
the Palestinian autonomy. By 1980, however, no progress has been achieved with 
regard to the principles of Palestinian self-rule called for in the Camp David 
Agreements.
601
 It is possible to underline at least three issues which precluded 
Egyptians and Israelis to reach an agreement on the Palestinian dimension of the 
accord. Firstly, Begin considered Palestinian self-rule to mean a very limited 
autonomy, covering only ―administrative functions in social and educational affairs‖, 
while Sadat interpreted the term of autonomy as a first step towards creation of 
independent state for the Palestinian people.
602
 Secondly, Egyptians considered Israeli 
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efforts to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as illegitimate.
603
 
Finally, the two countries had a different opinion regarding the representation of the 
Palestinian people and the role of the PLO in the peace process.
604
 Israelis were not 
prepared to provide neither to Jordan nor to Egypt the right to administrate the West 
Bank and Gaza, nor did they want to recognize the PLO as a legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people.   
Due to the above mentioned disagreements between the conflicting parties, 
Israel and Egypt decided to extend the initially agreed date for the termination of 
autonomy talks.
605
 However, a series of outside from the negotiation room events 
such as Israeli new law according to which East Jerusalem became a part of capital of 
the state, Israel annexation of the Golden Heights and invasion of Lebanon caused the 
talks to collapse.
606
  
The Lebanon war had a great impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process in 
general and the Palestinian problem in particular.  Firstly, this war led to the expulsion 
of the PLO from Beirut and an increased support for the PLO among West Bank and 
Gaza Palestinians. Israel failed to achieve its key objective aimed at reducing 
legitimacy of the PLO in the occupied territories. ―West Bank and Gaza Palestinians 
resorted to any available means to demonstrate their support for and solidarity with 
the PLO. They issued statements denouncing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and 
asserting the principle of the exclusive legitimate representational character of the 
PLO to the Palestinian people.‖607 The PLO also took some steps towards 
modification of its policy. It started to focus more on Palestinians in the Diaspora 
rather than on Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza.  
Secondly, the Lebanon war resulted in an increased comprehension of the 
Palestinian problem as well as sympathy towards the PLO among some European 
countries.  For example the French government throughout the war kept contact with 
the PLO and called for mutual recognition between Israeli and the Palestinians.
608
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Finally, this war led to an increased attention of the United States towards the 
peace process in general and the Palestinian question in particular. The US started to 
believe that the regional stability depends on its ability to find a solution to the 
Palestinian problem. Moreover, it had to demonstrate its commitment to bring peace 
in the Middle East domestically and internationally, namely to the Arab world and to 
its European allies.
609
 As a result, on September 1, 1982, President Reagan introduced 
his peace initiative aimed at the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the 
Palestinian problem.
610
  
The Reagan plan called for a full autonomy for the Palestinians after a five-
year transition period, the termination of the construction of new Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank and Gaza, implementation of Security Council resolution 242 and 
the settlement of a final status of Jerusalem through negotiation process. This plan 
mentioned the right of Arabs from East Jerusalem to vote for the ―autonomy council‖. 
The Reagan‘s peace initiative, however, dismissed the possibility of the creation of a 
sovereign Palestinian state. It also excluded the PLO from the participation in the 
peace talks and assigned a role of representation of the Palestinian people to Jordan.
611
   
The Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza had a different reaction 
to the Reagan peace plan. Some supported this project while other rejected it on the 
ground that it excluded the PLO from the peace talks and did not encourage the 
formation of a Palestinian state. Members of the PLO also had different opinion 
regarding Reagan‘s initiative. The radicals inside the PLO immediately rejected the 
peace proposal, while some moderate leaders found some positive aspects in this plan. 
They, however, argued that the plan requires some serious adjustments. According to 
them, it had to include the right of creation of an independent Palestinian state and to 
provide a role to the PLO in the peace process. Nevertheless, due to radicals, the 
Palestinian National Council dismissed the Reagan plan.
612
  
The reaction of the Arab countries to this peace proposal was also very 
diverse. Nevertheless, despite that the gap between their positions was very broad, 
they managed to elaborate a joint Arab peace plan, known as a plan of Fez. In contrast 
                                                 
609 See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): ―Israel on the Road to Peace‖, pp.34-35 
610 See Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986): ―The PLO After the Lebanon War‖, pp72 
611 See Ziva Flanhaft (1996): ―Israel on the Road to Peace‖,,pp.36-37; Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986): ―The PLO After the 
Lebanon War‖, pp.74-75 
612See Emile F. Sahliyeh (1986): ―The PLO After the Lebanon War‖, pp.78,93-94,101,108-109 
 178 
to Reagan‘s peace proposal, this plan called for the creation of the Palestinian state, 
Israeli withdraw to the 1967 boarders including Jerusalem, an acceptance of the PLO 
as a single representative of the Palestinian people.
613
  Although it is obvious that this 
plan had no chance of success, it, nevertheless, constituted a very important change in 
the policy of the Arab league towards Israel. The Article 7 of the Arab peace initiative 
mentioned indirectly the right of Israel to exist in the Middle East.
614
  
Israel‘s reaction to the Reagan‘s peace plan was more obvious. The Begin 
government very quickly announced its decision to reject this peace initiative on the 
basis that it contradicted to the Camp David Accords. The Israeli government claimed 
that issues such as the role of representation of Palestinians by Jordan, the status of 
Jerusalem, the participation of the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the 
election of the autonomy council and the total termination of the construction of 
settlements were not mentioned in the Camp David Agreements.
615
 Israelis also 
rejected Reagan‘s notation of a Palestinian autonomy. ―It opposed granting the 
Palestinians territorial autonomy because it believed autonomy did not concern 
territory but inhabitants only.‖616  In other words, the Likud government maintained 
the position that the Resolution 242 does not cover the West Bank and Gaza and, 
therefore, it has the right to keep those territories under its control. It is however 
important to point out that Israel did not have a united position on the Reagan plan. 
The Labor party disapproved Likud‘s policy. It argued that this plan can serve as a 
foundation for further negotiation. ―The Labor party, which Peres heads, has 
consistently acknowledged that the Resolution 242 apples to the West Bank and Gaza 
and has been willing to yield sovereignty over most of these territories to Jordan in 
the context of peace settlement.‖617 However, Begin was against of freezing all Israeli 
settlement in the occupied territories on the ground that they were crucial for the 
protection of the state. In any case Begin‘s government rejected all aspects of this 
peace initiative and continued to build new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza.
618
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Thus, the US didn‘t manage to find a joint position regarding Reagan‘s 
initiative and to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation room. As a result, the 
Palestinian question was once again left without resolution. 
Hopes of progress in a diplomatic domain were raised again in 1984 when 
Israeli election resulted in a political arrangement known as ―national unity 
government‖, in which Labor and Likud agreed to share power. 619As a result, Labor 
leader Shimon Peres became a prime minister and Yitzhak Shamir a vice prime as 
well as a foreign minister of Israel for the first two years. For the second half of the 
government‘s term they supposed to switch these roles.  
In contrast to Likud, the Labor party had a different attitude towards the 
Palestinian problem. Labor‘s solution to this problem was based on a territorial 
compromise rather than on functional ones proposed by Likud. This policy was 
primarily formulated by Yigal Allon who called for a limited Israeli territorial control 
over the West Bank and Gaza as a means of the preservation of the Jewish nature of 
the state. 
620
 
Thus, Peres believed that the solution to the Palestinian question can be found 
through the control of Jordan over the occupied territories. Therefore, he called for 
direct negotiation with Jordan. On April 11, 1987, a secret meeting between King 
Hussein and Shimon Peres in London took place. The outcome of this meeting 
became a document, so-called ―London agreement‖, which endorsed the idea of 
organizing the international conference aimed at the resolution of the Palestinian 
question, with the participation of the five permanent member of the Security Council 
and all conflicting parties involved, including Palestinian people as a part of the 
Jordanian delegation.
621
 It was agreed that any solution reached by the involved 
parties would not be subject of vetoing by the two superpowers and that this 
conference would create an opportunity for bilateral negotiation between Israel and 
the Arab countries.
622
  
This international conference, however, never took place. Shamir who became 
a prime minister of Israel in July 1986 was uncertain about this peace initiative. As a 
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result, King Hussein dropped the idea of hosting the international conference and 
Arab counters shifted their attention toward the Iran-Iraq war.
623
 
Due to the lack of progress in a diplomatic domain, inhabitants of the West 
Bank and Gaza decided to find the solution to the Palestinian problem by themselves. 
In December 1987, they started a series of violent riots, known as the Intifada.
624
 A 
popular uprising throughout Gaza and the West Bank had a great impact on the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  
Firstly, it had an effect on the PLO. The PLO accelerated the process of the 
modification of its policy, by further shifting its attention from the Palestinians in the 
Diaspora towards the West Bank and Gaza.
625
 Secondly, the Intifada was a very 
significant event because of its enormous level of intensity. For the first time, the 
uprising included not only the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza but also 
Israel‘s Arab citizens. 626 This made some Israelis more determine to find the solution 
to the Palestinian problem as soon as possible. ―There have been instances of 
Palestinian solidarity across the Green Line before, but not on this scale and not in 
this manner. The general strike on December 21, 1987 was unprecedented. It was a 
signal to the Israelis that if they continue along this road, than they will have to deal 
not only with the Arabs of the territories but with ―their‖ Arabs as well.‖627 Thirdly, 
the Intifada resulted in a creation of various extremist Islamist movements such as 
Hamas.
628
 Finally, the uprising against Israeli occupation brought the Palestinian 
question to world‘s attention again and signified another opportunity for the US to 
launch the peace process. Thus, in 1988 Shultz produced a new peace proposal, which 
combined elements of the Camp David Accord, the Reagan plan and the London 
agreement.
629
 
The Shultz plan called for almost an ideational international conference to 
what Peres and king Hussein had envisioned during their secret meeting in London, 
but it  was not very welcome by both the Israel right and the PLO. 
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Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir did not reject the plan, but objected 
some key elements of this initiative. He opposed a new timetable of a three-year 
autonomy period for the West Bank and Gaza and the concept of territory-for-peace. 
Moreover, he questioned the suitability of the international forum as a basis for 
productive talks. Nevertheless, Shamir stated that Israel would be prepared to conduct 
negotiation with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation based on the Camp David 
framework, without the participation of the PLO as well as interference, either by a 
superpower or by Arab states. 
630
 
The PLO reaction to the new peace initiative was more definitive. Arafat 
rejected this plan because it did not address Palestinians aspiration aimed at the 
creation of their own state and did not anticipate a direct participation of the PLO in 
the negotiation process. 
631
 
The US tried to convince Israel to follow the Shultz peace plan. Nevertheless, 
no international conference took place.  Another failure in the diplomatic domain, 
however, did not preclude the US for introducing another peace plan. Thus, in 1989 
US Secretary of State Baker formally submitted his peace proposal aimed at 
establishing a negotiation process between Israel and the inhabitants of the West Bank 
in Cairo on the basis of the Israeli government's May 14 initiative which called for the 
participation of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in talks on self-rule as well as on 
the permanent settlement. 
632
 
In contrast to Israeli initiative, however, the Baker plan did not include 
assurance that the PLO would not be allowed to participate indirectly in the 
negotiations, nor did it state about the exclusion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. 
It also did not explicitly guarantee that the talks in Cairo would include only the issue 
of election and would not lead to the question of future accommodation.  As a result, 
the Likud party refused to accept Baker‘s terms for launching the Cairo peace talks 
and the Israeli Knesset dissolved the Israel National Unity government in a vote of no 
confidence over Shamir‘s rejection of another peace initiative. This terminated the 
six-year partnership between Likud and Labor.
633
 Within three month after the 
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dissolution of the government, the Prime Minister Shamir formed the ultra right 
coalition which was reluctant to move the peace process forward. 
634
 Moreover, the 
US stopped its contacts with the PLO due to its unwillingness to disapprove a terrorist 
attack which took place on a beach near Tel Aviv. As a result the peace process was 
undermined once again. 
635
 
The end of the Cold War, Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the 
subsequent eruption of the Gulf War advanced the opportunities of breaking the 
diplomatic stalemate. ―The Gulf War created unique opportunities for renewed U.S. 
mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had brought about 
a ―historic‖ international coalition, with the United Nation playing its intended 
original role, and the defeat of Saddam Hussein had created new hope for diplomacy 
and negotiations.‖636 
Indeed, after the termination of the Gulf War, the Secretary of State James 
Baker went to the region to meet Israelis, Palestinians and heads of other Arab states 
in order to promote an idea of launching an international conference for Middle East 
peace. He proposed to hold the conference in Madrid on 30 October 1991 with the 
participation of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation under the joint sponsorship of the US and the USSR. It was agreed that this 
conference would be based on the London document of 1987, Shult‘s peace ideas and 
would take into account some of Likud governments‘ requests. Thus, it was decided 
that talks would be conducted in the bilateral committees, that any decision achieved 
by the involved parties during the negotiation process would not be subject of vetoing 
by the two superpowers and that it would be based on 242 and 338 resolutions.
637
  
After some consideration and extensive pressure by the Bush administration 
all invited parties formally accepted the invitation for attending the conference. 
Shamir government could not any longer ignore the pressure to negotiate, coming 
from the US, the Palestinians and the international community. The Palestinian 
popular uprising, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
638
 and the American‘s threat to 
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withdraw $ 10 billion of loan guarantees aimed at accommodation of Russian 
immigrants pushed Shamir to start the talks with the Palestinians. 
639
 
As a result, the Madrid conference started its work on October 30, 1991, as 
agreed.  It became a very important conference not in terms of achieved progress over 
substance but in terms of bringing for the first time all major parties involved in the 
conflict together in the conference room. ―For the first time, Israel sat as an equal at 
the negotiating table with all of its closest Arab neighbours. For the first time, Israel 
engaged in face-to-face political negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians. And for 
the first time, Arab states from Saudi Arabia to Mauritania signalled their willingness 
to make peace with Israel if acceptable terms could be found.‖640 
The Madrid Conference resulted in a few rounds of bilateral negotiations in 
Washington conducted between Israel and different Arab states. In addition, multi-
lateral talks as a part of peace process began in Moscow on 28 January 1992. 
Multilateral talks were held in five regional committees responsible to cover different 
issues such as economic cooperation, arms control, environment, water and refugees. 
However, due to inability of conflicting parties to narrow their differences and to 
identify a common position on disputed issues little progress was achieved.
641
  
The Palestinian-Israeli bilateral talks were held in 10 rounds. The first five 
rounds of negotiation took place before the Israeli election of 1992, which dismissed 
Likud party from power. Therefore, no substantive success during this period of time 
was achieved.  The Likud government was against the Palestinian‘s demand for 
broader self-rule, an absolute freeze on Israeli settlement in the occupied land as well 
as the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza.
642
   
The situation, however, changed dramatically after the Labor party led by 
Yitzhak Rabin won the election in June 1992.  
Rabin tried to maintain personal control over policy of Israel in the peace 
process. Therefore, he excluded Peres from important decision making processes by 
taking the defence portfolio for himself.
643
 ―Peres wasn‘t supposed to be involved in 
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bilateral peace talks with any Arab group. Rabin had received that job for himself, 
limiting Peres‘s role to mediating in multilateral talks about economic matters, the 
environment, the sharing of water, and other non-political issues.‖644  
 Although like the Likud leadership, Rabin‘s official position was that it would 
not communicate with the PLO, it was prepared to make a lot of compromises in 
order to achieve a peace treaty with the Palestinians. Thus, he agreed to cancel the 
establishment of new Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza.
645
 Moreover, 
during the following five rounds of the bilateral negotiations some improvements in 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks were achieved. Rabin offered to start election of a 
Palestinian administrative council with far broader autonomy which Likud had never 
been willing to consider. Furthermore, he assured the Palestinians that Israel consider 
the autonomy project not as a permanent solution to their problem. ―Likud had never 
been ready to discuss any idea that permitted anything more than personal autonomy 
for the Palestinians, enabling them to run only the most elemental aspects of their 
daily life. After Labor replaced Likud the Israeli government for the first time raised 
the territorial or geographic aspects of Palestinian self-rule.‖646 Nevertheless, despite 
those concessions on the part of Rabin, the gap between Palestinians and Israeli 
position remained enormous. The PLO´s bargaining position was so extreme that even 
the Labor government was not willing to accept.
647
  
First, the Palestinian delegation demanded a very broad power such as 
legislative, executive and judicial authority for the future government. Secondly, the 
Palestinians wished to start talks on the permanent status of territories in a year and a 
half rather than in two years.
648
 Thirdly, the Palestinian delegation demanded that 
Israel address the refugee problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 
242 which recognizes the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to Palestine. 
Fourthly, the Palestinians demanded that Israel release all Palestinian political 
prisoners.  Fifthly, the Palestinian delegation wanted Israelis to acknowledge that they 
view the permanent status of territories as synonym to an independent Palestinian 
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state.  The PISGA, a document of the Palestinian delegation which summarized its 
official position, stated that ―The acceptance, by the Palestinian people, of interim 
self-government arrangements does not in any way prejudice the exercise of their 
legitimate right to self-determination as embodied in the United Nations Charter and 
in the UN resolutions affirming the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people…..The 
Palestinian people is resolved to establish its own independent state.‖649 The 
Palestinians argued that the East Jerusalem should be included in the negotiation over 
a final status of the occupied territories. According to the PISGA, ―Jerusalem lies at 
the heart of our people's aspirations, and we are committed to make it the capital of 
our future independent state.‖650 
Israel was not prepared to make some significant concessions to the above 
described issues. It didn‘t want to address the refugee problem, to free all Palestinian 
prisoners, to include the East Jerusalem in the debates over the final status of 
territories, to start the negotiation on a final settlement earlier than in two years period 
and to commit itself to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state after the 
interim agreement. In addition to those disputes, the growing Palestinian violence 
against Israelis in the occupied territories had negative impact on the peace process. In 
December 1992 in response to the killing of eight Israel solders, Rabin ordered to 
expel 415 Islamic militants from the territories under Israeli control.
651
 This decision 
further undermined the peace process and as a result, the formal arena of the bilateral 
negotiations was shut down in 1993, without producing an agreement or at least a 
basis for the constructive negotiations.  
The PLO and the Israel, however, were also acting outside the official 
Washington-based diplomacy. They opened a secret channel of the negotiations, 
unknown to the USA, in Oslo. Raymond Helmick, a USA mediator of conflicts, notes 
recalled ―My dealings with the Middle East problem were substantially in the context 
of the Interreligious Committee. None of us knew anything of the clandestine meeting 
in Oslo, the black channel between Israel and representatives of the PLO.‖ 652 
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The secret negotiation between Israel and the PLO can be divided into at least 
two stages. The first stage of secret negotiations was conducted at the informal level, 
namely between private Israeli citizens and the PLO members. The second stage of 
talks was organized at the governmental level. This stage of negotiation began in May 
1993 and ended in September 1993 with the conclusion of the Declaration of 
Principles.  
The first stage of secret negotiations dates back to 1974 when the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) gave to the PLO leadership a task to make contacts with 
Israeli citizens. At the beginning this authorization covered contacts only with ―anti-
Zionist‖ Israelis. However, shortly after, this mandate was extended to cover contacts 
with non-Zionist Israeli and finally the PLO leadership received an authorization to 
conduct talks with all Israeli who either supported the creation of a Palestinian state or 
had some weight in the society.
653
  
The Rabin‘s victory in the general election created an opportunity to deepen 
the citizen based diplomacy through a Norwegian black channel. In 1992 Terje 
Larsen, a director general of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science 
(FAFO), proposed to Yossi Beilin, a member of the Labor party, to create a black 
channel of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Norway. Larson believed that 
the official Washington-based diplomacy would not bring any progress. He argued 
that only a direct contact between Israel and the PLO can lead to the resolution of the 
conflict. Beilen, who shared this opinion, advised him to assign the task of setting up 
a black channel to Hirschfeld, a Haifa University history professor. As a result, 
Hirschfeld became a key Israeli figure in this cannel of negotiation.
654
 
In December, he met a senior PLO figure, Ahmed Sulaiman al- Krai, the 
PLO's Minister of Finance, for the first time. During this meeting they agreed to 
continue talks in Norway in order to explore each other positions towards the peace 
process. A few rounds of talks were conducted between January and April 1993 and 
produced some significant results.
655
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The first meeting was held in January 1993 under cover of an academic 
conference, hosted and sponsored by the FAFO in Sarpsborg, 100 kilometres 
southeast from Oslo.
656
 The aim of this first meeting was not to find a solution to the 
conflict but rather to identify common language, to try to see the conflict from the 
other side's point of view and to narrow the differences. ―The parties were not 
discussing how a solution to the conflict would possibly look, but rather whether it 
was possible to find common ground so that they could start working together.‖657 
During the following meetings the conflicting parties agreed on the basic issues such 
as removal of the Israeli forces from Gaza, slow transfer of economic power to the 
Palestinians and ―Marshall Plan‖ for the citizens of Gaza.658  
In February, the conflicting parties decided to go further in their attempt to 
find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, they agreed to draft a 
Declaration of Principles regarding the Palestinian autonomy. The drafting process 
begun in the small town of Sarpsborg in February and was finalized in March. This 
document, known as Sarpsborg III DOP contained fifteen articles and was similar to 
the final version of the Oslo Accords. 
659
 
As negotiation proceed, it became more obvious that additional legal as well 
as governmental knowledge were necessary for the talks. Therefore, the foreign 
minister Peres decided to inform Rabin about the Oslo initiative and the necessity to 
move forward the talks. Even though Rabin still hoped that the talks in Washington 
would bring some visible success, he agreed to send Israeli official state 
representatives to Oslo under the condition that the peace talks remained hidden from 
publicity. 
660
  
Thus, in May 1993 he authorized Uri Savir, the director general of the foreign 
Ministry and Yoel Zinger, a legal expert, to go to Norway.
661
 This decision clearly 
indicated that not only Peres but also Rabin began to support the secret Oslo channel 
and, therefore, a transformation of the negotiations from informal level to the 
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governmental stage. ―Upgrading the talks had significance beyond procedural 
wrangling and proved to be a pivotal turning point. It transformed the Oslo track from 
academic, exploratory discussion to genuine, official negotiations. To Abu Alaa, it 
was an unmistakable sign that Rabin and not just Peres stood behind the Oslo 
channel.‖662 Form that tame the secret negotiation in Oslo became the main arena for 
Israeli-Palestinian talks.  
Uri Savir, however, initially received a very limited mandate from Rabin. He 
had no authorization to negotiate an agreement with the PLO. His task was to figure 
out the PLO‘s true intention regarding the peace process and provide recommendation 
whether or not Israel should became more actively involved in the negotiations.
663
   
Many hours of talks were conducted in order to explore the positions of each 
side in the conflict on each disputed issue. Those talks were useful because it clarified 
the points of disagreement, but no significant progress was achieved. Abu Alaa 
wanted Israel to accept that the autonomy would ultimately lead to the creation of the 
Palestinian state, while Savir was mainly concerned with issues related to the security 
of Israel. 
664
 
Savir rejected Alaa request to connect the autonomy project to the Palestinian 
state and to release 200 Palestinian prisoners. Instead, he demanded that the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories stop their terrorist activities against Israel.  Abu 
Alaa, however, argued that the PLO has no power to demand from the local 
Palestinians to end their arm struggle before Israel recognizes the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people.
665
 
Nevertheless, despite those differences, Savir recommended to Rabin to move 
the negotiation process in Oslo forward. He was confident that eventually an 
agreement would be possible to achieve. Therefore, he suggested appointing some 
additional legal experts to assist in writing a final version of the peace accord. Thus, 
in early June, Rabin allowed to Joel Singer, an Israeli prominent lawyer who provided 
legal expertise during the Camp David talks, to join the Oslo team. By doing so, the 
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Primer Minister increased the level of his involvement in the negotiations and 
virtually recognized the PLO as a legitimate bargaining partner.
666
 
Joel Singer, who joined the Oslo team in June, was unsatisfied with the draft 
of Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, so-called Sarpsborg III DOP. According to him 
the document was lacking legal accuracy and required some significant amendments. 
Singer wanted to exclude from the agreement the idea of the UN trustship and to 
remove any references to the question regarding the future status of Jerusalem. Thus, 
on July 4, 1993 Singer produced a new draft of the declaration of principles and 
presented it to the Palestinian team in Gressheim, a town north of Oslo.
667
  
 In this document Israelis formally agreed to pull out their military force from 
Gaza and Jericho area within three months after signing the DOP, to address the 
question of Jerusalem in future talks on final status of the occupied territories and 
committed themselves to execute a partial redeployment of IDF (the Israeli defence 
force) 
668
 
It is, however, important to note that the issue regarding the redeployment was 
written in a very vague language. Rabin wanted to insure that he would be capable to 
maintain security of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. According to the 
Prime Minister ―the detailed deployment of Israeli troops for strategic defence or for 
the protection of Israeli settlements and Israeli civilians would not be conditional on 
the other party‘s agreement.‖669 Thus, the new version of the peace agreement made 
the issue of redeployment conditional upon the Palestinian election and the ability of 
the Palestinian force to keep public order in the occupied territories. Since, however, 
majority of Israeli leaders believed that Arafat would not allow the elections to take 
place because of his anti-democratic style of ruling, they did not think that an interim 
redeployment would ever take place.
670
  
From the Palestinian team, Singer demanded a lot of concessions. First, the 
agreement stated that Israel retain responsibility for all security issues in Gaza and 
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Jericho. Second, Singer demanded from the Palestinians to drop the idea of the UN 
trusteeship and accept a limited power in the land beyond Gaza and Jericho. 
According to Singer‘s proposal the PLO would have right to cede control only in the 
fields of education, taxation, health, tourism and welfare. Thirdly, Israelis wanted to 
keep Jerusalem under Israeli control over the whole interim period. Thus, they 
demanded that the Palestinians withdrew their demand to place Palestinian institutions 
in East Jerusalem under their authority. Fourthly, the new draft of peace agreement 
called for Israeli control over Israeli settlements and an absolute freedom of 
movement for the IDF in the occupied territories. Finally, Israelis also demanded from 
the PLO to stop terrorist attacks on Israeli citizens, to end the Intifada and to amend 
the articles of the Palestinian charter which call for the destruction of Israel.
671
 
The Palestinian team found a new declaration of principles, drafted by Singer, 
unacceptable. ―From their perspective this new draft contradicted the earlier draft and 
rejected all the Palestinian input into the first draft. The Palestinians felt a sharp 
betrayal of the trust they had begun to develop with the Israeli team.‖672 
The Palestinians decided to respond to Singer‘s peace proposal by introducing 
their own peace plan. Thus, on July 10 at Halvorsbole they introduced a new version 
of the peace treaty, which included twenty-six amendments to the draft presented by 
Singer.
673
 The key differences between Israel‘s proposal and the PLO‘s initiative were 
obvious. The Palestinian position was based on the following elements:
674
 
 The new draft called for the appointment of the PLO as the governing 
authority in the occupied territories.  
 The PLO demanded a greater amount of territorial jurisdiction. It 
determined the size of Jericho differently than Israelis did. According 
to their measurement, the size of this town was far larger than the area 
from which Israel agreed to leave.  
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 The PLO demanded that Israel provide to the Palestinian authority the 
right to control the Allenby Bridge as well as roads between Gaza and 
Jericho. 
 The PLO wanted to control Gaza and Jericho from Jerusalem. Thus, 
they insisted that the PLO headquarters would be placed in Jerusalem. 
 The Palestinian wanted to control the Palestinian institutions in 
Jerusalem and demanded that Israel permit to the Palestinian 
inhabitants of this city to select their candidatures for the election for a 
self-rule council. 
 The PLO wanted that Israel recognize the PLO as the legitimate 
representative body of the Palestinian people.  
 The PLO demanded more power in the occupied land beyond Gaza 
and Jericho, namely the right to maintain control over Israeli 
settlements and military facilities. 
 Finally, the new draft didn‘t address the issues of the abandonment of 
terrorism and the cancellation of the articles of the Palestinian Charter 
which call for the distraction of Israel. The Palestinians argued the 
official cancellation of the Charter is not necessary because recognition 
of UN resolution 242 is equivalent to the modification of some articles 
of it.   
Uri Savir was shocked by the latest Palestinian version of the peace treaty. He 
immediately dismissed this document. Thus, both teams return home without reaching 
an agreement on disputed issues.
675
  
After the collapsed of talks, the Norwegian mediators had intervened in order 
to find a solution to the negotiation deadlock. Eventually Norwegians managed to 
convince both sides to return to the negotiation table and the conflicting parties 
resumed the talks in Oslo on July 24. Although the Palestinians agreed to droop their 
demand to control roads between Gaza and Jericho area, they continued to reject most 
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of the elements of the Singer‘s peace plan. Israelis, on their part, refused to accept any 
amendments to this initiative. As a result, the talks once again collapsed. 
676
 
Joel Singer believed that the disputed issues could be resolved through Israel‘s 
recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
Therefore, he often asked for the authorization to present the concept of mutual 
recognition to the Palestinian representatives. His notes recalled ―I also believed that 
the PLO was keen to win Israeli recognition as a legitimate negotiating partner, and 
would be willing to pay a high price for this. Israel should take this opportunity 
immediately, while it held the upper hand. I felt that there were commitments that 
only the PLO could make - for example, a commitment to cease terrorist activities 
outside the territories.‖677  
Peres, however, was not in favour of the idea of mutual recognition with the 
PLO. He believed that this concession on the part of Israel should be presented as a 
final card at the end of negotiations in order to obtain more compromises from the 
Palestinians.
678
 Rabin was also reluctant to approve the concept of mutual recognition. 
He feared that the recognition of the PLO would lead to discussions regarding an 
independent state for the Palestinians as well as refugee issue.  
As negotiation stalemate progressed, Rabin, however, started to realise that the 
mutual recognition agreement was an important precondition for achieving an 
agreement with the PLO.
679
 Thus, on August 11, Rabin authorized Joel Singer to 
present the mutual recognition agreement to the Palestinian delegation which was 
conditional upon the following PLO‘s commitments:680  
 
 The PLO recognises ―Israel‘s right to exist in peace and security‖.  
 The PLO accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.  
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 The PLO commits itself to resolve all disputed issues with Israel 
peacefully.  
 The PLO agrees to call on all Palestinians to stop all forms of terror 
against Israel.  
 PLO agrees to delete all articles of the Palestinian Charter entitled the 
destruction of Israel. 
   
After Israel presented to the PLO the mutual recognition agreement and 
agreed to link it to the peace treaty officially, the PLO withdrew its July 10 peace 
plan. However, many significant amendments to Singer‘s peace proposal remained.  
The two sides could not agree on the final arrangements of issues related to security, 
Jerusalem, the size of the Jericho, the amount of jurisdiction of the PLO in the 
captured land, the location of the Palestinian authority, and the control over the 
Allenby Bridge, roads between Gaza, Jericho as well as the crossing points to Egypt 
and Jordan.
681
 Nevertheless, it became clear that the PLO would agree to make crucial 
concessions in order to achieve the mutual recognition agreement. ―The July crisis, in 
which the Palestinian suddenly demanded comprehensive changes in the DOP, was no 
less an attempt to wring last-minute concessions on self-rule from the Israel than an 
opportunity to achieve mutual recognition, a long-sought PLO goal that would have a 
far-reaching psychological impact on both the Israeli and Palestinian public.‖682  
On August 17, Shimon Peres went to Sweden in order to resolve the remaining 
disputes. He contacted Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst and asked him to 
meet secretly in Stockholm in order to help him to finalize negotiations. They 
arranged an eight-hour telephone call with the PLO. Throughout the night, one by 
one, the negotiation partners managed to eliminate all remaining controversial 
questions.
683
  
The PLO accepted a limited control in the occupied territories. It was limited 
both in geographical scope (covering only Gaza and a little part of the West Bank) 
and in functional authority.  The Article VI  of the agreed minutes to the declaration 
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of principles states: ―Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: 
Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.‖684 The Annex II further 
extends jurisdiction of Israel. It states: ―Israel will continue to be responsible for 
external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. 
Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho area.‖685  
During the Stockholm telephone, the most difficult question to resolve was 
Jerusalem. The PLO continued to demand that the Palestinian leadership would 
exercise its authority from Jerusalem. Rabin refused to make concession on this issue. 
He clearly stated that the PLO offices would be located in the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
area and this point can not be negotiated. Nevertheless, Israeli leadership‘s aspiration 
to conclude an agreement as soon as possible compelled them to make a compromise. 
Rabin agreed to write a letter in which he would guarantee to the Palestinian people a 
free access to Holy Sites in Jerusalem. After Israel made this commitment the 
conflicting parties finally managed to frame the final version of the Declaration of 
Principles. The only difficult question remained for Rabin was to find the way of how 
he could formally recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. 
686
 
On August 27, Peres and Holst went together to California in order to inform 
the US about the achieved Declaration of Principles and to ensure its support toward 
the peace agreement. The Secretary of state Warren Christopher was shocked to hear 
that Israel achieved a deal with the PLO. Although the US was aware of the Oslo 
secret channel, it never took this process seriously. Nevertheless, after became 
familiar with the agreement, the US agreed to support the treaty.
687
  
Peres suggested that the US present the Declaration of Principles as an 
outcome of the Washington negotiations. Peres, probably, made this proposal in order 
to reduce the expected domestic opposition and to ensure a greater level of public 
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support towards the agreement. It is clear that the peace agreement mediated by a 
major power such as the United States can be better viewed domestically. Since the 
United States has a lot of diplomatic, economic and military resources at its disposal, 
it can compel the conflicting parties to conclude the peace accord and provide 
necessary guarantees in case of a violation of the treaty. Thus, Israelis wanted to 
portray the Declaration of Principles as an outcome of the Washington talks. The US 
official, however, rejected this proposal on the ground that they don‘t want to take the 
credit for success achieved by Norwegian mediators. The United States, nevertheless, 
agreed to host the signing ceremony in Washington and to take an active role in 
subsequent negotiations.
688
  
On August 30, Rabin handed over the Declaration of Principles to his cabinet 
for its approval. Although some Israeli official did not want to recognize the PLO 
while others complained about the content of the agreement, the majority of the 
cabinet understood that they can not afford the agreement to fail and voted in favour 
of the Declaration of Principles.
689
  
Many of the Palestinians also found the peace accord unacceptable. They 
complained that it represents a lot of concessions and no guarantees that Israel would 
allow the creation of the Palestinian state and continue talks on such sensitive issues 
as Jerusalem, settlements and refugees.
690
  
 Most shocked of all, however, were the Israeli and Palestinian delegates in 
Washington official talks. For months they were actively engaged in a bargaining 
process without even knowing about the existence of the Oslo secret channel where 
the genuine negotiations took place. Elyakim Rubinstein, a member of the Israeli 
delegation, notes recalled ―I didn‘t hear about the Oslo channel until the agreement 
had been cooked. Rabin called me in and said, ―Look here is the text.‖ I read it and 
found that the agreement called for fulfilment of only about 60 percent of what we 
demanding in Washington.‖691  
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On September 10, the last obstacle to the conclusion of the peace treaty was 
removed. Rabin issued a recognition letter in response to Arafat‘s letter in which he   
recognized the right of Israel to exist and undertook legal commitments to stop all acts 
of violence against Israel as well as to remove some articles from the Palestinian 
Charter. 
692
 
Thus, on Monday, 13 September 1993, Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine 
Liberation Organisation chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles 
for Palestinian self-government in Gaza and Jericho in the White House in 
Washington. Despite all its shortcomings, this peace agreement represented a very 
significant achievement in a long- lasting conflict. After so many years of denying 
each other the right to exist, the conflicting parties finally agreed to sign the mutual 
recognition agreement. Thus, the 13
th
 of September became ―one of the most 
momentous events in the history of the Middle East in the twentieth century. In one 
stunning move, the two leaders redrew the geo-political map of the entire region.‖693 
 
1.7.3 Theoretical part 
 
In this part, the overall objective is to investigate the question of why Israel 
and the PLO agreed to enter the negotiations and to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining process.  
There have been many attempts to answer these questions from a variety of 
angles and through the application of different theories. My explanations will be 
based on the theoretical framework outlined in the previous part of my dissertation on 
the interplay between a mixture of two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice 
and the constructivist theoretical framework.  
In the empirical analysis below, the material factors will be analyzed through 
RCT, while the immaterial ones through the constructivist framework.  
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1.7.3.1 Rational Choice Theory 
 
The key assumption of the rational choice theory is that human beings are 
rational individuals, who act in a manner that increase their potential benefit. In 
order to achieve this aim they tend to calculate all costs and benefits of any action 
before deciding how to perform.
694
  
Application of this theoretical approach to my case study suggests that both 
Israel and the PLO started to consider peace as a better option than the use of force 
or status quo due to some material factors such as security, strategic or economic 
considerations. In other words, they enter the negotiations and agreed to sign the 
Declaration of Principles because of both negative experiences derived from the 
conflict and positive expectations of future gains such as political, economic and 
strategic benefits.   
In accordance with the rational choice theory, the analysis below will intend 
to answer the following questions 
 
4. Why did conflicting parties agree to enter the negotiation process? What 
kind of material factors stimulated this decision?  
5. What was the outcome of the bargaining process? What kind of factors 
determined it?  
6. Why did the conflicting parties agree to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining process? What kind of reasons were behind this decision?  
 
1.7.3.1.1 Reasons which prompted the conflicting parties to 
enter the negotiation process 
 
The most famous explanation of change from conflict to cooperation was 
developed by  supporters of RCT who focus their attention on the most constructive 
towards peace moment in conflicts in their attempt to explain why certain conflicts 
can be resolved, while others not. They argue that decision of conflicting parties to 
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enter the negotiation process depends on the ripeness of a conflict i.e. a situation in 
which ―the status quo seemed more painful or dangerous than a potential negotiated 
compromise.‖695  
Indeed, in a previous case study, the analysis of different documents, 
interviews, memories as well as research papers suggests that the conflicting parties 
entered the negotiation process at the period of ripeness of the conflict. Domestic, 
regional and global conditions influenced both Israel and the PLO and created the 
situation which was favourable to the resolution of the conflict.
696
 Below I will 
survey the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of 
conflicting parties to enter the negotiations.  
 
Israel  
 
 It is obvious that the main reason which brought Israel to the Oslo 
negotiations was rooted in a domestic change in the country, namely the general 
election of 1992 that led to a victory of the Labor party over Likud. The policy of this 
party was less uncompromising toward the Palestinians‘ problem.697  
This Labor party was a ruling party in Israel for many years. It lost its 
governing position in Israel primarily because of several domestic scandals and 
internal conflicts rather than due to its foreign policy program or outlook towards the 
Palestinian problem. In 1976 the Labor party was accused in fraud of public funds. As 
a result, the election of 1977 resulted in Likud victory and ended a period of twenty-
nine years of Labor‘s power.698  
The general election of 1992 resulted in the victory of the Labor party and 
completely excluded Likud from decision-making process. According to RCT, the 
shifting mood by the Israeli electorate can be largely explained by economic factors 
and security concerns. Indeed, it is possible to underline at least four pieces of 
evidence which confirm this assumption. 
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 Firstly, Israel was struggling with a high unemployment rate which reached 
25 percent among the recent immigrants. The wave of Jewish immigration starting in 
1989, mainly from the former Soviet Union, brought around 260.000 new citizens to 
Israel who have the right to participate in the election. These new immigrants were 
not successfully integrated into the job market. They were either unable to find a job 
or obtained an extremely low salary.
699
 The Labor party managed to use Likud‘s 
failing integration policies very effectively during the election campaign. It ―played 
into the hands of the Labor Party, which blamed the Likud government for spending 
huge amounts of building of political settlements in the occupied territories-
settlements of ideological value only-rather than allocating funds towards improving 
the conditions of new immigrants and the poor.‖700 The ability of Labor to appeal to 
this electorate helped it to win nearly 75 percent of the Russian immigrant vote.
701
 
These immigrants‘ votes gave the Labor leadership an opportunity to gain five vital 
mandates without which their victory would have been not achievable.
702
  
Secondly, there was a lack of houses for new Soviet immigrants. Thus, in 
1990, the Likud party introduced a proposal for providing accommodation to these 
immigrants. It was agreed to pay for this project in part by the Unites State‘s loan 
guarantee and in part by an increase in taxis. Likud raised personal income tax on 5 
present as well as national sales tax on a 2 present. This policy was not positively met 
in Israel which motivated the national union decided to organize a general strike.
703
 
Moreover, Likud lost thousands of Sephardi Jewish votes because of several of its 
leaders did not manage to secure a place in the top leadership of the party. As a result, 
many people who voted in the previous election for Likud changed their preference 
and cast their vote for Labor in 1992.  
Thirdly, the USA demanded from Israel to undertake a serious effort aimed at 
reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians. The United States threatened to 
withdraw its $ 10 billion loan guarantee for the accommodation of new Soviets 
immigrants in case Israel was to continue settlement-building in the West Bank and 
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Gaza. The Likud government, however, refused to comply with American‘s demand 
and increased spending on settlements. During the election campaign Likud continued 
to emphasis on ideological value of building new settlements as a key priority, while 
the Labor leadership focused on economic prosperity. Rabin‘s campaign motto called 
for freezing settlements and allocating resources on more important social needs.
704
 
Finally, the intifada reinforced the security concerns among Israeli citizens. 
They started to realize that their safety depends on the ability of the government to 
find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Moreover, the Palestinian uprising was 
very costly in economic terms. It included military spending, reduction of foreign 
investment as well as distraction in tourism sector and other industries.
705
 Thus, 
Labor‘s emphasis on security and economic needs as well as its commitment to a 
peace process played a significant role in the elections, influencing ―86 present of all 
voters, 44 present of those who voted for Likud in 1988 but switched to Labor in 
1992.‖706―Rabin‘s personality, his position on the political spectrum, and the security 
myth he represents in the Israeli collective memory evidently made the differences in 
the polls.‖707 
Traditionally, Labor‘s attitude towards the Palestinian problem was different 
from that of Likud on at least two issues. First of all, it did not support Likud‘s 
settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza. It only advocated the establishment 
of a limited amount of settlements in the West Bank as a means of protecting Israel. 
Labor ―did regard Israel as having a legitimate and inevitable security interest in the 
West Bank…Thus Labor had never advocated Israel‘s complete withdrawal from the 
West Bank, and after 1967 the Labor government had begun establishing settlements 
it regarded as necessitated by security consideration.‖708 These efforts were mostly 
directed towards two areas, the Jordan Valley and in the zone near pre-1967 Israeli 
border. In 1980, Labor, however, started to call for a cancellation of the establishment 
of new Jewish settlement.
709
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Second of all, Labor, in contrast to Likud leadership, promoted a territorial 
compromise to the Palestinian problem. It believed that the autonomy project should 
cover territorial and functional jurisdiction, rather than a limited control over 
administrative affairs.  Labor emphasized a Jordanian solution to the Palestinian 
problem. It advocated Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and from the most areas from the 
West Bank in order to return this land to Jordan. Labor, however, didn‘t want to ban 
the existing settlements, which were not related to security interests but were built 
during Likud leadership. Thus, Labor‘s view on the fate of settlements after returning 
the territories to Jordan was not clearly defined.
710
  
Labor and Likud, however, also had identical views regarding some matter 
concerning the Palestinian problem. First, like Likud, the Labor party was against the 
formation of a sovereign Palestinian state due to security consideration. Second, it 
was against any direct contact with the PLO. The majority of the members of the 
Labor party argued that the PLO is a terrorist organization and, therefore, could never 
become a negotiation partner.  Finally, Labor‘s outlook towards Jerusalem was little 
distinct from that of Likud.  It believed that it has a legitimate right to keep East 
Jerusalem united and under Israeli control. Nevertheless, in contrast to Likud, the 
Labor party was willing to break the status quo and to move ahead with the peace 
process by making compromises on two vital questions, namely settlements and 
territory.
711
  
Thus, it is not surprising that the Labor party entered the negotiation process 
with the Palestinians. The question why it agreed to talk with the PLO, however, 
requires explanations. How it is possible to explain this sadden change in Labor‘s 
perception toward the PLO. What kind of factors led to the modification of its official 
position? The Rational choice theory provides some credible insights into this 
question from a materialistic point of view. Explanations derived from this theoretical 
approach can be divided into four groups. There are: necessity to break a status quo, 
collapse of the Jordanian alternative, the failure of the Washington talk and strategic 
considerations.  
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Necessity to break a status quo.  
 
Some changes in domestic, regional as well as in international environment 
created a situation which required an immediate rejection of a status quo.  
When Yitzak Rabin assumed office, he was aware that the sympathy of the 
electorate depends on his ability to fulfil his promises. During the June 1992 Israeli 
election campaign he promised to achieve at least three related goals, namely to find a 
solution to the Palestinian problem, to improve relations with the Arab world and to 
enhance personal security of Israeli citizens.
712
  
The security conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, however, continued to 
worsen. A new round of intensified attacks against Israel took place in 1992. In order 
to counter this extremist violence Rabin decided to deport 415 senior Hamas activists 
from the territories. It, however, didn‘t stop Islamic militants from fighting Israel. The 
popularity of Hamas which opposed any negotiated solution with Israel continued to 
rise.
713
   
Although Rabin still hoped to find a solution to the Palestinian problem 
without having to deal with the PLO, his fears continued to intensify that militant 
group such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad might seize power. Moreover, the PLO became 
less undesirable negotiating partner because of its acceptance of the right of Israel to 
exist in 1988.  ―Rabin and his advisers calculated that between Arafat and Hamas, 
Arafat was clearly the lesser of two evils. The time had come to strike a deal with 
Arafat, while he was still inclined to deal and before he became irrelevant.‖714  
Another factor which prompted an immediate solution to the Palestinian 
problem was the end of the Cold War. Israel‘s government understood that with the 
end of the Cold War the two superpowers would not be willing any longer to 
subsidize the conflict in the Middle East. In other words, the Israeli leadership feared 
that the US might not be longer the ―strategic ally‖ and stop its high level of economic 
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aid, namely three billions of dollars annually.
715
 The collapse of the USSR also 
created new economic possibilities for Israel. It represented the beginning of trade 
with the former Soviet Union as well as with China. It showed to Israelis that they 
have to spend their recourses as well as efforts on those new opportunities rather than 
to continue to invest their energy on the occupied territories.  
All those factors showed the necessity to break the status quo as soon as 
possible. Nevertheless, Rabin still hoped to find a solution to the Palestinian problem 
by finding an agreed formula with Jordan or with the citizens of the West Bank, 
without the need to communicate directly with the PLO. 
 
The failure of the “Jordanian option”  
 
After Labor came to power, it started to seek a solution to the Palestinian 
problem through Jordan. Rabin wanted to conclude an agreement with Jordan by 
returning to King Hussein the Gaza and large potations of the West Bank. Hussein, 
however, was neither willing to endorse Labor‘s plan nor to represent officialy the 
Palestinians.
716
  
In 1974 at the Arab summit conference held in Rabat, King Hussein accepted 
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and six years 
later he approved the Fez Summit resolution which called for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In other 
words, Hussein formally accepted the partition of the West Bank from Jordan. By 
doing so he pursued domestic interests, rather than the Palestinian course. ―Jordan‘s 
economic dependence on other Arab states requires it to avoid action that does not 
have broad Arab support, and the country‘s numerous Palestinian citizens could offer 
serious internal opposition if he were seen as acting against their interests.‖717 Thus, 
when Labor turned to King Hussein in 1992, he had no initiative to change his official 
policy course toward the Palestinian question.  Thus, it can be posited that the 
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collapse of the ―Jordanian option‖ played an important role in Rabin‘s decision to 
start the direct talks with the PLO.
718
 
 
The failure of the Washington talk 
 
The failure of the official talk in Washington was one of the most crucial 
reasons behind the Labor decision to start the negotiation process with the PLO. From 
the beginning the official negotiation process in Washington faced a lot of obstacles. 
It manifested itself in two ways. First, the Labor party was not able to find a substitute 
to the PLO. The PLO fully manipulated the Palestinian delegation by instructing it in 
a way that made any progress virtually impossible. It either gave instructions to make 
extreme demands that even the Labor government was no able to negotiate or to agree 
on a great number of concessions that were unaccepted for members of the Palestinian 
delegation. ―Whenever some progress was made in the negotiations, the PLO would 
instruct the Palestinian delegation not to make concessions and to go back to 
principles. In such a situation, the PLO gave the Palestinian delegation hard-line 
instructions which were intended to block the negotiations.‖719 On the other hand, 
when in August 1993 the PLO sent to the Palestinian delegation a draft agreement 
which contained a lot of concessions, the prominent members of the delegation 
resigned in protest. By doing so, the PLO probably wanted to show to Israel that it is 
the only leadership which could make concessions and to come to agreement with 
Labor.
720
  
Another problem at the Washington talk was that the negotiations were closely 
monitored by the international community which undermined the success of the peace 
process due to negative public opinion. All rounds of negotiation in Washington were 
covered by media. It made any progress virtually impossible to achieve because each 
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side in conflict tried to show to its potential voters that they did not betray their 
original bargaining position.
721
  
 
Strategic considerations  
 
In addition to the fear that militant group might come to power and inability to 
find an alternative negotiating partner, the Labor government has another two 
strategic reasons for entering into the negotiation process with the PLO. 
The first reason was that the agreement with the PLO would give a possibility 
to Israel to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict. In other words, it would 
create a situation in which the accord between Israel and the Palestinians would be 
concluded by the organization acting on behalf of all Palestinians.  
The second strategic reason is that weak actors are generally disadvantaged in 
the bargaining process. In this sense, Labor probably saw the PLO as an attractive 
bargaining partner because the latter was greatly weakened as a result of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Intifada and the Gulf War. Thus, it tried to use the opportunity to 
conclude a peace agreement with the PLO before it would gain its strength again and 
would demand the greater number of concessions on the part of Israel. In other words 
Israel wanted to ―make peace with the PLO while the latter was vulnerable- in order 
to strike a better deal than it could expect were it to wait until the Palestinians had 
regained strength.‖722 
Thus, I believe that RCT bring important asset to the analysis of Israel‘s 
decision to start the negotiation process with the PLO. In the section below I will 
evaluate the entire complex of material factors that have influenced the willingness of 
the PLO to enter the negotiation process. 
 
The PLO 
 
 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization is not a single organisation. It consists 
of different political bodies. Before the Oslo Accord, the PLO was controlled by two 
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bodies, the Palestine National Council (PNC), which functioned as the Palestinian 
parliament in exile and the Executive Committee, over which Arafat had reasonable 
great amount of control. The PLO‘s policy was based on the Palestinian National 
Charter, so-called the Covenant which called for the destruction of Israel.
723
 
Arafat‘s group, Fattah, was the biggest party within the PLO. The second 
largest political faction after al-Fatah is the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP). It was created in 1967 and from this time onwards the PFLP 
represents the left wing of the political spectrum.  
The PLO was founded in 1964 by the president of Egypt Nasser. Ahmed 
Shukeiry, an official representative of the Arab League and a marionette of the 
president of Egypt, became a leader of this organization. In 1969 Fatah or Victory 
Party which was founded in 1959 and governed by Yasir Arafat, took control over the 
PLO. Shortly after, Arafat tried to set up the PLO‘s headquarters in the West Bank. 
He, however, failed to achieve this goal and was forced to flee to Jordan. PLO‘s acts 
of international terror and Israel‘s retaliation led to the PLO‘s expulsion from Jordan 
to Lebanon in 1970.  From there Arafat, however, continued its terrorist attacks 
against Israel which eventually resulted in Israel‘s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Yasir 
Arafat and some other member of Fatah fled to Tunis, where they established the PLO 
headquarters.
724
 
The most puzzling question here is why the PLO started to seek a negotiated 
compromise after so many years of denying Israel‘s right to exist? What kind of 
factors prompted this decision? According to RCT, the PLO decided to enter the 
negotiation process with Israel because it was weakened by regional as well as 
international conditions, which reduced the amount of financial aid to the PLO and 
undermined its legitimacy. Those conditions can be summarised into the following 
groups: the Lebanon war, the Intifada, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War and the 
fall of the ideology of the Pan-Arabism.
725
 
 
The Lebanon war  
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The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982 and departure of the PLO 
from Lebanon to Tunis greatly affected the PLO. It manifests itself in three ways. 
First, the Lebanon has undermined the PLO‘s ability to carry out armed 
attacks on Israel because it lost its independent basis for conducting such operations. 
The Lebanon was a very lucrative place for the PLO‘s network of solders because the 
former suffered from divisions within the society and from the lack of an effective 
central government. This allowed the PLO in Lebanon to enjoy a great amount of 
political and military freedom. It almost became a state within the state. The 
evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon placed a lot of difficulties on the PLO‘s 
capacity to continue military company against Israel. First, it lost its access to human 
resourses to fight Israel. Before the war, the PLO recruited the Palestinians from 
refugee camps in Lebanon. Therefore, it always had in its disposal a sufficient amount 
of the Palestinians to pursue its liberation goal. Second, the PLO lost its access to 
Palestinian troops because after the Lebanon war they were placed to several isolated 
areas in Arab countries. As a result, it became more difficult for the PLO‘s leadership 
to communicate with, coordinate and instruct its solders. Third, the PLO lost its 
military infrastructure and equipment. Fourth, the evacuation of the PLO from 
Lebanon to Tunis deprived it from common border with Israel. As a result it became 
harder for the PLO to attack Israel. Moreover, it reduced the significance of the PLO‘s 
ownership of conventional weapons such as light arms, battle tanks, heavy artillery 
etc.
726
   
Second, the Lebanon war resulted in the shift of PLO‘s constituency from 
Lebanon toward the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Life under Israeli power 
made the Palestinians in the occupied territories more willing to approve a diplomatic 
solution to the conflict, instead of a revolutionary one.  Thus, the PLO had to adjust 
its outlook and strategy to preferences of many West Bank and Gaza Palestinians.
727
 
Finally, the Lebanon war facilitated the split in the PLO in general and within 
its largest faction, Fatah in particular. Although the differences of opinion existed 
before the war, the post-Beirut era produced additional disagreements between 
moderates and radical members of the Fatah. ―At the heart of the controversy was 
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underlying struggle between those who wanted to pursue diplomacy and negotiation 
as realistic tools for advancing Palestinian national aspirations and those who 
continued to harbour many illusions about the unity and the relevance of military 
struggle to liberate Palestine.‖ 728 The undermined organizational unity led to a poor 
performance of the PLO. The radicals inside the PLO attacked moderates members in 
general and Arafat in particular. They criticized Arafat‘s efforts to break away from 
past policies by establishing contacts with the Egyptian regime and Jordan as well as 
undertaking diplomatic moves toward opening direct contact with the US and Israel. 
Radicals called for another leadership in occupied land.
729
 
Thus, it can be assumed that the Lebanon War and the consequent evacuation 
of the PLO from Lebanon to Tunis reduced the PLO‘s capacity as well as willingness 
of some moderates, including Arafat to continue military struggle against Israel.
730
 
 
The Intifada 
 
Another important factor which made a potential negotiated outcome more 
desirable for the PLO than armed struggle or status quo was the outbreak of the 
Intifada (―shaking of‖ in Arabic) in the late 1980s. This event clearly showed to the 
PLO‘s leadership that Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank were not willing 
to live any longer under Israeli control. The Palestinians in the occupied territories 
started to question the efficiency of the PLO and to look for another leadership. ―The 
Intifada marked a serious challenge to the Tunis-based PLO which was losing touch 
with the needs of the local Palestinian population living under Israeli occupation.‖731 
The PLO‘s dominance appeared to be challenged from different movements, which 
emerged during the Palestinian popular uprising as an alternative force.  
The first movement was the Unified National Leadership (UNL). Although 
this movement was consisted of local PLO factions, they, nevertheless, were 
relatively independent from the PLO.  The UNL directed the initial activities of 
uprising. ―Working clandestinely and maintaining their autonomy, the UNL issued the 
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famous leaflets directing the people in mass action such as strikes, boycotts, 
demonstrations, civil disobedience and the resignation for all Palestinians working for 
the Israeli occupation authorities.‖732 However, since this movement took its lead 
from the PLO, it did not deny the latter leadership and didn‘t intend to serve as a 
negotiating partner with Israel.  Nevertheless, the Intifada created an instrument of 
political unification for different kind of groups that have been divided before.
733
  
  The second group, which increased its prominence due to the Intifada, was 
comprised of independent Palestinian elites, so-called ―brokers‖.  Most of those elites 
were educated individuals in such fields as law, medicine, academia etc. They called 
for the negotiations with Israel on the basis of a ―two-state solution‖ and criticized the 
PLO for its unrealistic strategy of arm struggle.
734
 
The third group which raised its importance as a result of the uprising 
consisted of militant group such as Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and 
Islamic Jihad.  These Islamist groups became the most dangerous alternative to the 
PLO‘s leadership and very creditable political force which challenged Arafat‘s 
authority in the occupied territories.  The militant groups as a competitive force to the 
UNL, appeared during the early months of the uprising.  At the beginning it was 
headed by the Islamic Jihad. Shortly after, however, some of its important leaders 
were taken to prison. As a result, Hamas took control over the daily attacks against 
Israel. Hamas did not recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of a 
Palestinian people, rejected a ―two-state solution‖ as well as the PLO‘s political 
program and called for the creation of an Islamic Palestine through defeat of Israel. 
During the Intifada, it attacked the popular, pragmatic slogan among the residents of 
the West Bank and Gaza for launching the international conference in order to find a 
solution to the Palestinian problem.
735
 Hamas stated in its Charter of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement that ―such conferences are nothing but a form of judgment 
passed by infidels on the land of the Muslims. Since when have the unbelievers been 
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fair to the people of faith? There is no solution to the Palestinian question other than 
sacred struggle.‖736 
Thus, it can be posited that the emergency of alternative political groups in 
general and militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in particular made the 
PLO to realise that it should do something in order not to lose its power. It played a 
significant role in the decision of the PLO to re-evaluate its strategy of armed struggle 
and to start to seek a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.
737
 
 
The end of the Cold War  
 
The collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war was another very 
important factor that prompted the PLO‘s willingness to find a negotiated solution to 
the Palestinian problem.  Because of the superpower competition in the Middle East, 
the Soviet Union provided to the PLO economic and political support as well as 
military assistance in terms of training and education. ―During the communist period, 
the Bolsheviks supported national liberation movements of the developing nations all 
over the world—including Palestine and recognized the social and political rights of 
the Palestinian people, at a time when the West was unwilling to do so.‖738 
Already in earlier 60s the USSR had established secret communication line 
with the PLO leaders. In 1969 it recognised the Palestinians as nationality and started 
to promote their right to self-determination at the international level. Throughout this 
period the Palestinian problem, however, was not a top priority for the USSR.  A 
crucial shift in Soviet-Palestinian relations took place only in the 70s because of 
Egypt‘s decision to withdraw its alliance with the USSR. As a result the Palestinian 
question became a main concern of Moscow's Middle East policy as a means of 
increasing its influence in the region in general and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
in particular.
739
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The Soviets started to supply military equipment directly to the PLO instead of 
delivering weapons through third Arab countries as it did before its evacuation from 
Egypt. In 1974 the PLO was allowed to open its office in Moscow and to train its 
solders in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the same year the Soviet Union helped to the 
PLO to receive an observer status in the UN and in 1978 Moscow recognized the PLO 
as the ―sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.‖740 
However, in the mid-1980s the situation started to change. New thinking 
promoted by Gorbachev brought about significant modification in Soviet foreign 
policy. It started to improve its relations with Israel and reduced its support to the 
Palestinian people. After collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the 
single superpower and the new Russian political elite further reduced its assistance to 
the Palestinians. Thus, the PLO could not any longer ask for Soviet economic and 
military help. It is also important to point out that the fall of the USSR brought 
another important change that significantly affected the PLO, namely it increased the 
amount of Soviet Jewish immigrants and consequently the demographic situation in 
Israel.
741
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the end of the cold war and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union played a significant role in the decision of the PLO to reconsider its 
strategy of arm struggle and to start to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
742
 
 
The Gulf War  
 
 The Gulf War of 1993 also had some important consequences for the PLO‘s 
approach toward the conflict and potential negotiations with Israel. Arafat‘s alignment 
with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War very negatively affected the PLO. Since 
the Iraq‘s attack of Kuwait was opposed by international community in general and 
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many Arab states in particular, the decision to support Saddam proved to be a disaster 
for the PLO.
743
 It manifests itself in two ways.  
First, it undermined the legitimacy of the PLO. Arafat‘s support of Iraq was 
not only criticized by the West but also by the Arab world. ―Arafat‘s support of 
Saddam during the Gulf war combined with Saddam‘s defeat not only delegitimized 
the PLO‘s role in the Peace process but also reduced overall Arab support for the 
Palestinian cause.‖744 Immediately after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the United 
States excluded the PLO from participation in any peace initiatives designed to 
resolve the Palestinian question and many Arab countries expressed their disapproval 
of the PLO. For example Saudi Arabia and other Persian states started to favour the 
Hamas as a substitute to the PLO‘s leadership. Their economic aid enabled Hamas to 
finance the uprising activities as well as social projects. As a result, the Hamas‘ ability 
to gather popular support further increased.
745
  
Second, Arafat‘s cooperation with Saddam Hussein deprived the PLO from 
financial aid. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait terminated their economic aid, including so-
called ―liberation taxes‖ paid by the Palestinians people employed in the Gulf states. 
As a result, the PLO financial assistance to the Palestinians in the occupied territories 
sharply declined from $120 million in 1989 to about $ 45 million in 1992.
746
  
Thus, at the conclusion of the Gulf War the PLO became weak and 
unimportant.  
 
Fall of the ideology of the Pan-Arabism 
 
The fall of the ideology of Pan-Arabism was another very important factor that 
increased the PLO‘s willingness to find a negotiated solution to the Palestinian 
problem.  The peace agreement of 1979 between Israel and Egypt as well as the 
increase of the fundamentalist movements in the region (which created to official 
regimes a great threat) encouraged many Arab states to shift their attention from the 
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 213 
Palestine problem towards internal policy priorities. ―Following the Camp David 
Accord of 1979, when Egypt became the only Arab country to recognise and sign a 
peace deal with Israel, the option of united Arab military action against Israel 
disappeared.‖747 Many Arab states stopped to consider Israel as the most dangerous 
threat and many of them even launched bilateral negotiations with the Jewish state.
748
  
The Gulf War even undermined to some extent the norm of non-alliance with 
Israel. For example Saudi solders participated in Israel‘s retaliation attacks against 
Scud strikes and Syria entered a coalition in which Israel took a part. 
749
 
Thus, the Palestinian people were left alone in their fight with Israel. 
Therefore, it can be posited that the only alternative appeared to be left for the PLO 
was to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict with Israel. 
 
1.7.3.1.2 The bargaining process and its outcome  
 
The analysis below is intended to evaluate the outcome of the bargaining 
process between Israel and the PLO. I will show that both sides had to make some 
very significant concessions in order to achieve the peace treaty.  
The Labor party introduced its opening bargaining position for the first time at 
the Washington official talk, while the PLO during the secret negotiations in Oslo. As 
it is visible from the table below the gap between PLO‘s and Israel‘s initial bargaining 
position was very significant.  
 
Table: Initial bargaining position and the outcome of the negotiation 
process
750
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749 See Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): ―Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel´s National Security Conception‖, in: Efraim Karch 
(2000): ―Israel: The First  Hundred Years‖, Vol. 2: ―From War to peace?‖, pp.102 
750 See David Makovsky (1996): ―Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo Accord‖; 
Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements,  September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
governing Arrangements‖, Accessed: 2008, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html;  Ziva Flamhaft (1996): 
―Israeli on the Road to Peace‖; Joel Singer (1998): ―Manipulating Arafat: Behind the Scenes at Oslo-Recognizing the need for 
mutual recognition, Accessed: 2008, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51a/026.html; William J. Bien: ―The Oslo Channel: 
Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator to Secret Negotiations‖, Accessed: 2008,  
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Dispute PLO’s demand  Israel’s 
Demand 
Outcome 
 
The Oslo peace accord 
Nature of peace 
Mutual recognition  The Mutual 
recognition 
agreement should 
be link officially to 
the peace accord  
No official 
recognition of the 
PLO. Presenting 
the peace accord 
as a proposal by a 
third party 
PLO’s initial 
demand 
Cessation of all terror 
activities against 
Israel  
The PLO can call 
for the cessation of 
all terror activities 
only after creation 
of the Palestinian 
state   
The PLO‘s 
commitment to 
stop all terror 
activities against 
Israel should be 
incorporated in 
the peace accord 
Israel's initial 
demand 
Revision of the 
Palestinian Charter  
No need in official 
amendments of the 
articles of the 
Palestinian Charter 
which request the 
destruction of 
Israel.  This was 
already done 
through recognition 
of UN resolution 
242  
 
Amendments of 
the articles of the 
Palestinian 
Charter which 
request the 
destruction of 
Israel at the time 
of the conclusion 
of the peace treaty 
Israel's initial 
demand 
The Interim Self-government Arrangement 
Amount of the 
territorial authority of 
the Palestinian self-
governing authority 
during the transitional 
period 
Withdrawal  of 
Israeli soldiers from 
the West Bank, Gaza  
Strip and Jerusalem  
Withdrawal of 
Israeli soldiers 
from the Gaza 
Strip only 
Israel’s 
compromise 
Withdrawal of 
Israeli military 
forces from the 
Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho area  
Timetable for 
withdrawal of Israeli 
soldiers from the 
Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area 
An immediate 
withdrawal of Israeli 
soldiers 
Gradual 
withdrawal of 
Israeli soldiers 
within two years  
PLO’s initial 
demand 
withdrawal 
within four 
months after 
conclusion of the 
agreement.  
                                                                                                                                            
 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/4.pdf; Iffat Malik: ―Analysis of the Oslo Accords‖, Accessed: 2008, 
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Creation of U.N. 
―trusteeship‖ 
Creation the U.N 
―trusteeship‖ upon  
withdrawal of Israeli 
soldiers 
No ―trusteeship‖ Israel's initial 
demand 
Amount of the 
functional authority of 
the Palestinian self-
governing authority 
during the transitional 
period 
Full jurisdiction 
(legislative, 
executive and 
judicial powers) 
Limited 
jurisdiction 
without control 
over  
settlements, 
military 
facilities, 
external and 
internal security  
Israel's initial 
demand 
The Palestinian 
institution in East 
Jerusalem  
PLO‘s control over 
Palestinian 
institutions in East 
Jerusalem 
Jerusalem 
remained under 
Israeli control   
Israel's initial 
demand 
Location of the 
offices of the  
Palestinian authority  
The offices of the 
Palestinian authority 
will be located in 
Jerusalem 
The offices of 
the Palestinian 
authority will be 
located in the 
Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area 
Israel's initial 
demand 
Holy Sites in 
Jerusalem  
Free access to the 
Palestinians to 
Christian or Muslim 
holy locations 
No legal 
commitments 
from Israel 
 
PLO’s initial 
demand 
Participation in self-
rule elections 
Palestinian residents 
of East Jerusalem 
have the right to 
participle in self-rule 
elections   
No participation 
of the Palestinian 
inhabitants of 
East of 
Jerusalem in the 
elections 
PLO’s initial 
demand 
Negotiation over the final status of territories 
The creation of the 
Palestinian state  
Legal commitment 
towards the creation 
of the Palestinian 
state 
No legal 
commitment  
Israel's initial 
demand 
The status of 
Jerusalem  
Jerusalem should 
became  the 
Palestinian capital 
City status is 
non-negotiable, 
remained under 
Israeli authority 
Israel’s 
compromise 
Israel agree to 
negotiate the 
status of 
Jerusalem in the 
future talks   
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The destiny of Israeli 
settlements 
Evacuation of all 
Jewish settlements 
No removal of 
Jewish 
settlements 
Israel’s 
compromise. An 
absolute freeze 
on establishment 
of new 
settlements. The 
status of the 
existing ones 
will be 
negotiated in the 
future talk.  
The right of return of 
the Palestinian 
refugees  
All refugees have 
the right to return to 
their homes, 
implementation of 
UN Resolution 194  
 
The Palestinians 
fled voluntarily, 
Israel is not 
responsible for 
their destiny.   
Israel’s 
compromise. 
Israel agree to 
negotiate the 
right of return of 
refugees in the 
future talks   
 
 
 
As is visible from the table above the outcome of the bargaining process 
required significant concessions of both conflicting parties. Israel agreed to pull out 
its soldiers not only from the Gaza strip but also from the Jericho area. By doing so it 
granted to the Palestinians not only functional but also territorial authority. Moreover, 
Rabin agreed to recognize the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people. Furthermore, Israel agreed to negotiate the issue of Jerusalem, the right of 
return of the Palestinian refugees as well as evacuation of all Jewish settlements from 
the occupied land in the future talk regarding the final status of West Bank and 
Gaza.
751
 These concessions represented a significant concession on the part of Israel.  
The PLO, on its part, also made a lot of concessions that removed the most 
vital obstacles to the conclusion of the peace treaty.  The PLO agreed to a limited 
territorial authority, without any legal commitment on the part of Israel regarding the 
creation of a sovereign Palestinian state in the occupied land. It also dropped the idea 
of the UN trusteeship and its insistence to control the Allenby Bridge as well as roads 
between Gaza and Jericho. Moreover, the PLO agreed to a limited functional 
jurisdiction by giving to Israel the authority to supervise settlements and military 
                                                 
751 See David Makovsky (1996): ―Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo Accord‖; 
Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements,  September 13, 1993, Accessed: 2008,  
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html; Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
governing Arrangements‖, Accessed: 2008, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html 
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facilities as well as to exercise its control over external and internal security. 
Furthermore, the PLO was also agreed to put aside many important issues such as 
Jerusalem, settlements and refugee to the future negotiation on the final status of the 
land under Israeli control. It also promised to Rabin to amend the Palestinian charter 
and to terminate all terrorist acts against Israel.
752
 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the PLO agreed to make a greater number 
of compromises than Israel did. Although the PLO did not achieve the aim the 
Palestinians always desired, namely an independent state, it nevertheless obtained a 
lot of benefits from the peace treaty.  Moreover, the PLO was a weak negotiating 
partner. With the official recognition of the Jewish state in the late 1980s the PLO lost 
its last bargaining card.  Arafat noticed ―it is a bad agreement. But it is the best we can 
get in the worst situation.‖753  
Israel, in contrast, had a lot of things to lose. It agreed to recognize the PLO 
and to some extent the Palestinians right of self-determination. Moreover, Israel was 
the strongest party during the whole negotiating process. It, nevertheless, agreed to 
grant to the PLO much more than it was willing during the Camp David summit. 
754
 
Therefore, I believe that although Israel had some important reasons to accept 
the outcome of the negotiations, the PLO, however, had a greater number of motives 
to sign the peace treaty. The analysis below is intent to prove this assumption.  
 
1.7.3.1.3 Reasons of why conflicting parties agreed to accept 
the outcome of the bargaining process 
 
Israel  
 
                                                 
752See David Makovsky (1996): ―Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo Accord‖; 
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The key factor which influenced Israel‘s decision to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining process was security considerations.
755
 It manifested itself in three ways.  
First, Rabin believed that the peace treaty with the PLO would enhance 
security of Israel. He was confident that PLO is capable to stop Intifada and to defeat 
militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Indeed, during the Oslo secret talk 
he made clear to the PLO that he would not conclude an agreement without its full 
commitment to stop popular uprising, to eradicate the militant Islamic threat and to 
cancel the articles of the Palestinian charter which request the destruction of Israel.   
Second, the importance of the West Bank and Gaza from a security point of 
view continued to decline. The ―military technology revolution‖ and the proliferation 
of modern arms greatly reduced the possibility of the classic conventional conflicts. 
International and regional changes showed to Israel that old-fashioned military 
deterrence had a great limitation and that the ability to defeat its enemies does not 
fully depend on territorial superiority.
756
 For example Ephiam Sneh, a member of 
Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, pointed out that ―The Awacs radar 
aircraft would provide Israel with better early warning than the country‘s current 
stations in West Bank.‖757 
Third, Rabin hoped that the peace treaty would help him to reduce external 
threat derived from some radical Arab states which did not want to participate in the 
peace process. Moreover, the Palestinian problem had a negative impact on moderate 
Arabs regimes inclined to negotiated compromise and, therefore, had the potential to 
increase the level of hostility between Israel and its neighbours. The proliferation of 
non-conventional weaponry changed the Israel‘s perception regarding its security. 
Arab‘s countries attempt to acquire weapons of mass distraction such as nuclear, 
chemical as well as biological arms showed to Israelis that military strength has its 
limitation, while a negotiated solution to the conflict may increase its security. In July 
1992 Rabin announced that ―the possibility that nuclear weapons will be introduced in 
the Middle East in the coming years is a very grave and negative development from 
Israel‘s standpoint…this situation requires to give further thought to the urgent need 
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to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and live in peace with our Arab neighbours.‖758 Thus, 
by making peace with the PLO Israel received an opportunity to address a root course 
of the Israeli-Arab conflict and, therefore, to improve relations with many Arab states 
and a possibility to counter a nuclear threat from radical regimes such as Iran and 
Iraq. Indeed, the Oslo accord facilitated a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan and 
improved relations with some Arab and other states.  
Taking into account that the security concerns has been the most important 
component of Israeli policy from the first days of its existence, the Oslo accords was a 
very good deal. Some experts, however, believed that Rabin, who had a better 
bargaining card, was capable to extract a greater amount of concessions from the  
weak PLO. Although this argument is quite reasonable, it fails to take into account the 
fact that Rabin had no time to continue the negotiation process.  
On the one hand he was pressed by his election campaign promises to solve 
the Palestinian problem within maximum nine months after becoming a prime 
minister.
759
 On the other hand Rabin was pushed by internal instability of his 
coalition. The first threat to Labor‘s narrow majority in the Knesset occurred two 
weeks after Rabin assumed his duties when opposition parties submitted non-
confidence vote over the government‘s decision to stop construction of Jewish 
settlement and to make a territorial compromise with Syria. A more serious crisis 
emerged in May 1993 when the ultraorthodox Shas Party leader threatened to 
withdraw his party from the coalition. This produced uncertainty whether or not the 
government manages to survive and, therefore, reinforced a need to sign an agreement 
with the PLO as quickly as possible.
760
 As Peres put it ―we must hurry or we may end 
up with a peace treaty but no government to sign it.‖761 
Thus, I believe that security concerns as well as time pressure were key factors 
which made the Labor party to accept the outcome of the bargaining process. 
 
The PLO  
                                                 
758 Rabin, in: David Makovsky (1996): ―Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo 
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759 See David Makovsky (1996). ―Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo Accord‖, 
pp.115 
760 See Ziva Flamhaft (1996): ―Israeli on the road to Peace‖, pp.103-104; David Makovsky (1996): ―Making Peace 
with the PLO: The Rabin Government‘s Road to the Oslo Accord‖, pp.68-69 
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The key factor which influenced PLO‘s decision to accept the outcome of the 
bargaining game was its weakness.
762
 Indeed, after the Lebanon and Gulf war, the 
PLO in general and Arafat in particular found themselves as weakened bargaining 
actors which  dominance was challenged by nationalists as well as militant forces in 
the occupied territories. Moreover, Arafat feared that Israel might withdraw from the 
Oslo negotiations and make a deal with either Jordan or Syria. Indeed, Israel used 
those fears as a chip to extract some substantive concession on the part of the PLO. 
During the negotiation process Peres even informed Holst and the Palestinian 
delegation in a written form that if the talks were not completed, ―the vacuum may be 
filled by opposing forces, or with other initiatives, including the possibility of desired 
progress between Israel and Syria.‖763 
Thus, the peace treaty with Israel was vital for preventing the collapse of the 
PLO. The conclusion of the accord provided perhaps the last possibility for the PLO 
to rule a Palestinian self-rule as well as to achieve worldwide legitimacy. ―The PLO 
calculated that the recovery of some land from Israeli control, along with Israeli and 
American legitimization of the organisation, would counter the anticipated backlash 
from those Palestinians who had consistently rejected any compromise with Israel.‖764 
Moreover, the Oslo agreement was accompanied by promises of considerable 
amount of economic benefit for the PLO. The Annex IV of the Declaration of 
Principles calls for economic aid for development of the West Bank and Gaza.
765
 
Indeed, already on October 1, 1993 different nation as well as international 
institutions met in the US in order to arrange economic assistance to the Palestinians. 
As a result they agreed to provide around $ 2.4 billion in the following five years.
766
 
Since then bilateral as well as international donors such as the International Monetary 
Funds (IMF), the World Bank, International Non-governmental Organisations 
(INGOs) etc. have been very active in providing financial aid to the Palestinian 
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National Authority (PNA). The Palestinians in the occupied territories became the 
recipients of the highest amount of aid in the world. The US alone granted to the PLO 
$375 million between 1993 and 1998 for the implementation of development program 
in the West Bank.
767
 Thus, for the PLO the peace agreement signify a lot of benefits. 
In fact the Oslo Agreement was the only available option for Arafat.  Moreover, it 
resulted in sufficient benefits. Thus, the PLO gained power, economic recourse as 
well as worldwide legitimacy.  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
In the previous part of my dissertation I evaluated the entire complex of 
material factors that have influenced the willingness of conflicting parties to enter the 
negotiation process and to accept the outcome of bargaining game. I showed that both 
parties acted as rational actors and achieved some material benefit from the peace 
treaty. Thus, this case study is consistent with the rational choice approach. However, 
I believe that the application of RCT to a certain political phenomenon in general and 
to this case study in particular produces some important shortcomings. 
Firstly, this approach tends to treat ‗national interests‘ as exogenously given. 
Constructivists, in contrast, investigate nature and formation of interests rather than 
regard them as given.
768
 Thus, by following the constructivist research design I have 
an opportunity to enhance the quality of my analysis. 
Secondly, supporters of the rational choice theory are unable to address 
important aspects of social life such as identity, culture, norms and ideas. They do not 
acknowledge the importance of immaterial factors in world politics. This greatly 
reduces the explanatory power of the RCT. 
Finally, RCT has some difficulties to explain the question of why Israel came 
to favour the peace accord. The question whether or not a more powerful party in a 
conflict is likely to make significant concessions with a weaker negotiation partner is 
open for interpretation. Some experts counter RCT assumptions and argue that Israel 
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had almost nothing to fear from the weak PLO and, therefore, could keep a status quo 
or to extract greater amount of concessions. Nevertheless, I think that rational choice 
assumptions bring important asset to the analysis as a starting point. It does however 
not provide sufficient explanation about the above mentioned question. I believe that 
the constructivists can address the shortcomings of RCT by integrating nonmaterial 
factors into analysis.  
It is, however, important to note that rational choice approach provides more 
sounding explanations regarding PLO‘s willingness to agree with the outcome of the 
bargaining game. The peace treaty was vital for the PLO as the only available option 
to secure its survival. To put it differently, the PLO had much to gain from the Oslo 
and almost nothing to lose since it was losing its dominance in the occupied land very 
rapidly. Thus, conclusions derived by RCT do not necessarily have to be 
complemented with other theoretical approaches. Integration of immaterial factors, 
however, to my analysis may produce interesting results by explaining the opposition 
among the Palestinians to this accord through the lenses of their conflicting identities. 
This investigation, however, will be beyond the scope of my study. Israel‘s decision 
to sign the treaty, however, required some further explanations. The Israeli 
government, in contrast to the PLO, had much to lose. It took a serious political risk 
by establishing the dialogue with the PLO and recognizing the Palestinians right of 
self-determination. Thus, the analysis below will have a particular emphasis on Israel.  
  
1.7.3.2 The Constructivist theoretical framework 
 
Constructivists recognise the central importance of ideational factors such as 
identity, culture, ideas, believes etc. in world politics.
769
 This theoretical framework 
seeks to explain the ways in which actors of international systems participate in the 
construction of reality.
770
 It argues that people‘s interactions and behaviours can not 
be analyzed through material factors alone. Constructivists, however, do not reject the 
importance of material factors on the outcome of certain political event. By doing so, 
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they complement theories that are grounded in cost-benefit analysis and offer one 
possible way of integrating material and ideational factors into analysis.  
Although Constructivists usually agree that immaterial factors play a crucial 
role in world politics, they focus on different immaterial factors in their attempt to 
explain processes of social construction of reality in general and certain political 
outcomes in particular.
771
 Thus, the application of this theoretical framework to a 
given case study produces different possibilities of how to approach parties‘ decision 
to conclude the peace agreement.  
One possible explanation was elaborated by Ilan Danjoux. His interpretation is 
based on the constructivist assumption regarding the social construction of national 
identities. In his study he focuses on ―role identity‖.  According to constructivism, 
―role identities‖ are always relational. An individual can not understand oneself 
without a comparison to others. Thus, construction of ―role identities‖ involves the 
examination of the nature of the ―others‖. 772 
Ilan Danjoux in his article ―Political cartoons and Conflict: Revealing shifts in 
the Israeli Palestinian conflict‖ claims that national identities are not fixed and can 
change over time. Using a constructivist approach he tried to prove that the 
conclusion of the Oslo Accord in 1993 became possible due to the transformation of 
the Israeli and Palestinian identities and opinion about each other. ―The prospects for 
peace between Israelis and Palestinians demand a fundamental transformation of the 
identity of ‗self‘ and the recognition of the ‗other‘. The Oslo Peace Accords 
constituted such a watershed, breaking long-standing symbolic taboos on mutual 
recognition. ‖773 Consequently, according to the author‘s opinion, the collapse of 
peace negotiations in 2000 took place due to the ―equally dramatic return to the 
demonized stereotypes that had defined the conflict for so long.‖774 Ilan Danjoux in 
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order to prove his point of view has undertaken an analysis of political cartoons that 
were drawn from the major Palestinian and Israel news papers.
775
 
In my opinion, however, this explanation has important shortcomings. While I 
do believe that national identities can change over time because they are human 
invention constructed by full array of rules, principles, ideas, norms and shared belief, 
I however disagree that this dramatic transformation of ―role identities‖ took place in 
a given case study.  
The Palestinians and Israeli ―role identities‖ are very much related to their 
prominent ―type identities‖. Through the latter type of identities they perceive the 
former. Therefore, a fundamental change of the identity of ‗self‘ and the recognition 
of the ‗other‖ required to some extent a transformation of ―type identity‖. The most 
prominent ―type identities‖ of Israel are Jewish and democratic identities. The most 
important forms of identification of Palestinian people are - an Arab identity, an 
Islamic identity and a Palestinian identity. These identities are largely formed by 
cognitive and ideological beliefs. ―Cognitive beliefs depict how the frames of agents 
are formed by historical lesson drawing and experience, whereas ideological beliefs 
constitute more abstract reasoning……‖776 For example, the refugee problem can be 
referred to the Palestinian cognitive belief drawn from historical lessons, while the 
question of Jerusalem can be regarded as Israeli as well as Palestinians ideological 
beliefs based on the idea that Jerusalem is a holy place.
777
 Thus, a fundamental 
transformation of ―type identities‖ of conflicting parties required a change of their 
cognitive and ideological beliefs. However, most of the problems that constitute those 
beliefs were not mentioned in the Oslo peace agreements. The Oslo Accords did not 
address such important issues as ―Sovereignty, nor does it provide answer to the 
question of borders, refugees, the fate of Jewish settlements, or the question of 
Jerusalem, all of which are postponed to a later stage in the negotiation.‖778  
Therefore, I think that the above mentioned explanation is not suitable to a 
given case study. In my opinion the constructivist approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict should be applied under another angle. Thus, in the analysis below I will 
focus on ―type identities‖ of Israel, cultural factors as well as the interpretative 
process of the Oslo documents. 
 
1.7.3.2.1 Cultural developments  
 
Application of the constructivists explanations regarding the decision of 
conflicting parties to sign the peace agreement produce a similar starting point of the 
analysis to that of the RCT.  In other words, constructivism does not deny that the 
main reason which made the Oslo Accords possible was the return of the Labor party 
to power in the 1992 election. Rational choice theorists, however, proceed with this 
starting point in a completely different manner that the constructivists do. The former 
theory focuses on material explanations, while the latter on the analysis of some social 
and cultural factors. According to RCT, the shifting mood by the Israeli electorate can 
be largely explained by economic factors and security concerns. I believe that by 
ignoring immaterial factors RCT provides only partial explanations regarding the 
questions of what permitted the Oslo negotiations to take place and to end 
successfully. Thus, the evaluation below is intended to fulfil the gap that was left by 
RCT through the integration of cultural elements into the analysis. 
Constructivists believe that international, regional or domestic structures can 
have two kinds of effects on agents, causal and constitutive. Causal effect means that 
structures can shape agents‘ behaviour. Structures both constrain and enable actors to 
act. Constitutive effect means that structures can shape and change identities, value 
and interests of a relevant actors.
779
 
Changes that had occurred at the international and regional structures had a 
great impact on Israeli ideational structure in general and on the peace process in 
particular. On the regional level those included the Lebanon war, the Palestinians 
popular uprising, the Iraqi war and the proliferation of the weapons of mass 
destructions. On the international level those changes included the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, technology revolution, the acceleration of 
processes of democratisation.  
Those cultural and social developments had both causal and constitutive effect 
on Israeli society. It affected public behaviour, identities, perceptions and interests. 
Cultural developments increased such values as liberalism, individualism and human 
rights as well as multiculturalism in Israel. The democratisation trend was expressed 
in a number of ways and became visible in many sectors in Israel. It is possible to 
outline at least four profound cultural changes that have occurred in Israel. There are 
the following: the democratisation of mass media
780
, the appearance of a civil 
society
781
, the changes in the Judiciary system
782
, the transformation of military-
societal relations
783
.  
 
Democratisation of mass media  
 
In the past decade the Israeli media has undergone a process of 
democratisation. According to Yoram Peri, the complex relations between the media 
and the state can be divided into three stages.  The first stage began from the first days 
of independency and continued until the Yom Kippur War. During this period the 
Israeli media was directed and controlled by government, particularly in the field of 
security. The Israeli defence force (IDF) had a right to approve the appointment 
correspondents responsible for writing issues related to security matters and they 
largely depended on information provided by the IDF.
784
 ―This was typical deferential 
journalism. The result was that the security discourse in the media was dictated by 
state oadministration and the military. The tone of the press was always supportive, 
and there was barely a mention of anything negative.‖785 
The second phase of the media-governmental relations began after the Yom 
Kippur war. The mistakes made by intelligence services during the war of 1973 
greatly impacted the media. The latter started to reconsider its relationship with 
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government and military sphere. Many journalists, reporters and editors started to 
demand a greater amount of freedom of press. They wanted to limit the censorship 
and their dependence on the government. They started to look for various sources of 
information. By doing so they transformed their relation with government from 
―subordination‖ to ―competition‖.786 
The third period began in 1980s and can be characterized as confrontational 
relations of media with the state. The Lebanon war and the Palestinian revolt 
produced a widespread criticism of government and the military institutions. The 
Israeli media increased its emphasis on moral values, international human rights 
norms and the right of citizens to read different types of information.
787
 For example 
the editor of Davar daily, Hanna Zemer in response to the events of the massacre in 
the refugee camps in Lebanon wrote: ―The Prime Minister… should have gone to the 
Presidential Residence to tender his resignation and thus free Israel and the Jewish 
people from the curse of this government which has turned our image into that of 
monster …we will not remain silent….there will come a day when we all send back 
our Israeli identity cards, because this is not the way we want to be identified.‖788 
The Intifada further mobilized the press. It resulted in an increased level of 
opposition to government‘s security policy in general and to state‘s approach towards 
the Palestinian problem in particular. Journalists started to interview the Palestinians 
and to provide information acquired from their sources. They began to question the 
efficiency of the use of force as an instrument of policy and some even to advocate a 
territorial compromise with the Palestinians.
789
  
  
The appearance of a civil society 
 
Another very important cultural development that has occurred in Israel was 
an appearance of a firm civil society in Israel. ―Civil society is the space outside the 
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state… this arena is conceptually distinct from the state, and is a site for the 
production of discourses which can in principle be critical of the state.‖790 Thus, civil 
society has an ability to challenge state‘s monopoly on transmitting the ―moral 
order‖.791 At the beginning of the history of Israel, the country was lacking a civil 
society. The Zionists did not intend to create a sphere independent from the state 
realm where the voluntary discourses can take place. Currently, however, the situation 
began to change in Israel. The combination of global and national structural changes 
has stimulated the emergency of a civil society in Israel. Signs of it became visible in 
the increase of the non-governmental organisations as well as different independent 
social groups.
792
  
Since many of these organisations try to promote human rights norms and the 
rules of international law, most of them have a very liberal approach to the Palestinian 
problem. Many of these organisations advocate a territorial compromise and strive to 
mobilize the Israeli society against of some spheres of government policy. For the 
first time an enormous opposition of NGOs to state‘s policy emerged during the 1982 
Lebanon war. Peace activists attacked the use of force in the occupied territories, the 
settlement policy and bombing of Beirut.
793
 The Intifada was a second major vehicle 
which set in motion the existing peace movements and led to the creation of new 
NGOs.  The Palestinian popular uprising created a new reality and extensive support 
among the peace advocates to end the occupation as well as to reach a negotiated 
solution to the conflict on the basis of a territorial arrangement. 
794
 For example, 
during the Intifada Peace Now, a far left-wing non-governmental organization in 
Israel,  was very active in attacking government policy based on the impediment of all 
possibilities aimed at reaching a compromise to the Palestinian problem. Peace Now 
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proclaimed ―The security forces can only hold their fire temporally; the only answer 
is negotiations, talks and compromise.‖795 
 
Changes in the Judiciary system  
 
The situation is more complex with regard to the Judiciary system, in 
particularly with the High Court of Justice (HCJ). Israel had no written constitution. 
The HCJ, therefore, has a broad authority. The HCJ is responsible for all issues that 
are not covered by other legal jurisdiction and has the power to change state 
decisions.  The HCJ may also pass new laws and ask to cancel legal rulings taken by 
other lower level courts, including in some cases decision adopted by religious 
courts.
796
 ―In establishing legal precedents the HCJ functions as a lawmaker parallel 
to the Knesset.‖797   
The HCJ, however, tries not to intervene in states decisions and often takes the 
positions of the security and political institutions in its rulings. Although it played an 
active role in promoting a unique nature of Israel as a democratic state, it takes a 
passive approach towards the Palestinian conflict in general and the peace process in 
particular. ―Traditionally, Supreme Courts tend not to adjudicate ―political issues‖ or 
issues of war and peace. Foreign affairs are usually conceived as subject to executive 
prerogative and to electoral politics….Abdication on foreign policy issues enables 
Supreme Court to legitimize and legalize governmental policies…‖798 Nevertheless, 
Israel provided to Palestinians the right to bring their appeals to the HCJ and in some 
rare occasions the court rules in favour of the Palestinians.  For example, in 1979 the 
Palestinians from a little village in the West Bank brought their case regarding illegal 
confiscation of their property by the state before the court. The High Court of Justice 
ruled in their favour and against state‘s decision to appropriate the land for building a 
Jewish settlement. It instructed the government to take out the settlers.
799
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Moreover, in the early 1990s Israel has undergone profound constitutional 
changes with regard to human rights norms. In 1992 it adopted two Basic Laws: 
―Human Dignity and Freedom‖ and ―Freedom of Occupation‖. Thus, for the first time 
in Israel‘s history the Knesset agreed to guarantee human rights such as rights to life, 
property, privacy, human dignity etc.
800
 
 Furthermore, the non-governmental organisations in Israel began to oppose 
the passive attitude of HCJ to the Palestinian conflict. These organisations started to 
bring issues related to the human rights of Palestinians to domestic as well as to 
worldwide attention by bringing cases related to the Palestinians before HCJ and by 
showing its legal decisions to mass media. Thus, although the HCJ still pays little 
attention to petitions derived from the Palestinians, it, nevertheless, became more 
sensitive to human rights‘ norms and more opened for public criticism.  
 
Transformation of military-societal relations 
 
The combination of global, regional and national changes has transformed 
military-societal relations in Israel as well. Originally, the Israeli defence force (IDF) 
had two tasks. It was not only a fighting force but also a key tool for nation building. 
As Ben-Gurion‘s put it ―while the first task of the IDF…is security of the State, that is 
not its only task. The Army must also serve as a pioneering education force for Israeli 
youth, both native- born and immigrants.‖801  The IDF enjoyed almost widespread 
domestic respect. A military record was associated with a status of full Israeli 
citizenship and was an essential precondition for obtaining a good job. There were 
almost no negative comments regarding the military bodies. The period since 1973 
has witnessed a dramatic transformation of military-societal relationship. The 
disapproval of Israel‘s public of issues related to security matters became visible. 
Israeli society began to question policies of governmental bodies, including IDF in 
general and the efficiency of the use of force in particular.  It started to demand a 
greater level of scrutiny of IDF activities and greater amount of transparency of the 
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military branch. For example in 1980s influenced by the mood of Israeli public the 
HCJ began to evaluate the IDF performance in the West Bank and Gaza.
802
  
 It is also important to note that changes have occurred not only in the 
perceptions of society towards Israel defence establishments but also in the military 
institutions itself.  This tendency can be proved by the fact that in 1990s many 
generals and important officers started to join the Council for Peace and Security, an 
organisation which promotes a territorial compromise with the Palestinians.  
To conclude, I believe that the constructivist theoretical approach brings an 
important asset into analysis. By explaining the shifting mood of the Israeli electorate 
through cultural constructs, it fulfils the gap that was left by RCT. In the next two 
sections I will address another very important assumptions elaborated by the 
constructivists. I will analyse the impact of ―type identities‖ of Israel and the 
interpretative practice of the Oslo documents on the peace process.  
 
1.7.3.2.2 Israel’s identities as a Jewish and democratic state 
 
In the previous case study aimed at the analysis of Israel-Egypt peace treaty I 
described the prominent ―type identities‖ of Israel, namely Jewish and democratic 
ones and showed the way of how these identities are viewed domestically and 
influence the attitude, law and structure of the official institutions in Israel. (See 
chapter III)  I proved that that Likud‘s decision to conclude the peace treaty with 
Egypt was largely a result of the interpretation of these dual identities of the state 
through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism.  
In this chapter I have a unique opportunity to investigate another interpretation 
of the above mentioned identities and its impact on the peace process.  
According to constructivism, the international system is a human creation 
constituted by a set of ideas, norms, thoughts and beliefs.
803
 Actors‘ preferences, 
perceptions, attitude and actions depend on their understanding of the world. There 
are, however, multiply possibilities of understanding the existing reality. The Labor‘s 
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interpretation of Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and democratic state was different from 
the Likud‘s perceptions of these two identities. The former viewed it through the 
lenses of a Labor or more secular Zionism rather than through a revisionist variation 
of this ideology. For the secular Zionists a historical attachment to the ancient land of 
Israel (Eretz Israel) is less relevant than a demographic factor and the application of a 
―Western-style democracy‖. According to their point of view a Zionist state and 
Israel‘s identities can not be maintain without a majority of Jewish people as well as 
democratic style of governance . Thus, the Oslo Accords which called for a territorial 
compromise on the basis of separation was a rational response to the Labor‘s 
interpretation of the Zionist ideology. In contrast to Likud, it argued that the 
incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza with a rapidly increasing Arab population 
of around 1.4 million people into Israel would ultimately lead to the collapse of 
Israel‘s identities as a Jewish and democratic state. The high birth rate of the 
Palestinians would make them the majority in Israel already in one generation.
804
 
―Jewish state would either have to deny equal political rights to a large segment of its 
permanent or indigenous population or free the prospect of having the Jewish state 
voted out of existence by Palestinians working through its democratic system.‖805In 
case Israel would not grant to the Palestinians Israeli citizenship or they voluntarily 
decided not to opt for it –the democratic character of the state would be undermined 
because the minority would rule over majority.
806
  
Along those interpretations of Israel‘s identities, a new leadership also 
challenged the principle of ―self-help‖ that is dominant in the national security 
paradigm and exercise an ongoing influence on the Jewish identity. This paradigm is 
largely based on the Zionist ideology, memory of Holocaust and perception that anti-
Semitism can not be eradicated.
807
  After the Labor party won the election, Rabin 
pointed out ―we must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in thrall for 
                                                 
804 See Mark Tessler (1989): ―Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel‖, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark 
Tessler (1989): ―Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ‖, pp.274-279; Theodore H. Friedgut (1995): 
―Israel‘s Turn Toward Peace. The Foundations of Israel‘s Negotiations for Peace‖, in: Robert O. Freedman: (1995) : ―Israel 
Under Rabin‖; See Karin Aggestam (1999): ―Reframing and Resolving Conflict, Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998‖,  
pp.58, Accessed: 2008, http://www.svet.lu.se/Fulltext/Aggestam.pdf 
805 Mark Tessler (1989): ―Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel‖, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler 
(1989): ―Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada‖, pp.279 
806
 See Mark Tessler (1989): ―Thinking about Territorial Compromise in Israel‖, in: Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark 
Tessler (1989): ―Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada ‖, pp.279 
807 See Uri Bar-Joseph (2000): ―Towards a Paradigm Shift in Israel´s National Security Conception‖, in: Efraim Karch 
(2000): ―Israel: The First  Hundred Years‖, Vol. 2: ―From War to peace?‖, pp.107 
 233 
almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, 
reconciliation, and cooperation that is sweeping the entire globe.‖808 
A radical shift of attitude with regard to the concept of national defence began 
to take place since 1975. For example, in 1975, Peres emphasis that Israel should rely 
on its own military power and enhance its military power in order to obtain peace, 
whereas in 1993 he believed that Israel should cooperate with international as well as 
regional organizations and to strive for peace in the Middle East in order to achieve its 
security.
809
 He stated that it is necessary to move from ―the traditional concept of 
national defence, which depends mainly on military and weapons systems, to the 
modern concept, which is of necessity based on political accords, and embraces 
international security and economic considerations.‖810 
The Labor‘s interpretation of Israel‘s identities as well as the principle of 
security provided a very different view with regard to the potential danger from 
keeping status quo in conflict or from the incorporation of the occupied territories into 
Israel.
811
 By dropping the principle of ―self-help‖ and by viewing reality through the 
secular Zionists, Rabin perceived a potential separation from the Palestinians as an 
opportunity for enhancing Israel‘s national security, sustaining Israel‘s democratic 
and Jewish character of the state.  
Moreover, the Oslo Accords provided a possibility to legalized and 
legitimized Labor‘s interpretations of the Palestinian conflict along the line of a 
unique nature of Israel as a Jewish democracy. The wording of the Oslo Accords 
enhanced the legitimacy of Israeli policy. First, it adopted the notation of ―disputed‖ 
rather than ―occupied‖ territory. Second, instead of ―withdrawal‖ the Oslo Accords 
use ―redeployment‖. Third, it refers to ―Palestinians in the territories‖ but not to the 
territories themselves. 
812
 Finally, the PLO by accepting not to use terrorism against 
Israel admitted perception of Israel that it was a terrorist organisation, rather than a 
liberation movement. 
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Thus, it can be posited that immaterial factors such as cultural elements, new 
concept of security and identities were crucial to the construction of Israeli interests 
and played a very important role in Israel‘s decision to sign the peace treaty with the 
PLO.  
1.7.3.2.3 Conflicting interpretation of the Oslo Accords  
 
The key task of the constructivism is the analysis of a socialisation process 
by which people obtain knowledge from their life experience. According to 
theoretical assumptions of this theory, actors of international system participate in 
the construction of reality through creation of new rules or interpretation of the 
existing ones in a new way.
813
 Their knowledge of the existing reality is constructed 
as a result of interpretation processes. This process might change the actual 
meanings of the rules, legal documents, concepts and principles in question. In 
other words, each interpreter creates her own knowledge of reality. Constructivists 
argue ―that all human beings construct their own version of reality, and therefore 
multiple contrasting ways of knowing and describing are equally legitimate…..each 
interpretation of reality is as valid as the rest.‖814 Thus, there are many possibilities 
of interpretation of reality and all those interpretations are justified.  
Application of this assumption to my case study suggests that both the PLO 
and Israel read the Oslo agreements through different lenses.  Thus, their 
conflicting interpretation of the nature of the agreement was a very important factor 
which made the successful conclusion of the Oslo Accords possible.  
Indeed, the Oslo Accords lied down a basis for conflicting interpretation. 
The architects of this agreement constructed it in a manner that made multiply 
possibilities of interpretation not only possible but also necessary. They virtually 
encouraged the parties to interpret the treaty in a way that was beneficial for 
them.
815
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The agreement was very vague and based on "constructive ambiguity." This 
term was first used by Henry Kissinger as a means of negotiating tactic. It refers to 
deliberate application of unclear wording to contentious issues in an agreement in 
order to enable conflicting parties to interpret it in a manner suitable for them.
816
 
The ―constructive ambiguity‖ of the DOP was in particular visible with regard to 
issues such as external security, the size of Jericho, the status of Jerusalem, the 
question of refugee, Gaza‘s settlement, the number of Palestinian prisoners to be 
realised, implementation of the agreement and a final settlement. 
According to Israeli interpretation of the Accords, the DOP stipulated that 
Israel would maintain control over external security, while the PLO insisted on a 
shared Palestinians/ Israelis control over external borders.
817
  On 30 August 1993 
Rabin noticed before the Knesset that ―We are prepared to be party to establishing a 
reality whereby the internal Palestinian security will be in the Palestinians‘ heads‘. 
Let me re-emphasise –the security of Israel, of settlements and Israelis, is in our 
hands, with the extensive interpretation we will imbue it with.‖818 Another disputed 
issue during the stage of the implementation of the Oslo accord was the size of the 
Jericho. Israelis defined it‘s of 25 square kilometres, while the PLO referred to the 
―Jericho district‖ of 390 square kilometres. Conflicting parties also could not agree 
on the definition of the settlements in Gaza. Rabin wanted to define the settlements 
as blocs, while Arafat referred to it as isolated communities. Finally, the most 
important controversial issue became a final settlement, including creation of a 
Palestinian state, future status of Jerusalem and the problem of the Palestinian 
refugees. Those issues were simply undefined in the agreement.
819
 Thus, both 
parties enjoyed a great degree of flexibility in interpreting those issues in a 
completely different way. The PLO was able to interpret and to present the Accords 
to the Palestinians in the land under Israeli control as a basis for the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza strip, all of the West Bank as well as 
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East Jerusalem. Israel, in contrast, perceived the agreement without any 
commitment from their side to the creation of a sovereign state. ―Israeli side was 
not prepared to concede the fact that the Oslo process would eventually lead to a 
Palestinian state-just as the Palestinian side was also reluctant to relinquish its 
ideological commitment and dream of regaining control of all of historic 
Palestine.‖820 
Thus, it can be concluded that conflicting parties‘ conflicting interpretation 
of the Oslo accord played a crucial rule in their ability to come to agreement with 
each other and to build domestic support of their decision.  
 
1.7.4 Conclusion 
 
The core argument of my study has been that the conclusion of the Oslo 
accords between Israel and the PLO has to be analysed through a theoretical 
framework elaborated in the first chapter of my dissertation on the combination of 
two theoretical approaches, namely rational choice and the constructivist theoretical 
framework. The application of those theories to my case study showed that the 
decision of conflicting parties to enter the negotiation process and to accept the 
outcome of the bargaining game depended on the entire complex of material and 
immaterial factors.  
According to the RCT, both parties acted as rational actors and achieved some 
material benefit from the peace treaty. In other words, they enter the negotiations and 
agreed to sign the Declaration of Principles because of both negative experiences 
derived from the conflict and positive expectations of future material gains such as 
political, economic and strategic benefits. For Israel it was strategic and security 
considerations as well as inability of the Labor party to find a different to the PLO 
negotiating partner. For the PLO the peace treaty was the means of survival. It 
provided a possibility for the PLO to gain power, economic resources as well as 
worldwide legitimacy.  
                                                 
820 Nadav Morag (2000): ―The Unambiguous Ambiguity: The Opacity of the Oslo Peace Process‖, in: Efraim Karsh 
(2000): ―Israel: The First Hundred Years. Vol. 2: From War to Peace?‖, pp.208  
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In my study I proved that rational choice materialistic explanations have 
important shortcomings which can be resolved by constructivist assumptions.  
Constructivism presents a unique opportunity to build bridge between theories of 
international relations and social theories.
821
 It provides a possibility to link material 
factors to ideational ones. By doing so, it fulfils the gap that was left by supporters of 
RCT.  
In accordance with the Constructivist theoretical framework I showed that the 
decision of conflicting parties to sign the peace agreement depended to a great extent 
on cultural developments in Israel; the Labor‘s interpretation of Israel‘s identities as a 
Jewish and democratic state through the lenses of a revisionist variation of Zionism; 
and on both sides‘ conflicting interpretation of the Oslo documents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
821
 See Andrea Teti (2004): A Role in Search of a hero: Construction and the Evolution  of Egyptian Foreign Policy, 
1952-67, pp. 1-2, Accessed: 2008,  http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/politics/research/readingroom/tetiJMS04.pdf 
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Conclusion 
 
The key goal of this dissertation has been to show that the outcomes of 
different negotiation processes can not be understood through the analysis of either 
material or ideational factors alone. I argued that the decisions of enemies to break the 
status quo and to conclude peace agreements should be analysed through both 
perspectives.  
In this respect, in the theoretical part of my dissertation I presented an 
innovative theoretical framework on the combination of RCT and the constructivist 
theory.  The former theory allows to investigate the process of transformation from 
conflict to cooperation through the entire complex of material factors, while the latter 
through the full array of ideational factors.  
The overall objective of the empirical part of my dissertation was to show 
the applicability of my theoretical framework to the real world. For this purpose, I 
selected three completely different case studies, namely the Austrian State Treaty of 
1955, the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 and the Oslo Accords of 1993. My 
findings suggest that in all case studies conflicting parties acted in a rational way and 
started to consider peace a better option than the use of force or status quo due to 
various material factors such as security, economic and strategic considerations. 
Nevertheless, in all above mentioned case studies RCT‘s explanations appeared to be 
not sufficient for explaining the question of what encouraged adversaries to seek 
peace with each other. The application of the constructivist theoretical framework 
helped me to address shortcomings of the former theory. It showed that immaterial 
factors played an important role in motivating the conflicting parties to come to a 
mutually acceptable compromise. In other words, actor‘s identities, beliefs and the 
ability to interpret the world through the different lenses ware not less crucial for 
successful resolution of conflicts than their rational calculations of material benefits. 
The key contribution of this dissertation was theoretical. It manifested itself 
in two ways. Firstly, after the end of the Cold War scholarly interest in the social 
constructivist theory has grown dramatically because the limitations of conventional 
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theories became more visible.
822
 Thus, IR constructivist empirical studies include 
many different issues such as analysis of the culture of national security (Peter J. 
Katzenstein 1996), humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), etc. However, little 
research is available on political outcomes of different negotiation processes in the 
social constructivist vein. Thus, by conducting my research in a largely unexplored 
domain, I contributed to the extension of the explanatory power of the constructivist 
theory. 
Secondly, in my dissertation I combined the constructivist theory with 
rational choice theory. I showed that despite that RCT and constructivism operate at a 
different level of philosophical abstraction and have completely different 
methodological as well as theoretical foundations, it is possible to supplement these 
theories with each other without undermining their key assumptions. I proved that 
they can be combined with each other as long as we accept that the RCT is based on 
the concept of instrumental rationality
823
 and the constructivist‘s postulate that reality 
is socially constructed.
824
 By doing so, I developed an analytical framework for the 
analysis of outcomes of different negotiation processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
822
 See K. M. Fierke (2001): ―Critical Methodology and Constructivism‖, in: Karin M. Fierke and Knud Erik 
Jorgensen (2001): ―Constructing International Relations, The Next Generation‖, pp.115; Alexander Wendt (1999):‖Social 
Theory of International Politics‖, pp.4; John Gerard Ruggie (1998): ―Constructing the World Polity, Essays on International 
Institutionalization‖, pp.11 
823 See Stephen L. Quackenbush (2004): ―The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory‖, Accessed: 2008, 
http://web.missouri.edu/~quackenbushs/rrct-ii.pdf 
824 See Ole Wæver (1997): ―Figure of International Thought: Introducing persons instead of paradigms‖, in: Iver B. 
Neumann and Ole Wæver (1997): ―The Future of International Relations. Master in the Making‖, pp.25 
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Abbreviation List 
 
ASU The Arab Socialist Union 
DOP Declarations of Principles 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EEC  European Economic community 
EU  European Union 
FAFO The Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science 
Hamas  Islamic Resistance Movement 
HCJ High Court of Justice 
IDF Israeli defence force 
IMF International Monetary Funds 
INGOs International Non-governmental Organisations 
IO International organisation 
IR International Relations 
ISGA  Interim Self-Government Authority 
MENWFZ  A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OPEC Organization of petroleum exporting countries 
PFLP The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PISGA Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority 
PLO  The Palestine Liberation Organization 
PNA Palestinian National Authority 
PNC  Palestinian National Council 
RCT Rational choice theory 
UN  United Nations 
UNL  The Unified National Leadership 
UN SCR United Nations Security Council Resolution 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Diese Doktorarbeit analysiert die Ergebnisse von unterschiedlichen inner- 
und zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungsprozessen. Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es 
nicht, praktische Vorschläge für den Abschluss von Friedensabkommen zu erarbeiten 
oder die Rahmenbedingungen zu identifizieren, unter welchen Vereinbarungen zur 
Konfliktlösung voraussichtlich unterzeichnet werden. Vielmehr ist es Ziel dieser 
Dissertation, einen innovativen theoretischen Ansatz für die Analyse der Ergebnisse 
von Verhandlungsprozessen zu erarbeiten und dessen Anwendbarkeit zu zeigen. 
Die vorliegende Studie besteht aus zwei Teilen, einem theoretischen und 
einem empirischen Teil. Der theoretische Teil setzt sich aus 3 Kapiteln zusammen. 
Das Hauptziel des theoretischen Teils ist die Erarbeitung eines kohärenten und 
innovativen theoretischen Ansatzes für die Darstellung des Zusammenspiels zwischen 
zwei theoretischen Ansätzen, nämlich der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung 
(Rational Choice Theory) und dem konstruktivistischen Ansatz (constructivist 
theoretical framework), um die politischen Ergebnisse unterschiedlicher 
Verhandlungsprozesse analysieren zu können. Folglich widmet sich das erste Kapitel 
der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung, und das zweite Kapitel behandelt den 
konstruktivistischen Ansatz. Das dritte Kapitel beschreibt den Nutzen einer 
Kombination beider Theorien in einem gemeinsamen Ansatz. 
Das wesentliche Ziel des zweiten Abschnitts, des empirischen Teils, meiner 
Dissertation ist, die Anwendbarkeit meines innovativen Ansatz in realen Situationen 
zu zeigen. Deswegen untersuche ich den Abschluss von drei gänzlich 
unterschiedlichen Friedensabkommen mittels Anwendung der oben genannten 
theoretischen Ansätze. Die erste Fallstudie behandelt den Österreichischen 
Staatsvertrag von 1955; die zweite Studie den Israelisch-ägyptischen Friedensvertrag 
und die dritte Fallstudie das Oslo-Abkommen von 1993.  
Der wesentliche Beitrag dieser Dissertation ist theoretischer Natur und zeigt 
sich in zweifacher Form.  
1) Nach Ende des Kalten Krieges wuchs das wissenschaftliche Interesse am 
Sozialkonstruktivismus dramatisch, weil die Restriktionen der 
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konventionellen Theorien offensichtlicher wurden825. Deswegen 
enthalten konstruktivistische Studien viele unterschiedliche Themen wie 
die Analyse der Kultur der nationalen Sicherheit (Peter J. Katzenstein 
1996), humanitäre Intervention (Finnemore 1996), etc. Nichtsdestotrotz 
gibt es wenig Forschung zu den politischen Ergebnissen 
unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsprozesse im sozialkonstruktivistischen 
Umfeld. Aufgrund meiner Studie in einem somit größtenteils 
unerforschten Bereich erweitere ich die Erklärungskraft der 
konstruktivistischen Theorie. 
2) In meiner Dissertation kombiniere ich die konstruktivistische Theorie 
mit der Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung. Obwohl die Theorie der 
rationalen Entscheidung und der Konstruktivismus auf unterschiedlichen 
Ebenen philosophischer Abstraktion operieren und gänzlich 
verschiedene methodologische als auch theoretische Grundlagen haben, 
zeige ich, dass es möglich ist, dass diese Theorien einander ergänzen, 
ohne dass ihre wesentlichen Annahmen unterminiert werden. Ich zeige, 
dass sie miteinander kombiniert werden können, wenn man akzeptiert, 
dass die Theorie der rationalen Entscheidung auf dem Konzept der 
instrumentellen Rationalität (instrumental rationality826) basiert, und 
man zusätzlich das konstruktivistische  Postulat, dass Realität sozial 
konstruiert ist,827 akzeptiert.  
Auf diese Weise entwickle ich einen Ansatz für die Analyse der Ergebnisse 
unterschiedlicher Verhandlungsprozesse.   
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